Shining a light on immigrant Asian and ethnic Asian Pacific Island communities to illuminate the cultural patterns that create order and define relationships, that nourish families and communities and keep them growing.
This project is sponsored by Wildflowers Institute with the assistance of the Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy and The Northern California Grantmakers.
Monica Abello
Michael A. Alconcel
Angileny Aloha
Luisa Antonio
Po Yee Au
Khamouane Baccam
Michael Balaoing
Reylita Bambilla
Koy Ban
Toni Bautista
James Bell
Vida Benavidez
Rufina Blarama
Precious Bugarin
Alice P. Bulos
Pamela Burdman
Hugh C. Burroughs
Santos Busquit Calida
MC Canlas
Fahm Chan
Im Chan
Lauren Chan
May Tak Man Chan
Peggy Chan
Somphone Chansombath
Kao Chiem (Yaofey) Chao
Lau C. Chau
Arthur Chen
Tony Chen
Xiu Ben Chen
Ying Chen
Zhao Qian Cheng
Man Mei Cheung
Touch Chhnin
Huyn Chhun
Hoeuy Chin
Touch Chhrun
Eric Crystal
Elaine Chu
Winnie Chu
Anni Chung
Pui Fong Chui
Rann Chun
Edward T. Daranouyongs
Huan Hao Deng
Khamkeung Douangmala
Prasert Douangmala
Reht Eam
Abigail K. Eang
Aurora Echano
Antonio C. Edayan
Lynn Fang
Joey B. Flora
Kevin Fong
Robert Fong
Seng Kouay Fong
Edwin E. France, Jr.
Betty Fung
Vic Gaerlan
Tessie Guillermo
Pong Kit Ha
Bunna Hang
Sandra R. Hernández
Jon Hill
Bill Ong Hing
Sherry Hirota
Pein Sin Ho
Sam Ho
Ruth Holton
Xiu Fang Chu Hom
Chin Houy
Li Fang Huang
Lixing Huang
Khorn Ing
Ek Ioeun
Alan Jenkins
Vurn Juang
Chham Keo
Khoun Keokhounavong
Khountheung Keokounnavong
Oune Kham Keomanyjjan
Chareunphan Keopradabsy
Johnny Keopradabsy
Khoeut Ker
Khom Keung
Lee Keung
Oun Kham
Samoeun Khieu
Annie Khoonsrivong
Hack Khoonsrivong
Kirby Khoonsrivong
Leck Khoonsrivong
Michael Khoonsrivong
Phillip Khoonsrivong
Robert Khoonsrivong
Saeng Khoonsrivong
Ing Khorn
Lolita Kintanar
Kathy Lim Ko
Sovanna Koeurt
Tith Kong
Stewart Kwok
Him Mark Lai
Michael Lam
Sanny Lam
Miu Ha Lam
Khampha Lasavongsy
Henry Lau
Alex Laurant
Ly Kim Lay
Thomas C. Layton
Alexander Lee
Evelyn Lee
Faye Woo Lee
Irene Lee
Mindy Lee
Peter Wei Wood Lee
Bernard Leung
Jian Hua Li
Wie Li
Laura Liamsithisack
Lawrence Liamsithisack
Lindsay Liamsithisack
Bounsong Linhasack
Toei Linhasack
David Liu
Linda S. Lloyd
Ek Loeurn
Men Lon
Sareth Lon
Lak Long
Rolland C. Lowe
Joseph Lucero
Naomi Lucks
Phanny Lun
Heng Luong
Sue Luu
Lay Kim Ly

Wildflowers Institute gratefully acknowledges the contributions that
the following persons have made to the development of Studies 2000.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loan Ly</th>
<th>Pha Rasavongsy</th>
<th>Sophan Soun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maly Manith</td>
<td>Em Rattanak</td>
<td>Phone Sourirayansy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bingo Marasigan</td>
<td>Crisanto Raya</td>
<td>Kamtom Soyvira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel Marasigan</td>
<td>William C. Richardson</td>
<td>Christina Sprague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katrina Mariano</td>
<td>Boeun Rin</td>
<td>Nusaath Suphan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig McGarvey</td>
<td>Nim Ros</td>
<td>David Sweet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Mean</td>
<td>Chai Chan Saechao</td>
<td>Bernadette Sy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurice Lim Miller</td>
<td>Diana Saechao</td>
<td>Johnny Syphanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco L. Montero</td>
<td>Farm Seng Saechao</td>
<td>Tony Syphanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khamsavang Namthao</td>
<td>Fouchiane T. Saechao</td>
<td>Cindy Yu Tam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasakhone Namthao</td>
<td>Kouichoy C. Saechao</td>
<td>Fouvang C. Tang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loei Nem</td>
<td>Kuay Seng Saechao</td>
<td>Alyce Bezman Tarcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hak Nheth</td>
<td>Lai Seng Saechao</td>
<td>Chhay Than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billy Norasith</td>
<td>Ou Luang Saechao</td>
<td>Ol Thath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chanpheng Norasith</td>
<td>Tafou Saechao</td>
<td>Carolyn Tower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayfonh Norvang</td>
<td>Vurn Kuang Saechao</td>
<td>Paul Tsang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banyanh Nousaarth</td>
<td>Warn Luang Saechao</td>
<td>Aileen Tung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macy Nucup</td>
<td>Chanchoy T. Saeliee</td>
<td>Kun Tuy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophan Nusatt</td>
<td>Chan On S. Saeliee</td>
<td>James Tyler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banyen Nusaath</td>
<td>Saeng Finh Saeliee</td>
<td>Min Ua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thanth Ol</td>
<td>Nai Poo Saeparn</td>
<td>Khatharya Um</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Omi</td>
<td>Foo On K. Saephan</td>
<td>Juliet Valerio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy Ou</td>
<td>Fahm Chanh Saephan</td>
<td>Sally A. Vargas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narith Ourk</td>
<td>Nai Chiem Saephan</td>
<td>Shirley Vuong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Pacia</td>
<td>Meuy Seng Saetern</td>
<td>Ut Hong Yong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorali Palma</td>
<td>Moung K. Saetern</td>
<td>Pounh Yongphouthone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jia Fu Pan</td>
<td>Dey Kouei Saeteurn</td>
<td>Sarah Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheng Zhan Pan</td>
<td>Weum Tso Saeteurn</td>
<td>Cynthia Wong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra Pel</td>
<td>Peggy Saika</td>
<td>Cui Xia Wong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joachim Perlas</td>
<td>Khamtanh Sananikone</td>
<td>Francis Wong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophal Phath</td>
<td>Wath Santhikham</td>
<td>Jai Lee Wong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven C. Phillips</td>
<td>Sakhom Sarisuk</td>
<td>Janile Wong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saloun Pho</td>
<td>Miguel A. Satut</td>
<td>Kent Wong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konesy Phommavong</td>
<td>Tain Savoeung</td>
<td>Lai Ming Wong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phou Phommachack</td>
<td>Tien Savoeung</td>
<td>Kent Woo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maniseng Phonepackdy</td>
<td>Thomas Chep Schao</td>
<td>Richard Woo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunry Phornasavanh</td>
<td>Toni Shapiro-Phim</td>
<td>Daunchay Xayabanha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sty Phornasavanh</td>
<td>Moira Shek</td>
<td>Hak Xion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidaphone Phouvixay</td>
<td>Gary B. Siriyamkham</td>
<td>Jeffrey Xu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dy Pin</td>
<td>David Situ</td>
<td>Dianne Yamashiro-Omi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kek Poeun</td>
<td>Xiu Zhen Situ</td>
<td>Pei Fang Yan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hom Prachit</td>
<td>Se Siv</td>
<td>Sue Yeng Yan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sy Prachit</td>
<td>Sopheap Siv</td>
<td>Ping Yee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janny Prak</td>
<td>Khorn Sok</td>
<td>Nat Yinn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samnang Prak</td>
<td>Koy Sok</td>
<td>Sokhom You</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Proschan</td>
<td>Dee Somsanith</td>
<td>Jin Len Yu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamgeun Rajaphone</td>
<td>Eang Son</td>
<td>Jue Yu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judy Rasamy</td>
<td>Eng Sopheap</td>
<td>Li Zhen Zhang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sophat Sorn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Wildflowers Institute gratefully acknowledges the generosity of the foundations that made Studies 2000 possible.

The California Endowment
The California Wellness Foundation
The Annie E. Casey Foundation
Community Foundation Silicon Valley
The Ford Foundation
Wallace Alexander Gerbode Foundation
The James Irvine Foundation
W. K. Kellogg Foundation
The David and Lucile Packard Foundation
The San Francisco Foundation
Acknowledgments

Seeing the Patterns provides a way of learning about communities from a cultural perspective.

The Program Itinerary gives the July 23–25 agenda.

The Overview offers statistics on Asian and Pacific Islander Americans in California and a perspective on Asian Pacific American communities. This section also contains a review of national immigration and refugee policies for Asians and Pacific Islanders in the United States.

Community Profiles describe the Cambodian, Laotian/Khmu, Chinese, Filipino, and Iu Mien communities in Northern California. The profiles provide data on these people in several counties and maps showing the cultural formation of some of the communities. The profiles also contain short articles about an individual in each community as well as some background information on Asia and the circumstances that led to the migration of people to the United States. The profiles of the five communities are listed in the order of the date of the site visit:

- Cambodian
- Laotian and Khmu
- Chinese
- Filipino
- Iu Mien

The Bibliographies section contains both an annotated bibliography and a list of reference books and materials.

The Committees section lists the members of the Steering Committee, the Advisory Board, and the Funders Committee.

The Wildflowers Institute section introduces the institute’s Board of Directors, staff members, and consultants for this project.

Notes
Bring the image up close to your face without attempting to focus. Slowly move the image away from you, and keep your eyes relaxed. Before you reach arm’s length, a picture should jump out at you.
WHAT DO YOU SEE WHEN YOU LOOK AT AN ETHNIC COMMUNITY?

You may see the people at the cultural core—some wise elders and people with a clearly defined hierarchy of roles and responsibilities—who hold the traditional values and virtues of the community and keep them strong.

You may see the people in the cultural interface—the generations born in this country, especially the youth, who are open, flexible, and prone to experimentation—who ripple outward from the core onto the shores of a new community.

You may see the centers of gravity that hold the people and give their lives nourishment and meaning—the spiritual centers, the women sharing stories and supporting each other as they cook, the grandparent and grandchild engaged in heart-to-heart communication, and youth creating music together.

You may see some or all of these patterns that underlie a community, or you may not. It all depends on how you’ve learned to look.

More than two thousand years ago, during the Western Han dynasty, Chinese artisans created a special bronze mirror. If you look into the mirror, you will see your own face reflected back. But if you shine a light through the mirror in a certain way, you will see revealed an intricate pattern that is otherwise hidden. This is the real pattern of the mirror: To see it, you must look with the right light.

Wildflowers understands that what we see is all in how we look. Studies 2000 is shining a light on immigrant Asian and ethnic Asian Pacific Island communities to illuminate the cultural patterns that create order and define relationships that nourish families and communities and keep them growing.
CULTURAL CORE AND INTERFACE

Neighboring Community

Core

Interface

Interface

Neighboring Interface

Side View

Top View

Varying ratios of core size to interface size
**STUDIES 2000 AGENDA**

**Sunday, July 23, 2000**

4–5:30pm  Arrival and check-in, The Fairmont Hotel, atop Nob Hill, San Francisco, 415.772.5000
5:30pm  Reception at the Fairmont Hotel (Pavilion Room)
6:00pm  Opening remarks by Hanmin Liu
6:10–6:30pm  Music presentation by composer Francis Wong
6:30pm  Dinner with Steering Committee members
7:45–8pm  Status of Asian Pacific American communities by Richard Woo
8–8:15pm  Discussion

**Monday, July 24, 2000**

7am  Breakfast on your own
7:30am  Depart from the Fairmont Hotel to Stockton; briefing on the bus on the Cambodian and Laotian and Khmu communities by Francis Wong, Weisheng Liu, and community leaders
9–12noon  Track One: Site visit to the Cambodian community, APSARA, 3830 N. Alvarado Avenue, Stockton, 209.944.1700. Hak Nheth, Sovanna Koeurt, Bunna Hang, and Kun Toy are the Steering Committee coordinators for this site.
9–12noon  Track Two: Site visit to the Laotian and Khmu community, Weber Point, Center and Channel Streets, Stockton, 209.547.7801. Robert Khoonsrivong is the Steering Committee coordinator for this site.
12:15–1:30pm  Lunch with city and NGO leaders of Stockton at Weber Point for both tracks
1:30–2pm  Travel to the Pittsburgh Marina by bus and transfer to the MV Harbor King, Red and White Fleet, 415.447.0591
2–6pm  Boat ride on the Delta; reflection session facilitated by Wildflowers Institute Staff and community leaders
6pm  Arrive at Pier 43 1/2, San Francisco; travel by bus to the Fairmont Hotel Dinner on your own
Tuesday, July 25, 2000

7:30am Buffet breakfast and briefing on sites in San Francisco Bay Area by Michael Reichert and Wildflowers Staff (Pavilion Room)

8am Track One: Depart for Oakland by van

9–12 noon Site visit to the Lao Lu Mien community, Lao Lu Mien Culture Association, 485–105th Avenue, Oakland, 510.635.8358. Kouichoy Saechao and Moung Saetern are the Steering Committee coordinators for this site.

8:15am Track Two: Depart for South of Market, San Francisco, by van

8:45am Site visit to the Filipino community, South of Market, San Francisco. Alice Bulos, MC Canlas, Luisa Antonio, and Bernadette Sy are the Steering Committee coordinators for this site.

8:15am Track Three: Depart for San Francisco Chinatown by van

8:30am Site visit to the Chinese community. Anni Chung, Evelyn Lee, Faye Lee, Rolland Lowe, and Kent Woo are the Steering Committee coordinators for this site.

12–12:30pm All Tracks: Return to the Fairmont Hotel by van

12:30–1:30pm Lunch at the hotel (Pavilion Room)

1:30–2:30pm Reflections of the Site Visits by Some APA Community Leaders, co-convened by Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy and facilitated by Professor Bill Ong Hing (Pavilion Room)

2:30–3pm Break

3–5pm Discussion about strategies for working with the APA communities, facilitated by Wildflowers Institute, Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy, and Northern California Grantmakers (Pavilion Room)

6pm Depart for dinner by bus

6:15–9pm Dinner at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Charles LaFollette, 2620 Larkin Street, between Lombard and Chestnut Streets, San Francisco, hosted by Sandra R. Hernández, M.D., The San Francisco Foundation
CALIFORNIA ASIAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER AMERICANS
by Ying Ying Meng

Population

- According to the 1998 current population estimation by the Commerce Department’s Census Bureau, there were 10,507,280 Asians and Pacific Islanders (APIs) in the United States, or 3.9% of the total population.¹

- California remained the state with the most APIs at 3.9 million, or 37.5% of the U.S. API population in 1998. New York was a distant second at 994,601, followed by Hawaii at 756,597, Texas at 556,355, and New Jersey at 452,524 (Figure 1).²

Figure 1
States Ranked by API Population in 1998


- The number of APIs residing in California jumped by 990,330 (a 33.6% increase) between 1990 and 1998, the largest increase of any state.³ From 1980 to 1990, APIs grew by 116.7% and were California’s fastest-growing population.⁴

- The major increase in the API population in California came from migration (62%) between 1990 and 1997.⁵

- The Asian population is the fastest-growing group in all four regions in the United States. In 2025, the nation is expected to have 21 million Asians. At that time, California is expected to remain the state with the largest share of Asians, 41%.⁶

- APIs occupied about 12% of the population in California in 1998, the third-largest race group in the state (Figure 2).⁷
Figure 2


- Los Angeles County in California maintained its position in 1998 as the county in the United States with the highest number of APIs (1.2 million). Honolulu County, Hawaii, was second (566,111), followed by Orange County, California (361,199); Santa Clara County (San Jose), California (359,029); and Queens County, New York (332,393).  

- Los Angeles County in California also led all counties in the United States with the largest increase of APIs (more than 233,620) from 1990 to 1998. Orange County, California, had the second-largest increase for this eight-year period (108,370), followed by Santa Clara County (San Jose), California (92,547); Queens County, New York (89,720); and San Diego County, California (90,135).

Table 1. California Counties with the Largest Asian and Pacific Islander Population, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTY</th>
<th>API POPULATION IN 1998</th>
<th>INCREASE OF API SINCE 1990</th>
<th>PERCENT INCREASE OF API SINCE 1990</th>
<th>PERCENT OF API IN COUNTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOS ANGELES</td>
<td>1,227,246</td>
<td>233,620</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORANGE</td>
<td>361,199</td>
<td>108,370</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANTA CLARA</td>
<td>359,029</td>
<td>92,547</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN DIEGO</td>
<td>296,848</td>
<td>90,135</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALAMEDA</td>
<td>270,951</td>
<td>69,409</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN FRANCISCO</td>
<td>269,694</td>
<td>55,991</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN MATEO</td>
<td>149,670</td>
<td>38,603</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACRAMENTO</td>
<td>143,063</td>
<td>44,193</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTRA COSTA</td>
<td>117,782</td>
<td>39,094</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN BERNARDINO</td>
<td>90,711</td>
<td>28,425</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN JOAQUIN</td>
<td>86,962</td>
<td>25,613</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two-thirds of California’s 1990 API population were immigrants. Thirty percent of the California API community was linguistically isolated (8% for the general population).* In addition, 43% of the Asians and 17% of the Pacific Islanders five years and older do not speak English very well as compared with 16% of the general population.10

Among Asians and Pacific Islanders in California in 1990, Chinese and Filipinos were the largest ethnic groups, followed by the Southeast Asians, including Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians (Figure 3).11

In 1990, Daly City, San Francisco, and Stockton, California, had the largest proportion of APIs in their total population in the United States, 43.8%, 29.1%, and 22.8%, respectively.12

Figure 3

![Pie chart showing the distribution of APIs in California in 1990.](image)


Economic Status

APIs had a bipolar income distribution with a higher median income than the general population in California ($39,769 vs. $35,798) and a lower per capita income ($13,733 vs. $16,409) in 1989. APIs living below the poverty line were also overrepresented (14.1% vs. 12.5%). Southeast Asians were the most impoverished with poverty rates from 27% to 62.6%, and Filipinos and Japanese were the least impoverished (5.8% and 6.5%, respectively).13

*Based on the census definition, a household is classified as “linguistically isolated” if it includes a person age 14 years or over who does not speak English, or a person age 14 years or over who speaks a language other than English and does not speak English “very well.”
• In 1990, 12% of API households received social security compared with 24.6% of the white population. Fourteen percent received public assistance income (Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Supplementary Security Income, and General Assistance, excluding medical care assistance) compared with 7.2% for whites.¹⁴

• An analysis of the March Supplements of the Current Population Survey showed a dramatic 47% reduction in the number of API immigrant food stamp recipients that was most likely a result of the enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law.¹⁵

• Census data for 1990 showed that APIs over 65 years had a relatively higher percentage (35.3%) with an annual income below $5,000 compared with 23.6% of white households between 65 and 74 years.¹⁶

• API unemployment rate was 5.6% and varied from 3% to 20% among different API ethnic groups, while the general population was 6.6% in 1990.¹⁷

• Asians have a bipolar distribution in terms of jobs. For example, the Chinese had more workers in managerial and professional specialties than whites (35.25% vs. 31.94%) and more people 16 and over not in the labor force than whites (35.5% vs. 33%).¹⁸

• In high-tech industries Asians hold 20% of all jobs. Asian managers and technical professionals compose 16% of this workforce. In addition, Asians make up 43% of Silicon Valley electronics assembly workers.¹⁹

• In the San Francisco Bay Area, 53% of all textile and apparel workers are Asian women and 28% are Asian men.²⁰

Education

• APIs had a bipolar distribution in education in 1990. Thirty-four percent of APIs had bachelor’s degrees. There were more API people with less than a fifth-grade education (7.9% vs. 4.7% of the general California population). Over 51% of Asian Indians 25 years and over have earned bachelor’s degrees while 59% of the Hmong, 48% of Cambodians, and 45% of Laotians had less than a fifth-grade education. Fewer API men had less than a fifth-grade education (5.8%) compared with API women (9.8%).²¹

• During the 1998 school year, 24.6% of the students enrolled in public schools in California were Limited English Proficiency (LEP) students. Of these, 40.1% of the Asian students were classified as LEP students.¹ ²²

¹ Asian LEP students speak the following primary languages: Burmese, Cantonese, Chaozhou, Gujarati, Hindi, Hmong, Indonesian, Japanese, Khmer, Khmu, Korean, Lahu, Lao, Mandarin, Mien, Pashto, Punjabi, Taiwanese, Thai, Toishanese, Urdu, Vietnamese, and other languages of China.
• The top ten languages spoken by LEP students during the 1997–98 school year in California were Spanish (1,140,197), Vietnamese (43,008), Hmong (30,551), Cantonese (25,360), Filipino (20,062), Khmer (18,694), Korean (15,521), Armenian (13,584), Mandarin (10,380), and Lao (8,343). There were 5,192 LEP students speaking Mien in California.23

• In California, 11.1% of the enrolled students in 1997–98 were APIs, while 4.9% of the teachers had an API ethnic background.24

Health

• During 1996–97, 24% of APIs in California were uninsured, up from 21% in 1994–95. The increase in uninsured rates among APIs exacerbates the gap between whites and APIs. While nearly one in four APIs now lacks health insurance, whites continue to have the lowest uninsured rate among all ethnic groups (15%).25

• First-generation Asian children were found to be more likely (26%) than second-generation children (6%) to lack a usual provider or source of health care.26

• In terms of prenatal care among APIs in California, a report in 1996 indicated rates varied according to ethnic group. Japanese American women were the most likely to receive prenatal care, with only 10% not starting prenatal care in the first trimester. In contrast, 34.7% of Laotian women did not start prenatal care in the first trimester.27

• In 1992, APIs had the highest incidence of tuberculosis with 52.3 new cases reported per 100,000 population compared with 5 per 100,000 for whites, and 14.9 per 100,000 for California’s general population.28

• APIs had 305.8 deaths per 100,000 compared with 511.3 per 100,000 among whites for those 75 years and over in California during 1989–91. This may be due to elderly immigrants returning home in their waning years.29

• Homicide among young adults age 15–24 was the second leading cause of death for API males in California and accounted for more than one in five deaths from 1989 to 1991. For women it accounted for one in ten deaths.30

• Based on average annual age-adjusted cancer incidence rates between 1988 and 1992 in California, cervical cancer incidence was higher among API women than among white women (11.7 vs. 7.5 per 100,000).31
• The 1992–94 aggregated California State Behavioral Risk Factor Survey (BRFS) showed that 13% of APIs were at risk for hypertension. Filipinos had the highest prevalence of hypertension (24.5%), followed by Chinese (15.7%).

• Domestic violence was a growing problem for the API community. There have been 1,242 arrests of APIs for domestic violence, compared with 21,190 among whites, but underreporting is very likely.

• There was a 17% increase in the amount of reported hate incidents directed at APIs in 1996. The rise is particularly significant because the FBI reported a 7% decrease in violent crime in 1996.

2 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
11 Asian/Pacific Islander Data Consortium, Our Ten Years of Growth.
12 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
25 R. Levan, M. Kagawa-Singer, and R. Wyn, Declining Medi-Cal Coverage Leads to Increasing Uninsured Rate among California’s Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders. UCLA Center for Health Policy Research, April 1999.
30 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
New Roles/New Communities

Asian Pacific Americans have accumulated a distinctly unique history and a set of experiences that span over two hundred years. Our history is in constant evolution as new Asian Pacific immigrants create and reinvigorate Asian communities. For second-, third-, and fourth-generation Asian Pacific Americans, this reinvigoration of Asian communities is shaded with similarities and differences. There are contrasts between “old” Chinatowns and the formations of “new” Chinatowns, Little Saigons, Manitowns, and Koreatowns. In the brown-tone photographs from our parents’ albums, we see vibrant families, businesses, language schools, cultural centers, parades, and festivals. Based on our history of living through the civil rights movement, the third world strike (the ethnic identity movement at University of California, Berkeley, protesting the lack of education of the history of people of color), the Japanese American redress/reparations movement, and Vincent Chin, we can predict that with the increasing visibility of Asians in isolated regions as well as in cities, there will be backlashes to our increased numbers, manifested in violent racist attacks. As Asian Pacific Americans, we occupy an interesting “space” in the spectrum of race relations because we are neither white nor black. We are both victims and perpetrators of racism. Because we are a people of color, no matter how “American” we are, we will be perceived as “foreigners.”

As second- and third-generation Asian Pacific Americans, we witness the cultural estrangement between parents and their children because we were also once angry youth who desperately fought to shed our “Asian-ness” to become more Americanized, realizing in hindsight that acculturation has come at a high price. Many have lost their native language, thereby losing communication and connections with our past heritage, with relatives, with our culture. We can empathize with elderly newcomers who struggle to survive because our grandparents were alone without access to services in their own language and culture to comfort them. We feel the confusion newcomers experience in institutional systems because our parents were in their place not too long ago, asking us to interpret for them, to fill out their forms, to troubleshoot when they were taken advantage of. It is from the depths of our experiences that we express concern for low-income non-English-speaking immigrants because we know what they and their children will endure to become American.

This overview provides a summary of the main policy issues expressed by local and national Asian Pacific American (APA) social service and advocacy organizations. The conceptual framing of the issues and the advancement of specific recommendations take place within a broader context of race relations in the United States. With respect to contemporary public policy, Asian Pacific Americans frequently encounter the problems of invisibility, marginality,
and neglect. This is particularly disturbing given the dramatic growth and increasing heterogeneity of the nation’s APA population. A thorough examination and rethinking of the social location, condition, and status of APAs needs to occur to understand the ramifications of shifting APA demographics on city neighborhoods, schools, and community and civic institutions—particularly when this rapidly growing population is dominated by non-English speakers and a whole generation removed from more established APA communities.

It is an enormous challenge to capture and convey the current status of the Asian Pacific community in such a brief format. A more expanded analysis of the status of APA communities is warranted. Reports and information gathered for this paper made it very clear that relevant data sets are sparse, and that there is a significant lack of available disaggregated data on APAs that can provide a more focused assessment of specific APA subgroups. There is also a lack of opportunities for community organizations to network, share information, and build relationships that can advance a broader policy agenda. Many APA organizations voiced the need to support efforts to strengthen networks between APA organizations locally, statewide, and nationally.

Fighting the Stereotype

Part of the problem resides in the perception that APAs do not directly experience material deprivation or social disadvantage by race. Based on select social indicators (e.g., median family income, educational attainment, poverty rates), APAs as a whole seem to be relatively well off. This perception disguises a number of things. First is the fact that APAs are a heterogeneous and diverse formation of Asian ethnic groups. As a broad category, they exhibit a bimodal pattern with respect to key social indicators of well-being—some groups are extremely “successful,” while other groups continue to be mired in poverty. Second, it is important to note that there lurks beneath these glowing social indicators a repertoire of ideologies and cultural representations that are evoked in particular moments to render Asian Americans foreign, subversive, and suspect. The Asian campaign finance donor controversy and the recent Chinese nuclear spy scandal provide examples of this. After many generations, Asian Americans are still regarded as perpetual foreigners. This has a chilling effect on their mobility and acceptance as true Americans.
**Becoming Visible**

The dominant black/white paradigm of race in the United States has also hindered a full appreciation and understanding of the specificity of the APA experience. How we think about, engage in, and politically mobilize around racial issues has been fundamentally shaped by the prevailing black/white paradigm of race relations. Historical narratives of racial minorities are often cast in the shadows of the black/white encounter, and contemporary conflicts between a number of different racial/ethnic groups are understood in relationship to black/white conflict. We need to move beyond this bipolar model and examine how different groups are stratified in the broader racial hierarchy. Specific social policies (e.g., affirmative action, immigration reform, community economic development) have different implications and consequences for different racial minority groups. Politics, policies, and practices that are framed in dichotomous black/white terms miss the ways initiatives either empower or disempower Asian Pacific American communities.

**Struggling with Fragmentation**

Ethnic and cultural diversity within the APA community accounts for multiple and relatively small community-based organizations. For example, there are an estimated thirty-plus Asian Pacific subgroups with distinct languages, dialects, and cultural and religious practices. This diversity is reflected in the community through fragmented services across ethnicity, age, and service issues. Within one ethnic community, there are likely to be separate organizations serving the elderly, youth, children, women, young girls, and delinquent youth; organizations addressing education, mental health, and physical health; and nonservice organizations such as historical societies, cultural centers, and political clubs. This scattering of organizations embodies historical, cultural, linguistic, and political factions within one ethnic community. Some of them have been shaped by funding sources. Efforts need to be made to support the convening of these organizations to share information and engage in creating “seamless” approaches to services. This engagement of similar yet disparate organizations is complex and often politically sensitive. Many organizations have responded to the need to create service-based coalitions; however, there is little funding available to support the infrastructure that is developed, causing many to fall apart. These “community councils” require financial support and staffing to ensure sustained participation and results.

Philanthropy’s “big picture” approach often incapacitates and silences resource-poor organizations and communities. Many of these small and fragmented organizations are unaware of the role that philanthropy can play in seeding innovative approaches and creating new linkages and networks that are so desperately needed. The integration of these small segregated organizations can serve as a challenge and an opportunity for philanthropy to move beyond its traditional mode of operation.
**Shifting Identities**

APA community service organizations are struggling to meet an increased demand for services from emerging new immigrant communities. This challenge comes at a time when government funding is becoming more stringent. There are few studies on the impact of new government regulations on ethnically based community organizations. For example, agencies that receive funds for San Francisco’s summer youth programs are required to serve youth citywide. What was once a program for ethnic-specific youth with common heritage, cultural base, language, and

experience is altered and diminished to accommodate serving a broader constituency. Though many of the APA organizations have tried to integrate Asian American history and culture segments into their programs, it has been very difficult to sustain their relevancy, particularly for non-Asian youth.

Many of California’s job-training funds come with similar stipulations. As a result, ethnic-specific groups, particularly those based in Chinatowns, Manilatowns, and Japantowns, are providing services to a broad range of ethnic groups diffusing their original mission. This continually weakens the historical and cultural context in which these organizations operated and, though it may be “politically correct” to open up these programs to serve broader constituencies, diffusion has led to identity confusion.

Organizations are asking themselves once again, “Who are we? What is our role in the Asian community?” Some have lost their “Asian-ness” and have had drawn-out debates about changing their names to reflect new populations they now serve. Discussions center on whether to become “generic” and issue focused and to move away from being ethnic specific. A well-grounded fear expressed by many founding leaders is that by becoming generic, the historical legacy from which the organization was founded will be lost forever.

These significant changes have implications on the organization’s infrastructure, staffing relations, board composition, and governance structure. Included in this shifting paradigm are organizations whose actual numbers are diminishing through interracial marriages and lack of immigration such as the Japanese American community. We need to recognize the shifting nature of these organizations, and the inherent need for strategic planning, reassessment, and realignment of organizational identities. Just as important, we need to value their legacy and give recognition to their experience in empowering disenfranchised communities.
Leadership Crisis

Leadership is instrumental in articulating the vision and new direction of organizations that are experiencing these difficult transitions. Executive directors are typically mired in day-to-day survival and have few opportunities to participate in activities or issues outside their organization and to understand and discuss broader trends with peers. We have seen high executive turnover rates in APA organizations. New executive leadership characteristically comes with limited nonprofit administrative experience and a different set of values and perspectives on the role of community and community-based organizations. The context in which the new leaders come from and operate differs from that of many of the “old-timers,” whose approach and leadership style is grounded in the civil rights era. There is no formal mentoring opportunity given between “old-timers” and “new-timers.” As each executive transition occurs, the knowledge base and the networks are lost.

This “generation gap” in community leadership has simultaneously brought tensions and new opportunities. For new immigrant communities, it is difficult to find leaders who can function comfortably within the American system, access resources, and represent the needs of their communities. It is essential to address this leadership issue within emerging communities and to create strategies that will utilize the accumulated experiences, knowledge, and networks of existing leaders.

New Perceptions and Relations

Unlike the initial wave of Asian immigrants who rarely returned to their home countries, new Asian immigrants frequently shuttle and divide their time between their country of origin and the United States. Because their affinities and affiliations are more global in nature, there is less identification with local communities and their issues. Within the same ethnic group, a variety of identity positions are present along nativity status and generational lines.

Racial Justice

The rally to end racism and fight for equal access that served to unite diverse Asian populations in the civil rights period is not understood by many new Asian immigrant groups. The notion of participation in pan-Asian coalitions also seems foreign and questionable. Throughout history, many ethnic groups have suffered under the dominance of Japan, China, or Europe. This historic prejudice or fear is deeply instilled as they create their own community structures. Mistrust between APA subgroups adds to the complexity of building networks and forging collaborations between agencies and communities.

The civil rights movement played a critical role in the birthing of many APA organizations. Recently arrived Asian immigrant populations are unaware of this civil rights legacy, and new immigrant community leaders and organizations function under a different context.
Color-Blind But Color-Conscious

In this period when affirmative action is being dismantled, civil rights legislation is challenged, and a “color-blind” society is touted as the solution to our differences, the premise upon which many established APA organizations operate is being questioned. Government and private funding sources are beginning to ask whether support for ethnic-specific purposes serves to further segregate ethnic groups. The word “balkanization” in funding circles has been used to describe the negative implications of ethnic- and gender-specific funding. Deeper thinking and discourse needs to occur to determine whether ethnic-specific funding, or balkanization, further separates racial and ethnic groups from mainstream participation, or if this approach supports and empowers communities so that they can sustain their own culture.

Though the argument to create a color-blind society may be seen as well intentioned, it does not erase the more broadly held racist perceptions that exist about our differences. As long as skin color makes us visible, and our language and cultural ways differ from those of mainstream America, the perception that we are “outsiders” will continue. To claim that we need to be color-blind may potentially discount and undermine the importance and value of our cultural heritage and may serve to erode the need for culturally based and linguistically accessible remedies to social disparities.

Common Voices

A survey of APA organizational concerns reveals some common themes and issues that speak to the specificity of conditions in APA communities. They identify both unique and widely shared problems that can only be addressed by interventions that reflect the diverse ethnic populations served. Information was drawn from policy recommendations issued by the following local and national organizations: Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics (LEAP), Chinese American Voter Education Committee (CAVEC), Asian Immigrant Women Advocates (AIWA), Asian Pacific Islander Youth Network, Children and Youth Council, ARC Associates, Asian Community Mental Health Services (ACMHS), National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium (NAPALC), Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (SEARAC), Asian and Pacific Islanders’ California Action Network, Association of Asian Pacific Community Health Organizations (AAPCHO), Asian and Pacific Islander American Health Forum, National Asian Women’s Health Organization (NAWHO), Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy (AAPIP), Asian/Pacific Islander Data Consortium (APIDC), and Asian American Pacific Labor Alliance (AAPLA).
Unprecedented Growth-Increased Diversity

The 1990 Census Bureau reported APAs as the fastest-growing minority population (95%), outpacing Hispanics (53%) in growth percentages. Though Hispanics remain the largest minority population in numbers, the APA percentage growth reflects dramatic population surges in states throughout the country. In some states where Asians were once virtually invisible, the population has doubled, presenting new challenges regarding race relations, social service systems, and community institutions.

Within the APA population, clearly the largest growth continues to come from new immigrants. It is estimated that over 65% of the APA population is foreign born. This percentage was derived from the 1990 census, which is now somewhat dated. California Department of Education researchers estimate that 75% of the APA school-age population will be immigrants or children of immigrants whose dominant home language is not English. They expect these children will face major language, cultural, and social adjustments because school districts are unprepared at the instructional level to meet the need for English-language instruction. AAPIP’s latest report, An Invisible Crisis: Educational Needs of APA Students, brings to light the critical lack of bilingual/bicultural teachers and counselors to address the changing school demographics.

The most significant growth is in the Southeast Asian population. Between 1980 and 1990 the following populations increased dramatically: Cambodian (818%), Laotian (212%), Hmong (1,631%), and Vietnamese (151%). The migration of people from Southeast Asia represents the single largest group of refugees ever to enter the United States. Within this population we know there is great economic, education, religious, linguistic, and cultural diversity. We know that they face low levels of English-language proficiency and the highest level of poverty among the APA subgroups.

LEAP’s report, The State of Asian Pacific America: Policy Issues to the Year 2020, forecasts that children, young adults, and the elderly are the fastest-growing age cohort among Asian Pacifics. Children and young adults (0-24) are projected to increase 107% by the year 2020. The elderly population (age 65 and older) will increase 355%. Of this population, foreign-born elderly will increase 510%, constituting the majority of the foreign-born population.
Language Rights and Access to Services

A tremendous amount of energy and debate is focused on the issue of health care reform to ensure accessible and quality health care services for all Americans. Within health care reform it is just as important to embrace language rights and cultural competency as basic civil rights issues. Asian Pacifics have the highest percentage of persons characterized as “linguistically isolated.” In California in 1990, an estimated 33% of all APA households were “linguistically isolated” as compared with 28% of Spanish-speaking households and 15% of households speaking “other” languages, according to data collected and analyzed by the Asian/Pacific Islander Data Consortium. This already has had serious ramifications on multiple levels of service provision.

Karen Narasaki, executive director of the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium (NAPALC), discussed numerous violations of existing civil rights laws where language access has been denied for APAs who try to utilize the legal, health, and government social service systems. A recent report by the Institute for Wisconsin’s Future found that the state’s program to end welfare has not provided bilingual caseworkers or translated materials for the large welfare-dependent Hmong population. The report cites a possible civil rights violation, prompting a federal inquiry and potential loss of funds if evidence of civil rights violation is found. Similar cases are emerging in California.

Health Care and the Need to Disaggregate Data

Most studies aggregate the APA population as a homogeneous group, which results in a misread of the real conditions faced by APA subgroups. There is a tremendous lack of information that has been disaggregated, making it even more difficult for community service organizations to raise funds. Tessie Guillermo, executive director of the Asian American Health Forum in San Francisco, has provided undaunted leadership on this issue. Her health studies have focused on disaggregated data within the APA population and its implications for health care services.

For example, current data on APAs in aggregate indicate that breast and cervical cancer rates are lower than the national average, but these data mask the fact that among the APA subgroups, Native Hawaiians have the highest rate of breast cancer incidence and mortality rates in the nation, while cervical cancer incidence rates for Vietnamese are five times higher than those of whites. Native Hawaiians are also five times more likely to die of stomach cancer than their white counterparts and have a higher prevalence of diabetes.
Data on teen pregnancy rates in aggregated numbers reveal that APAs have the lowest birthrate percentage in comparison to other racial minorities. However, disaggregate data reveal that the birthrate for Laotian teens under age 18 was 8.7% compared with 2% for white teens. For Cambodians, Hawaiians, and Guamanians, it was twice the national norm. Laotians have the highest birthrates for those under 18 of all subgroups in California. Data on tobacco use reveal smoking rates for Filipinos as 24%, Koreans as 36%, and Laotians as high as 72% in California. Without disaggregate health data, incorrect assumptions can be made about health care needs. The National Center for Health Statistics revealed that over 28% of Asian Pacifics in the United States are uninsured, compared with 20% of whites. But again, we have yet to see disaggregated data for low-income APA subgroups, which are likely to have high numbers of uninsured.

Poverty rate is also another critical index that is often misunderstood. A recent report released by the Urban Institute on Racial and Ethnic Disparities stated that “. . . the poverty rate for Asians (14%) as an aggregate group is close to [that of] Whites (13%) while poverty rates for Blacks, Hispanics and Native Americans are twice as high.” However, a disaggregate analysis for APA groups of poverty rates reveals that 64% of Hmong, 43% of Cambodian, 35% of Laotians, and 26% of Vietnamese are below poverty.

Cultural Competency and the Need for Bilingual Providers

There is also a severe shortage of bilingual/bicultural staff to meet the needs of non-English speakers. AAPIP’s education report found that the teacher-student ratio for limited-English-proficient students in schools is 1:21,000 for Cambodians and 1:1,113 for Hmong. Similar disproportion exists in health and mental health care services where there is a severe shortage of trained bilingual/bicultural health care workers.

The demand for qualified bilingual personnel can be heard in all sectors of our society. Karen Narasaki of NAPALC reminds us that although courts are required to provide translators, a northern Virginia judge announced that he would no longer order translators in cases involving only misdemeanors because of their backlog. In most states there has been an increasing number of health and safety code violations and citations levied against Asian small businesses by inspectors. The local inspectors are generally monolingual English, and forms and information on code requirements are not translated in Asian languages. Not only financial resources and entry level jobs are lost, but many immigrant small-business owners are forced to close their doors.
Training programs focused on bilingual workers are virtually nonexistent as are programs to prepare providers in how to provide culturally sensitive services. Although organizations such as Asian Health Services and Asian Community Mental Health Services have provided leadership in creating countywide translation services, there continues to be a need for ways to recruit potential bilingual workers from new immigrant communities.

**Mental Health Issues**

Asian Pacific mental health organizations, such as Asian Community Mental Health Services in Oakland, California, face the challenge of addressing the cultural taboos in seeking counseling and support outside the family structure. The “shame” factor in the mental health arena significantly limits the actual number of people seeking mental health care. Resources are needed to support culturally sensitive outreach strategies. Those who do receive care are typically referred by other agencies and usually are at a crisis point.

Of the few small-scale subgroup studies that exist, findings reveal high levels of depression and posttraumatic stress disorder, particularly among the APA immigrant population who have limited language and education. In San Francisco during 1993–94, Asian youth under 18 represented the second-largest racial ethnic client group utilizing the San Francisco Community Mental Health System (Asians constituted 30% of the system’s clients, up from 19% in 1992–93). Among American-born college students in California, research indicates higher levels of stress and anxiety compared with non-Asian students.

**High Suicide Rates**

AAPIP’s An Invisible Crisis reveals high rates of depression and mental illness, particularly among APA female students. The suicide rate among Asian Americans has risen threefold in the last two decades. The suicide rate among Chinese American youth is 36% above the national average, while the suicide rate among Japanese American youth is 54% higher. Asian American youth show significantly lower rates of self-esteem when compared with Caucasian and African American youth. Immigrant grade school students who experience family disruption, the stress of not speaking English, the difficulties of living between two cultures, and racial discrimination have high dropout rates and gang participation. The stress of isolation and family disruption has also impacted the non-English-speaking elderly population. Elderly Chinese and Japanese women have the highest suicide rate of all racial and ethnic groups, including European Americans.
**Youth Violence**

In most urban settings with large populations of new immigrants, the number of Asian youth gangs has increased. The immigrant status of many Asian parents combined with economic demands of both parents working results in their children being left unsupervised during nonschool hours. Southeast Asian, Thai, Samoan, Tongan, Korean, and Filipino youth are becoming more vulnerable to gangs and high-risk behavior.

Partially in response to the politically hostile environment against immigrants, the number of hate crimes against APA youth has increased. In 1995, mental health staff at Kaiser Hospital in Oakland reported an alarming increase in Asian youth patients who were joining gangs or were school dropouts. Upon further investigation, the Kaiser staff found that these youth had all been victims of hate crimes.

**Increasing Rates of Domestic and Hate Violence**

Incidents of domestic violence in all segments of the community are spreading beyond husband-wife disputes to abuses against extended family members. This is due to the interdependence between family members to help with immigration, employment, education, child care, and the shifting role of women in newcomer families.

The number of racially motivated crimes has also increased. In 1993, when APA civil and legal rights organizations began their campaign for hate crime policy, the number of incidents reported was 155. In 1996, the number increased to 534 incidents. According to the 1998 crime audit published by the NAPALC, 429 racially motivated crimes were committed against Asians nationally. Of these, South Asians (India) were targeted in significantly larger numbers. There is a significant undercount of these crimes primarily because immigrants, who are often the victims, are reluctant to report such attacks.

Using data from Los Angeles’ Human Relations Commission, Professor Karen Umemoto’s research on APA hate crimes brings to light the role of APAs as perpetrators of hate crime as well as victims of it. These findings indicate the importance of addressing racism within APA communities and for the inclusion of APAs in hate reduction strategies. As mentioned earlier in this report, many prejudicial notions are embedded in historic events and are often expressed within our integrated communities. Living in a multiracial environment is a new experience for many APA immigrants, and few tools are available that teach how to co-exist in the midst of language and cultural differences.

**Labor Force Participation Rates**

The Southeast Asian Resource Action Center (SEARAC) of Washington, D.C., Asian Immigrant Women Advocates (AIWA) of Oakland, and the Asian American Pacific Labor Alliance (AAPLA)
of Los Angeles and New York focus on the high rates of underemployment and unemployment of less educated and unskilled new immigrant groups. Some of the most pressing issues APA workers face are (a) lack of literacy skills, (b) lack of knowledge of their rights as workers, and (c) lack of collective voice and representation. Asian immigrant workers are oftentimes subject to unsafe working environments and are the target of labor violations and unfair treatment such as subminimum wages, racial discrimination, sexual harassment, and denial of employee benefits such as medical insurance and retirement pensions.

Of Southeast Asians 16 years of age and older, labor force participation rates were 29% for Hmong, 47% for Cambodians, 58% for Laotians, and 65% for Vietnamese. Not surprisingly, Southeast Asians (64% of Hmong, 43% of Cambodian, 35% of Laotian, 26% of Vietnamese) and Pacific Islander (17%) groups have higher rates of poverty compared with the total U.S. population (13%).

**High Concentration in Low-Wage Jobs**

There is a high concentration of Asian immigrants working in low-wage, entry-level jobs in the garment, electronics, hotel, janitorial, and other manufacturing and service industries in the United States. Many of these workers are victims of hazardous working conditions.

AIWA’s survey of the garment industry found that 85% of the garment workers in the San Francisco Bay Area are Asian immigrant women. The study also revealed that 80% of the workers do not receive overtime pay and many were not even paid minimum wage.

In Silicon Valley in California, the electronics industry has drawn a large concentration of Asian immigrants, particularly women. Researchers have found a high number of Asian immigrant women in the circuit board assembly line. According to a study conducted by Professor Karen Hossfeld of San Francisco State University, about 70% of the entry-level labor force in the electronics industry was composed of immigrant women. A manager she interviewed told her that “There’s just three things I look for in entry-level hiring. Small, foreign, and female.”

**Low Levels of Educational Attainment**

AAP’s *Invisible Crisis* calls attention to the need to review disaggregate data within the Asian Pacific populations. When we break down these numbers, a different picture about APA educational attainment emerges.

Contrary to the belief that all Asians are well educated, disaggregated data reveal that 96% of Hmongs, 93% of Cambodians, 95% of Tongans, and 93% of Laotians have less than a bachelor’s degree.
Language Testing and Remedial Education

Among Asian Pacifics, 73% were found to speak a language other than English compared with 13.8% of the total U.S. population. In 1990, the Council of Chief State School Officers estimated that only 36% of all U.S. students who had limited proficiency in English had been identified as such, revealing a major gap in the system’s ability to identify and meet the educational needs of limited-English-proficient students.

Subtractive Bilingualism

Though learning English is required for academic achievement, AAPL’s study takes a nontraditional position by enforcing the need for language preservation as an overlooked component to academic achievement and overall student well-being and self-esteem. Studies have found patterns of subtractive bilingualism: as immigrant and refugee youth learn English, they lose their native language. Losing one’s language and the ability to communicate with immigrant non-English-speaking family members cuts these youth from their culture and history and leads to misunderstanding and lack of support from family members. This has forged a separation between family members, causing family dysfunction.

The issue of bilingual education has both united and separated APA parents as they struggle over education issues. Similar to Spanish-speaking parents, who believe in English-only immersion programs as a requirement to gain economic stability and success, many APA parents also believe in the “English-only” strategy. Others believe in preserving their indigent language as a means to communicate and instill cultural heritage and pride. Yet American society and the political mainstream do not value a multilingual approach and, at least in California, the English-only movement has gained significant momentum and support.

Conclusion

Newly emerging populations are confronted with perpetual language and cultural barriers. Mainstream institutions and social service programs are struggling to address this diversity and are overwhelmed with the lack of information, materials, and personnel to respond in linguistic and culturally appropriate ways. Review of issues presented by the various community-based organizations reveals the critical need to look beyond the initial presentation of aggregate data. In understanding the vast array of subgroups within the APA populations, aggregate data do not reveal the true conditions of smaller, newer immigrant populations. If we dig deeper, a very different picture emerges,
which helps to define strategies that can address these issues. Mainstream social problems are not exclusive to white Americans, because many of the same issues are also found in APA communities, such as domestic violence, elder abuse, drugs and alcohol, and youth gangs. Language and culture can be interpreted as barriers to mainstream services; however, there is a growing movement within APA community-based agencies to recognize and work with language and culture as assets in designing service strategies that are appropriate and more effective.

**Summary of Policy Recommendations**

The following is a compilation of policy recommendations drawn from various reports submitted by APA organizations. Common threads focus on addressing cultural and linguistic barriers to services, the need for a clearinghouse of research information, bilingual and bicultural materials, the recruitment and training of more bilingual/bicultural service providers, and the importance of providing continuing leadership training and nonprofit technical assistance. Another consistent recommendation was for inclusion of service populations in the design and implementation of programs to reinforce community building and the empowerment process. Support to increase opportunities for collaboration between APA organizations and larger external institutions such as state/county social services was cited repeatedly. Emphasis was placed on creating comprehensive systems of care, which linked health, mental health, social services, job training, housing, and education. Critical to sustaining collaborations and new networks is the funding to keep them together and operating. Collaboratives were weakened if maintained on a volunteer basis. To increase the public’s understanding and awareness of the diversity within the APA population, advocacy and education need to be strengthened.

**Recommendations**

**Advocacy/Research/Public Policy**

* Establish an APA research center that will serve as a central repository of existing APA data sets and will focus on identifying and addressing research and data needs for the APA community. This center can serve as a clearinghouse where community agencies and individuals can access accurate information on APA populations and receive information about programs and services. An important function of this center will be to develop culturally sensitive and bilingual materials to serve government services, community service providers, and schools.
* Support research that targets high-risk, underserved APA subgroups for whom inadequate information is not available by looking at secondary analysis/disaggregation of existing statewide data sets to understand what the true indices are for APA underserved populations.
* Support longitudinal studies that incorporate the influence of migration and acculturation behaviors, economic differences, dual language proficiencies, educational levels, and variations in community infrastructures.
* Develop an evaluation and monitoring system to measure the impact of service strategies and hold publicly supported institutions accountable.
* Research and develop inclusive curriculum to be used in our schools that will accurately portray the diversity within the Asian Pacific subgroups.
* Increase the cultural competency of all social service personnel serving the APA population.

**Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Services**
* Increase services that are bilingually accessible and culturally sensitive to the diverse APA subgroups.
* Provide training for non-Asian service providers serving Asian populations on constituent culture, practices, and traditions.
* Increase opportunities for basic English-language instruction and language programs to sustain the mother language and treat both with equal importance.
* Improve English-language assessment of APA language-minority students. Upgrade inservice training to teachers and counselors to increase their insight, sensitivity, and skills in working with APA students and provide translated information about the American education system, their rights, and responsibilities as parents.
* Increase educational opportunities for new APA immigrants to learn about workers’ rights and access to health care, housing, and legal services.
* Increase services to meet the needs of the major growing segments of the APA population: children, older youth, and the elderly.

**Strong Leadership**
* Increase opportunities for civic participation and engagement particularly in the areas of parent-school relations and neighborhood issues.
* Support advocacy efforts that protect immigrants and their families from discrimination.
* Seek input and include Asian Pacific community leaders in the design and development of policy and programs.
* Promote linkages for emerging APA leaders and organizations with established organizations in mentoring relationships.
* Strengthen and create leadership training programs, particularly for underrepresented populations.

**Technical Assistance to APA Organizations**
* Support efforts that will lead to stronger APA organizations, particularly those that are immigrant led. At the same time, recognize that the teaching of solid administrative and leadership skills needs to be provided.
* Support bilingual/bicultural technical assistance providers.

**Multiracial Alliances**
* Support cross-cultural and cross-ethnic coalitions focused on addressing common community/neighborhood issues.
* Support efforts to build alliances between individuals and organizations within the APA population.
Introduction

The terms Asian American, Asian Pacific American, and Asian Pacific Islander are used to describe residents of the United States who themselves are from or whose ancestors were from the Asian Pacific region of the world. Although the term Asian Pacific American (APA) may bring to mind someone of Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Korean, Filipino, or Asian Indian descent, the U.S. Census Bureau actually includes thirty-one different groups within the Asian Pacific designation. For example, someone of Cambodian, Guamanian, Samoan, Thai, Laotian, Hmong, Hawaiian, or Tongan extraction would also fall within this category.

The Asian Pacific American population in the United States is not large relative to the entire U.S. population. The approximately 10.5 million Asian Pacific Americans represent only 3.9% of the total population. Filipinos and Chinese are the two largest groups, followed by Japanese, Asian Indians, Koreans, and Vietnamese.

The Exclusion Era

An understanding of the evolution of Asian Pacific America commences with an appreciation of the history of immigration policies and laws and of the social and political forces that motivated them. The history is one of arrival and cycles of acceptance (motivated primarily by the desire for cheap, rootless, and dependable labor) and rejection (fueled by racial prejudice and fear of economic competition); U.S. relationships with the countries of Asia; and the specific laws that produced and reflected these cycles.

The cycles of rejection and acceptance are represented by federal immigration laws and state and local policies. State and local leaders supported the recruitment of Asian immigrants for the fields, the mines, the railroads, or as domestic help as well as discriminatory rules on landownership, business operations, education, civil rights, and taxes.
Two quite intriguing schemes governing immigration and resettlement emerge from examining the evolution of immigration policies. Before 1965 the United States aimed to admit Asians only for specific purposes, exclude them altogether if necessary, and always keep them in check. In 1965 the United States fundamentally restructured its immigration scheme with little consideration for the potential consequences on Asian Pacific America. It established a uniform framework for the admission of all people that, in large part, is still in operation today. These changes aspired to a new global egalitarianism. They relaxed the nation’s historical efforts to control Asian immigration, though perhaps only inadvertently.

For 350 years after Columbus, Asian immigration to America was virtually nonexistent. The United States imposed no restrictions, but Japan, Korea, and China beginning in the seventeenth century executed immigrants upon their return. In other Asian countries, there appears to have been less desire, need, and ability to resettle in the United States. Few Asians did so before the mid-1800s.

The Chinese were the first to enter in number. Driven by the rice shortage and the devastation of the Taiping Rebellion and drawn by the lure of gold, Chinese peasants and laborers began making the long journey in the 1840s. Early on, the Chinese were officially welcomed. The simultaneous opening of both China and the American West, along with the discovery of gold in the 1840s, led to a growing demand for and a ready supply of Chinese labor. Drawing praise for their industry and abilities and for their willingness to accept lower wages, Chinese were considered almost indispensable. Despite the official encouragement of importing Chinese labor, the Chinese who arrived soon encountered fierce racial animosity. This prejudice, exacerbated by fear of competition from aliens, prompted calls for restrictive federal immigration laws.

The tension between a desire for Chinese labor and a nativist resentment of Chinese immigrants is best captured by the commotion surrounding the 1868 Burlingame Treaty. China agreed to end its strict control over immigration, and the United States would benefit from the free immigration of the Chinese to the American continent as an essential element of trade and commerce. But only two years later, Chinese immigrants were judged unworthy of citizenship in the Nationality Act of 1870. Five years later, Congress enacted the Page Law prohibiting the importation of Chinese women for immoral purposes. But the overzealous enforcement of the statute effectively barred all Chinese women from entering. In 1879 a measure was placed on the California ballot to determine public sentiment on Chinese immigration: 900 favored the Chinese, while 150,000 were opposed.

Responding to growing clamor, the Forty-seventh Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act on May 6, 1882. The law excluded laborers for ten years, and effectively slammed the door on all Chinese immigration. It did permit the entry of teachers, students, and merchants, but their quota was quite small. After a series of extensions, the exclusion law was made permanent in 1904.
The early history of Japanese immigration differs considerably from that of the Chinese. The Japanese opening to the West commenced with the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry and four U.S. naval ships in Tokyo Bay in 1854. Perry forced the Japanese to sign the Treaty of Peace and Amity, in which Japan agreed to open its doors to foreign trade, helping to bring about the Meiji Restoration of 1868. As Japan emerged from feudalism and isolation into modern industrialization and international commerce, a few hundred Japanese immigrants came to the United States between 1860 and 1880. Like the initial wave of Chinese immigrants, Japanese laborers were at first warmly received by agricultural employers in Hawaii and California. Few came to the mainland, so little effective political pressure was incited to exclude them.

By the turn of the century, unfavorable sentiment toward the Japanese grew as their laborers began to migrate to the western United States. Japanese agricultural workers were more financially independent than the Chinese. Their determination to secure their place in American society was greatly resented by a rising chorus of white workers. After Japan’s crushing victories over China in 1895 and Russia in 1905, policymakers viewed exclusion as a means of controlling a potential enemy. Japanese laborers were eventually restricted but not in conventional legislative fashion. Japan’s emergence as a major world power meant that the United States could not restrict Japanese immigration in the heavy-handed, self-serving fashion with which it had curtailed Chinese immigration; the risk would be to offend an increasingly assertive Japan. To minimize potential disharmony between the two nations while retaining the initiative to control immigration, President Theodore Roosevelt negotiated an informal agreement with Japan. Under the terms of the so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement reached in 1907 and 1908, the Japanese government refrained from issuing travel documents to laborers destined for the United States. In exchange for this limitation, Japanese wives and children could be reunited with their husbands and fathers in the United States.

At the turn of the century, the United States was beginning its relationship with the Philippines as it was changing its view toward Japan. After the U.S. victory over Spain in 1898 in the Spanish-American War, President McKinley concluded that the people of the Philippines, then a Spanish colony, were unfit for self-government and that the United States had to take over. This action met with violent resistance from many Filipinos who had yearned for independence from colonial domination.

After the takeover, Filipinos were regarded as noncitizen nationals of the United States who could enter without regard to immigration laws. Yet fewer than 3,000 Filipinos, most of them farmworkers in Hawaii, had immigrated by 1910. However, they became a convenient source of cheap labor after Japanese immigration was restricted in 1908. Just as the Chinese exclusion laws had encouraged employers to look to Japan, so the limitations on Japanese immigrants led to an intense recruitment of Filipino laborers because of their open travel status. They were praised as especially hardworking, submissive, and reliable.
By the late 1920s, Filipino laborers looked beyond Hawaii and the trouble began. They came to California, for work not only on citrus and vegetable farms, but also in homes and at other low-wage service positions. White resentment of Filipinos soon boiled over into violence, and numerous anti-Filipino outbursts erupted in California between 1929 and 1934. During the severe unemployment of the Great Depression, exclusionists suggested that Filipinos should be repatriated for their own benefit as well as for that of the United States. Policymakers had a major obstacle, however. Filipinos could travel legally, so until the Philippines was granted independence, Congress could not exclude them.

An unlikely coalition of exclusionists, anticolonialists, and Filipino nationalists managed to band together to promote the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934. This was everything exclusionists could hope for. When their nation would become independent on July 4, 1946, Filipinos would lose their status as nationals of the United States. Those remaining here would be deported unless they became immigrants, but the annual quota that would go into effect immediately was only fifty visas.

The advent of the twentieth century witnessed the entry of other Asians, such as Asian Indians, but in even smaller numbers. Larger numbers of poorer workers from India found labor opportunities in British colonies. A few thousand who immigrated, most of them men, settled primarily in California, and most of them found agricultural jobs.

Even small numbers of Asian Indians managed to agitate the Asiatic Exclusion League. Racial and economic nativism was again at the core of the agitation. The Asian Indians competed for agricultural jobs and were willing to work for lower wages in other jobs. Nativists used violence in an attempt to force Asian Indians out of local jobs, then persuaded federal officials to block their entry, on the grounds that they were poor and would need public assistance. Eventually, and as part of a renewed xenophobia that was aimed at southern and eastern Europeans as well, Congress enacted restrictive immigration legislation in 1917. Part of the act created the “Asiatic barred zone,” extending the Chinese exclusion laws to include all other Asians. The zone covered South Asia from Arabia to Indochina, as well as the adjacent islands. It included India, Burma, Thailand, the Malay States, the East Indian Islands, Asiatic Russia, the Polynesian Islands, and parts of Arabia and Afghanistan. Only Filipinos and Guamanians, under U.S. jurisdiction at the time, were not included.

**Post-World War II Changes**

World War II brought about the first cracks in the wall of Asian exclusion. When the United States and China became allies against the Japanese during the war, Congress agreed to repeal some aspects of the exclusion laws. Despite stiff opposition from the American Federation of Labor and from some veterans groups, Congress in 1943 passed the Chinese
Repealer. For the first time, Chinese immigrants were allowed to become naturalized citizens, and persons of Chinese descent were allotted a yearly quota of 105 immigrant visas. On July 2, 1946, two days before the Philippines regained independence under Tydings-McDuffie, Congress also extended naturalization rights to Filipinos and Asian Indians, allotting an immigration quota of 100 for each country as well. In 1952 naturalization benefits were extended to other Asian immigrants, but the immigration laws retained strict racial immigration quotas that had been adopted in 1924. An Asia-Pacific triangle was drawn—consisting of countries from India to Japan and all Pacific islands north of Australia and New Zealand—from where a maximum of 2,000 Asians were allowed to immigrate annually.

Finally, after efforts by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower to remove the racist immigration quotas from the laws, President Johnson was able to push through reform in 1965 that largely had been based on efforts made by President Kennedy prior to his assassination. His vision of visas on a first-come, first-served basis gave way to a narrower and more historically parochial framework that provided few if any obvious advantages for prospective Asian immigrants. The new law allowed twenty thousand immigrant visas from every country not in the Western Hemisphere. The allotment was made regardless of the size of the country, so that mainland China had the same quota as Tunisia. Except for a new refugee category that some Chinese might be able to use, the new provisions were not expected to bolster Asian immigration. Since most of the visas were reserved for family reunification, policymakers believed that countries of Asia (and Africa), with low rates of immigration before 1965, might in fact be handicapped, since their smaller numbers presumably meant there were fewer people here who had relatives there.

**Asian Pacific America Prior to 1965**

A close look at the development of Asian Pacific American communities reveals that, whether entirely anticipated or not, immigration laws and policies played a highly influential role in the making and remaking of the various communities. Family structure, vocational ambitions, economic achievements, residential patterns, political status, and community size all reflect the imprint of decades of strong controls. Each group’s demographics implicate distinctive historical patterns.
Chinese Americans
Combined with the antimiscegenation laws then in place in California and Oregon, the Page Law and the exclusion laws deprived male Chinese laborers of the opportunity to marry and have children. By 1890 men outnumbered women among Chinese Americans almost 27 to 1. The Chinese American population declined from more than 100,000 in 1882 to about 85,000 in 1920. Throughout this period the vast majority of Chinese settled in California, in part because the majority of those who had worked in other states, such as on the railroads, moved there. The Northeast historically attracted Chinese diplomats, students, and merchants. Many Chinese settled in rural areas, working in gold mines and on farms and starting up grocery stores, restaurants, laundries, and other small businesses. Those who settled in rural areas were characteristically from rural areas of southern China. Small mining, railroad, and farming communities developed in the late 1800s and continued through the early 1900s. Toward the mid-1900s, many children of rural families went to college and later resettled in metropolitan areas, abandoning the labor-intensive businesses of their first-generation parents. Ineligible for citizenship and the target of harsh social attitudes and an array of repressive state and local laws, Chinese found themselves segregated and excluded. Many laborers were forced to resettle in urban Chinatowns. Small business was particularly prominent in the development of these Chinatowns—particularly San Francisco’s. China’s alliance with the United States during World War II helped to precipitate socioeconomic changes in Chinese America. Demand for Chinese men and women in the wartime industries was strong. A new professional class began developing. In 1940 less than 3% held professional and technical jobs; by 1950 more than 7% did.

Japanese Americans
With the legalization of immigration from Japan in 1885, many Japanese accepted offers of work on the plantations of Hawaii. In the 1890s, almost 27,000 entered the United States. At the turn of the century, recruitment of Japanese laborers became more organized, and 130,000 immigrated between 1901 and 1910. The Gentlemen’s Agreement reduced the number of entrants to about 84,000 between 1910 and 1920. But because wives and children could enter, the population steadily increased. By 1965 the community consisted of more women than men. Although Japanese were first recruited to Hawaii, many who went on to the mainland owned small businesses and worked as tenant farmers in the rural West. Initially, California, Washington, and Oregon afforded the Japanese the opportunities to own their own farms and businesses. By the time California’s Alien Land Law (prohibiting aliens from owning land) was enacted in 1913, about 4,000 Japanese in California were agricultural landowners or lessees, and 20,000 Japanese were farmworkers. In response to the land laws, many made their way to major cities. By 1940, 37,000 lived in Los Angeles, 11,000 in Seattle, and 5,000 in San Francisco. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the civilian government acceded to unprecedented military orders that subjected all West Coast Japanese first to curfews and then to forced evacuation into detention camps. Eventually 120,000 Japanese Americans, most of them citizens by birth or lawful resident aliens, were interned in camps scattered throughout the
country. Internment did not produce sweeping changes in Japanese settlement patterns, even though many were bitter over the racial hostility on the West Coast. Since areas surrounding the camps offered few economic opportunities, most had little choice but to return to the West Coast. The alien land laws and internment experience forced Japanese Americans to adapt to urban life by redefining their vocation and place in society. Often pooling resources, they were able to start restaurants, laundries, barbershops, and other service enterprises. Others turned to gardening. The war and internment disrupted a developing professional class, but in general from 1924 to 1965, more and more second-generation Japanese Americans (ironically, many who were World War II veterans using the GI bill) were able to attend college, and many developed greater interests in science and technical fields.

Filipino Americans
Until Philippine independence, the privileged travel status of Filipinos became a highly used commodity. By 1920 almost 27,000 Filipinos were counted in the census, virtually all of them working in the fields of Hawaii. Between 1920 and 1934, about 34,000 entered each year; the majority were men. Many Filipino men married non-Filipino women, particularly Mexican women, because of antimiscegenation statutes. The Independence Act passed in 1934 discouraged entry, and by 1940 the population had decreased by 10% to under 100,000. Like China, the Philippines became a critical ally of the United States during the World War II and about 10,000 Filipinos took advantage of special citizenship opportunities presented to war veterans. After other Filipinos took advantage of the naturalization rights afforded in 1946, many were able to petition for women and children to join them in the United States. By 1965 the ratio of men to women in the community was closely balanced (1.25 to 1). Filipinos tended to resettle in major urban areas in California, where Manilatowns or Little Manilas materialized in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Salinas, Stockton, and Fresno. By 1960, 80% resided in urban areas. The large numbers who had entered in the 1920s often harvested fruit and lettuce on the West Coast. In the off-season they provided service labor for hotels, restaurants, and private homes as busboys, cooks, hotel chauffeurs, dishwashers, domestic help, and gardeners. More than 80% of the 45,000 Filipinos on the mainland in 1930 were farm laborers. Gradually a modestly sized class of professionals began to emerge. By 1960 more than 12% were professionals or managers, but 32% were still employed as farmers or farm laborers.

Korean Americans
Before 1965 the Korean American population was quite small. About 11,000 agricultural workers, predominantly men, were recruited for Hawaiian plantations before 1905, largely from an unemployed urban class. When Korea was a protectorate and then a possession of Japan from 1905 to 1945, Japan refused to allow any significant Korean emigration. The Korean American population, which stood at 5,008 in 1910, increased to only 8,568 in 1940. The overwhelming majority lived in Hawaii. Even after the partition of Korea in 1945, few South Koreans were able to immigrate because of the general Asian exclusion laws in effect. Between 1952 and
1965, South Koreans demonstrated an increasing interest in immigration to escape political unrest and economic instability. The Korean War (1950–53) caused economic decline. The entry of immigrants after 1952 and their children born in the United States pushed the population to about 45,000 by 1965. The ratio of men to women was fairly even. Most Koreans were attracted to the West Coast. In addition, Denver, Salt Lake City, and Butte, Montana, had numbers of migratory Korean miners and railway workers who formed small, isolated farming communities. In 1940 the population was predominantly rural, but became increasingly urbanized after World War II. Small communities developed in New York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., and some college towns in the East and the Midwest. Whereas early Koreans were predominantly agricultural workers, students and political refugees added to occupational variation. Some took low-wage jobs such as factory workers, cooks, waiters, and janitors; others demonstrated a facility for small business and started laundries, restaurants, and retail groceries.

**Asian Indian Americans**

The few Asian Indian laborers who came to the United States, along with a small number of more educated Indians, accounted for a total of only about 7,000 from 1881 to 1917. The establishment of the Asiatic barred zone in 1917 put an abrupt end to Indian immigration, and many discouraged by the naturalization bar returned to India. Of those who remained, 80% of the men married women of Mexican descent and were able to enjoy a family life. India-U.S. relations were strained until World War II. As Gandhi’s reputation spread, his movement attracted supporters. By the time India gained independence in 1946, the United States had an important military ally. More Indians immigrated to the United States as political and economic instability heightened. By 1965 about 50,000 Asian Indians resided in the United States. They settled primarily on the West Coast, and they were primarily Sikhs from the Punjab region of north India. Others, primarily Hindus, were attracted to New York. Before 1917 they were primarily agricultural workers. By 1920 Asian Indians leased and operated approximately 85,000 acres of farmland. In spite of alien land laws, many men and their Mexican wives entered into agricultural leasing and ownership agreements in Southern California. A professional class began to emerge after 1946. Indian and Western universities were graduating many intellectuals who were not able to obtain jobs in the Indian economy. They were attracted by employment opportunities in the United States, and their facility with English aided their transition into American society. By 1963 more than half of the household heads were professionals and managers.

**Asian Pacific America after 1965**

Asian Pacific Americans will continue to be the fastest-growing ethnic group in the United States into the new millennium principally because of immigration. Although the APA population comprised less than 1% of the total U.S. population in 1960, by 1998 the share was nearly 4%. In absolute numbers, this represented more than a tenfold increase from about 1 million to
10.5 million. Except for Japanese Americans, every group is mostly foreign born (e.g., Chinese, over 60%; Koreans, 80%; Asian Indians, 80%; Filipinos, over 70%; Vietnamese, 90%). Current annual levels of immigration are substantial (e.g., Filipinos, 60,000; Chinese, 55,000; Koreans, 30,000; Asian Indians, 30,000; Pakistanis, 9,700; Thais, 8,900).

Beyond numbers, there is every reason to believe that immigration and refugee policies will continue to shape the Asian Pacific American profile in terms of where people live, gender ratios, employment and income profiles, and even social and political life.

The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act set the stage for the development of Asian Pacific America as we know it today. Its emphasis on family reunification (ironically not intended to benefit Asian immigration) provided the basis for growth. Family categories offered many more visas (80% of all preference and 100% of immediate relative, nonquota visas were designated for family reunification) and less stringent visa requirements. A relationship as spouse, parent, child, or sibling is all that was necessary. In the occupational categories, on the other hand, a certification from the Department of Labor was needed to show that no qualified American worker could fill the position an immigrant was offered. Today, 80 to 90% of the immigration from most Asian Pacific nations is in the family categories. But that was not always the case.

Filipinos, Asian Indians, and Koreans are the best examples of how the 1965 amendments were used to transform Asian immigration. In the late 1960s, about 45% of Filipino immigrants entered in the professional and 55% in the family unity categories. Within a few years, however, family networks developed that enabled naturalized citizens to take advantage of reunification categories. By 1976 Filipino immigration in the occupational categories dropped to about 21%. And by 1990 a little more than 8% came from the occupational categories compared with 88% in the family categories. About 64% of all Koreans entered in family categories in 1969 compared with more than 90% by 1990. For Asian Indians, the figures were 27% in 1969 and about 90% in 1990. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Koreans and Asian Indians also took advantage of the nonpreference investor category. About 12% of all Koreans and 27% of all Asian Indians entered as investors at that time. Investor visas became unavailable in 1978.

Under the 1965 reforms immigrants essentially were categorized as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens or under the preference system. As immediate relatives they were not subject to quotas or numerical limitations. The category included the spouses and minor, unmarried children of citizens, as well as the parents of adult citizens. The preference system included
seven categories. First preference: adult, unmarried sons and daughters of citizens. Second preference: spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of lawful permanent resident aliens. Permanent residents (green-card holders) could petition for relatives only through this category. Third preference: members of the professions or those with exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts. Proof from the Department of Labor that the immigrant would not be displacing an available worker was required for the third and sixth preferences. Fourth preference: married sons and daughters of citizens. Fifth preference: siblings of adult citizens. Sixth preference: skilled or unskilled workers, of which there was a shortage of employable and willing workers in the United States. Seventh preference: persons fleeing from a communist-dominated or Middle Eastern country, or uprooted by a natural catastrophe. Seventh preference was eliminated in 1980, but not until after about 14,000 Chinese from mainland China entered in the category.

**Chinese Americans**

From 1965 to 2000, the Chinese American population has increased from 360,000 to about 2 million, and greater numbers of Chinese women have entered. The gender ratio is about even. Chinese immigrants still prefer California, but New York comes in second. Over 95% of Chinese Americans reside in urban areas. More than a third of Chinese Americans are classified as professionals or managers (including small business), while 20% are in service work. About 20% of recent immigrants end up below the poverty line.

**Filipino Americans**

By 2000 the Filipino American population of 200,000 in 1965 increased tenfold to about 2 million. Their family-oriented culture, political instability, and economic problems in the Philippines provided the push and pull for immigration to the United States. Many Filipinas immigrated as spouses of U.S. servicemen and as nurses and other professionals. Filipinos are the largest Asian American community in California, Washington, and Illinois. The employment profile of the community is quite diverse. About a quarter are professionals and managers (including nurses), and about 17% are service workers. About 6% of Filipino families fall below the poverty line, compared with 7% of white American families.

**Korean Americans**

While only 45,000 Korean Americans resided in the United States in 1965, today their population is more than a million. After the 1965 immigration amendments, Korean immigration surged, dominated by women. The population is dispersed throughout the United States, although more than 40% of Korean Americans reside in the West. Almost 15% reside in New York. About 20% choose to live in southern cities, especially in Virginia and Texas. Many doctors from Korea immigrated until the laws were amended in 1976 to limit the number of foreign-trained physicians and surgeons entering the United States. Today a quarter of the population is employed as professionals or managers (including green grocers) and almost a fifth is employed in service jobs. Almost half of the population holds blue-collar jobs. More than 10% of recent Korean immigrants fall below the poverty line.
Asian Indian Americans

The Asian Indian American community has also experienced phenomenal growth since 1965, from about 50,000 to over a million. More than any other group, Asian Indians used the occupational and investor categories of the 1965 reforms to develop family networks in the United States. Their gender ratio is very balanced. California and the Northeast are very popular destinations with Asian Indian immigrants, but almost 25% reside in the South. New York, California, and New Jersey are the three most popular states. About 50% of Asian Indian Americans are professionals and managers, including small-business owners. Yet unemployment and poverty are not insignificant among Asian Indians. The unemployment rate among immigrant Indian women (10%) is the highest among all immigrant Asian women. More than 7% of Asian Indian families fall below the poverty line.

Japanese Americans

The Japanese American community grew from about half a million to more than a million between 1965 and 2000. Relative to other Asian groups, fewer Japanese immigrants arrived. What had been the largest Asian Pacific American group in 1970 slipped to third place by 1980. Japan’s relative economic and political stability appears to be the main reason, along with the fact that many early Japanese immigrant families were able to enter intact. The gender ratio is about 85 men to 100 women. More than a third of the population lives in California and 30% in Hawaii. Japanese America is occupationally highly diverse. Almost 30% are professionals and managers, and about 13% are service workers. Only 4% of Japanese American families fall below the poverty line, although 10% of those who recently immigrated are poor.

Vietnamese and Refugee Policies

The first wave of Southeast Asian refugees began in 1975, shortly after the United States withdrawal from Vietnam in April. The vast majority of those who were permitted to enter were Vietnamese. By the late 1970s the profile of Southeast Asian refugees changed, as more Chinese ethnics began entering Malaysia to avoid mistreatment in Vietnam. And in the wake of Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, thousands of Cambodians fled across the Thai border into refugee camps. Both eventually found their way to the United States, where they arrived in much worse physical and mental condition than their predecessors. Joined by more Laotians, these newer arrivals were considerably poorer and less formally educated than those in earlier waves.

Southeast Asian refugees constituted the largest nonwhite, non-Western, non-English-speaking group of people ever to enter the country at one time.

They constituted the largest nonwhite, non-Western, non-English-speaking group of people ever to enter the country at one time.
Vietnamese Americans are the fastest-growing Asian Pacific American group. From few numbers in the early 1970s, today they number close to a million. The development of Southeast Asian communities in the United States is related more to refugee policies than to standard immigration admission criteria. Take its current size. Of the 18,000 who immigrated by 1974, many were the spouses of American businessmen and military personnel who had been stationed in Vietnam. But a dramatic upsurge in new arrivals began after 1975, with 125,000 admitted immediately after the troops pulled out of Southeast Asia. By 1980 more than 400,000 additional refugees were welcomed from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, approximately 90% of whom were from Vietnam. Although the 1980 Refugee Act established new controls, the flow of refugees continued due to persistent humanitarian pressure on the United States. After a second, sizable wave entered in 1980, the flow of new entries declined steadily. In 1984, 40,604 Vietnamese refugees entered, then the average dropped to about 22,000 until 1988 when 17,626 were admitted. So by 1988, 540,700 Vietnamese refugees had arrived. By October 1991, 18,280 Amerasians (mostly from Vietnam) arrived along with another 44,071 relatives. Eventually as many as 80,000 to 100,000 Amerasians and their relatives may enter. As a result of these entrants, more than 90% of the Vietnamese population is foreign born, the highest percentage of all Asian American groups.

Refugee policies also affect gender ratios. In 1980 there were 108.5 Vietnamese men per 100 Vietnamese women, compared with 94.5 per 100 in the general population. This ratio is not as skewed as those for initial waves of Filipinos and Chinese, which were much more male dominated. The refugee policy that enabled Vietnamese to enter after 1975 under unique circumstances contributed to greater balance. Rather than fleeing individually, those departing Vietnam have done their best to keep their families intact. Roughly 45% of recent arrivals are women.

Refugee policies have impacted the community in other ways. Resettlement policies affected the current distribution of the community. More than half of Vietnamese Americans live in the West, but almost 30% reside in the South, with about 10% in both the Northeast and the Midwest. Since they were poor as entering refugees, more than 60% of all Southeast Asian households are on public assistance, three times the rate of African Americans and four times that of Latinos. Officials recognized that ethnic coalescence would be a beneficial support system as long as clusters were not so large that they overburdened local services. This was reflected in the 1981 Khmer Cluster Project. When the project began, Cambodian refugees were entering in substantial numbers for the first time. Unlike second-wave Vietnamese and some Laotians, they had no relatives drawing them to particular areas. The project placed about 8,500 of these so-called free cases in clusters of 300 to 1,300 in twelve sites located in ten cities chosen for their capacity to absorb refugees.
Despite the project’s efforts, secondary migration within the United States continued, especially among Hmong refugees. Sometimes entire communities relocated in response to suggestions by their leaders. Between 1980 and 1986, for example, 30,000 Hmong migrated to Fresno in the Central Valley agricultural area of California. In response, the federal government experimented with financial incentives designed to attract refugees to appointed locations, such as Phoenix, where there were fewer refugees, more jobs, and a more hospitable environment.

**Pacific Islanders**

Immigration has played a much less significant role in the development of the Pacific Islander population than it has in the Asian Pacific American population in general. Many Pacific Islanders, such as those from Guam and American Samoa, are nationals of the United States with the right of free entry into the United States. Hawaiians, who are native born, make up 60% of the total Pacific Islander census tabulation. Samoans (noncitizen nationals) and Guamanians (U.S. citizens) are the next two largest groups, comprising about 17% and 14% of the Pacific Islander population, respectively. So almost 90% of Pacific Islanders are either citizens or nationals. The total population is about 420,000.

Pacific Islanders prefer to live in the West, with about 75% in California and Hawaii. After California and Hawaii, Washington is favored with almost 20,000 Pacific Islander residents. The only other states with at least 5,000 Pacific Islanders are Oregon, Texas, and Utah.

Their characteristics vary from those of other APA groups. Pacific Islanders are a young population. They have a median age of 25, in comparison with the median age of 30 for the total APA population. About 13% of the APA population is 65 years old or over, compared with only 4% of the Pacific Islander population. The average Pacific Islander family is larger (4.1 persons) than the average American family (3.2 persons). Samoans have the largest families, with an average of 4.8 members. About 19% are headed by women with no spouse in the household, compared with 12% of other APA families. Three-fourths of Pacific Islanders, age 25 and over, are high school graduates, which is about the same as the general population. While 20% of the general population graduated from college, only 11% of Pacific Islanders have received a bachelor’s degree or higher. Of working-age persons, 70% of Pacific Islanders participate in the labor force compared with about 68% of the general APA population; 63% of Pacific Islander women participate compared with only 57% of all women in the United States. They are much more likely to work in service occupations (almost one-fifth), and are less likely to work as managers or professionals (18%, compared with 31% of all APAs). They also earn less per capita than all APA and all American families.
Conclusion

The Asian Pacific American community continues to grow and be affected by our nation’s immigration and refugee policies. Although only about 4% of the total U.S. population today, by 2020 the collection of APA groups is projected to reach about 20 million—roughly 6% of the country.
CAMBODIAN AND LAOTIAN AMERICANS

by Ying Ying Meng

Population

- In 1997, three Southeast Asian groups—Cambodians, Laotians, and Hmong—made up about 5% of the Asian American population.¹

- In July 1997, 13.8% percent of the population in San Joaquin County were APIs.²

- From the 1990 census to July 1997, the Asian and Pacific Islander (API) population in San Joaquin County increased at the fastest rate, 34.3% (Table 1). The major increase of the API population came from migration (56.2%).³

Table 1. Race/Ethnic Population Estimates for San Joaquin County, April 1990 to July 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>BLACK</th>
<th>NATIVE AMERICAN</th>
<th>API</th>
<th>HISPANIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APRIL 1990</td>
<td>480,628</td>
<td>283,583</td>
<td>24,791</td>
<td>3,807</td>
<td>55,774</td>
<td>112,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY 1997</td>
<td>542,164</td>
<td>298,279</td>
<td>28,696</td>
<td>3,941</td>
<td>74,918</td>
<td>136,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGE SINCE 1990</td>
<td>61,536</td>
<td>14,696</td>
<td>3,905</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>19,144</td>
<td>23,657</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- According to 1990 census data, about 23% of the population of Stockton City of San Joaquin County, California, were APIs. Among them, 5% were Cambodians and 4% were Laotians (Figure 1).⁴

Figure 1

Stockton Population by Race/Ethnicity

• Stockton had 10,212 Cambodians, or 98% of the San Joaquin County Cambodian population, 15% of the California Cambodian population, and 6.9% of the U.S. Cambodian population in 1990.5

• Based on 1990 census data, the total Cambodian population was 147,411 in the United States, or 2% of the API population. Since 1980 the Cambodian population has grown 1,120.7% in California.6

• Stockton had 4,045 Laotians, or 95.5% of the San Joaquin County Laotian population, 7% of the California Laotian population, and 2.7% of the U.S. Laotian population in 1990.7

• In 1990, the total Laotian population was 149,014, or 2% of the API population in the United States. Since 1980 the Laotian population has grown 386% in California.8

• Based on 1990 census data, 79% of the Cambodians and Laotians in the United States were foreign born.9

• The nation’s Cambodian and Laotian population was young, with a median age of 19.4 and 20.4 in 1990, respectively. This is about thirteen years younger than the median age for the U.S. population as a whole.10

• In 1990, among those Cambodians five years and older who spoke an API language at home, 73.2% of them did not speak English well or not at all and 56.1% of the households were linguistically isolated.* Among Laotians, 70.2% do not speak English well and 52.4% of the households were linguistically isolated.11

• U.S. total Lao lu Mien population was about 32,000, or 0.4% of the API population; 27,920, or 87% of the Lu Mien population, live in California.12

• Oakland in Alameda County has 4,500 Lao Lu Mien, or 16% of the California Lu Mien population and 14% of the U.S. Lao Lu Mien population, based on a 1997 estimation.13

• Average household size of the Lu Mien community in Oakland is 11.4 people.14

*Based on the census definition, a household is classified as “linguistically isolated” if it includes a person age 14 years or over who does not speak English, or a person age 14 years or over who speaks a language other than English and does not speak English “very well.”
Economic Status

- San Joaquin County (Stockton) in 1995 had the highest per capita rate of public assistance in the country with 25% of its population receiving Medi-Cal (Medicaid). Yet it also had the highest average household income of the San Joaquin Valley counties—$57,991. Thus it seems to have two groups—the very poor and the prosperous middle class.  

- Per capita income of the API population in Stockton City in 1989 was the lowest ($6,914) among all the racial groups. By comparison, whites had a per capita income of $14,141 and blacks, $7,789.  

- In 1989, 47.3% of Cambodians and 50.5% of Laotians lived below the poverty line in California, as compared with whites, who had only 9%.  

- Across the United States in 1989, 38.1% of Cambodian families had no one working in the family, while 26.7% of Laotian families had no one working in the family.  

- Among legal permanent residents, 20.9% of Cambodians under 65 and 53.5% of Cambodians over 65 received public assistance. In addition, 14.8% of Laotians under 65 and 58.3% of Laotians over 65 received public assistance in 1990.  

- In June 1999, the unemployment rate of the Southeast Asians in San Joaquin County was estimated to be 35–40%, while the overall local unemployment rate was 9%.  

Education

- In the Stockton City Unified School District, 20.9% of the enrolled students in 1997 and 1998 were Asians, excluding Filipino and Pacific Islanders, while 6% of the teachers were Asians.  

- The four-year school dropout rate among Asian students in the Stockton City Unified School District was 7.1%, which was lower than the overall dropout rate in the district (9.5%).  

- During the 1998 school year, 29.7% of students enrolled in the Stockton City Unified School District were Limited English Proficiency (LEP) students.  

- The top four languages spoken by LEP students during the 1997–98 school year in the Stockton City Unified School District were Spanish (5,557), Hmong (1,725), Khmer (1,609), and Lao (544).
According to the 1990 census, 48% of the Cambodians and 45% of the Laotians had less than a fifth-grade education.\textsuperscript{25}

**Health**

A study of insurance rates among California’s APIs indicated that Southeast Asians had been most dramatically affected by declining Medi-Cal coverage. In 1994–95, the Medi-Cal program insured 51% of Southeast Asians. In 1996–97, the percentage declined to 34%. Because the job-based coverage and privately purchased insurance remained the same, the uninsured rate doubled from 11% to 23%.\textsuperscript{26}

Cambodian young adults, 15–24 years, had one of the highest male homicide rates (after Samoans) in California during 1989–91, five times more than the rate of whites.\textsuperscript{27}

The health services to Cambodian and Laotian Medi-Cal beneficiaries in San Joaquin County were 71% and 65% less than expected, respectively, during 1996–97. At the same time, African Americans had 22% and whites 49% more services than expected.\textsuperscript{28}

Laotians had the highest rates of teen pregnancy in California, 8.7%, while the Chinese had the lowest percentage, 0.3%, based on a 1994 study.\textsuperscript{29}

Based on average annual age-adjusted cancer incidence rates between 1988 and 1992 in California, lung cancer incidence was the highest among Southeast Asians (70.2 per 100,000), Filipinos (59.9 per 100,000), and Koreans (54.9 per 100,000).\textsuperscript{30}

Cervical cancer incidence was the highest among Southeast Asians, 35.2 per 100,000, while the incidence rate among whites was 7.5 per 100,000, according to average annual age-adjusted cancer incidence rates between 1988 and 1992 in California.\textsuperscript{31}

A study conducted by Mayo Clinic indicated that initial breast and cervical cancer screening rates for Cambodian women older than 50 years of age who had used the health care system were significantly lower than for non-Cambodians. Expressed barriers included lack of knowledge about cancer, shyness at physical examinations, lack of transportation, fear of a large technical medical center, and need to make appointments.\textsuperscript{32}

The mental health status of a general population sample of Cambodian refugees living in the United States was assessed ten years after leaving their homes in Cambodia. Subjects were found to be experiencing extremely high levels of posttraumatic stress disorder, dissociation, depression, and anxiety. Ninety percent of these refugees exhibited marked symptomatology in one or more of these categories.\textsuperscript{33}
• Among Asian Americans, Japanese women were most likely to seek prenatal care in their first trimester (89.6%), while Laotian women were least likely to seek early care (56.1%). This resulted in Laotian babies being at more than twice the risk of pre-term births.34

• In the United States, an estimated 10–15% of Southeast Asians are chronic carriers of the hepatitis B virus.35

• Cigarette smoking among Cambodian and Laotian men is among the highest reported in the United States. A study published in 1997 reported a 33–55% smoking rate for Cambodians, and a 72% rate for Laotians.36

---

3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
8. Asian/Pacific Islander Data Consortium, Our Ten Years of Growth.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
15. San Joaquin County Mental Health Services, Cultural Competency Plan, April 1999.
22. Ibid.
28. San Joaquin County Mental Health Services, Cultural Competency Plan.
30 Chen, Meng, Kunwar et al., The Health Status of Asian and Pacific Islander Americans in California.
31 Ibid.
34 S. Dumbault, J. A. McCullough, and J. W. Sutocky, Analysis of Health Indicators for California Minority Populations.
The traditional center of gravity for Cambodian immigrants in Stockton, California, is the Buddhist temple, governed by a chief monk, a high priest, a chief of operations, and their assistants. The temple serves as a gathering place for community building as well as teaching religious and cultural values. The Cambodian people reside in a series of villages around Stockton, and the most well organized of these is Park Village. Park Village is the only one of the villages with its own community center. There, English and Khmer classes are offered and other community events and performances are held. The village’s strength is also exhibited by its strong connections to the temple: the chief of operations and his two assistants, as well as the two assistant high priests and two other senior priests, are all Park Village residents.

In addition to their religious roles, the priests serve as liaisons between the village and the temple, raising money for the temple and summoning monks when they are needed for weddings and funerals. The priests also serve as informal leaders of Park Village, sitting on the twelve-member board of APSARA, the Asian Pacific Self-Development and Residential Association, the membership organization that purchased the property from the federal government. APSARA manages and maintains the facility. Its board consists mainly of community elders, but it recently expanded to include a twenty-eight-year-old college-educated man and a thirty-five-year-old woman who is active in the temple. The APSARA board reports to the Park Village Apartments (PVA) Board, which carries ultimate responsibility for fiscal management, including subsidies from the federal government. The PVA Board consists of four community members and three non-Cambodians who represent social service agencies. When safety issues arise, including the need to evict community members who are involved in gangs, APSARA often refers the final decision to PVA.
Im Chan isn’t sure how she endured all the tragedies life has brought her. Her only answer is *at tmut*.

*At tmut* means persevering through hardship.

*At tmut* means staying anchored and not being distracted by anger.

*At tmut* means accepting your fate.

“I can’t say enough about the word *at tmut,*” says Im Chan. “I learned *at tmut* from my parents and from my society. I learned it by observing everything around me.”

Im Chan needed *at tmut* to cope with losing most of her family before she turned thirty. It gave her strength as family members were rounded up from their village by Khmer Rouge soldiers and held in camp after camp. And it kept her going when her parents, her husband, and her youngest son all perished from starvation. Only Im Chan and her other son, eight-year-old Raa, survived.

Eight years later, in 1986, after remarrying, escaping through the jungle, and spending five years in Thai refugee camps and two in Texas, Im Chan arrived in Stockton’s Park Village housing complex with her husband, Chun Keut, sixteen-year-old Raa, and four young children.

But the family’s dream of getting a fresh start in peaceful new surroundings died one morning in January 1989 during recess at nearby Cleveland Elementary School, where nine-year-old Rann and seven-year-old Ram were students. A crazed gunman dashed into the schoolyard and began randomly spraying bullets, sending children running in all directions.

After an anxiety-filled day spent rushing to the school, then to the hospital, the family learned that Ram had died. She was one of five children—all Southeast Asian refugees—who lost their lives in the shooting. Rann, who was on the playground at the time, carries a haunting image of the day his sister died. “The part I remember most was this girl crawling toward me with blood all over her. It was really bad, seeing somebody dying in front of you,” said Rann, now twenty.

The Red Cross gave the family $3,000 to pay for a casket and burial plot and white clothes to wear to the funeral. But it fell to the Park Village community to raise the thousands of dollars the victims’ families needed to pay for a traditional weeklong ceremony and to invite Buddhist monks to chant blessings for Ram and the other victims.
Reporters visited the families by the droves, and social service agencies made the victims’ families a top priority. But Im Chan doesn’t remember them helping much. Only Sovanna Koeurt of Park Village, one of very few Cambodian women to become a community leader, seemed to know what Im Chan was going through and how to help her. So she relied on Ms. Sovanna—and on at tmut.

“When I came to the United States, I thought it was going to be peaceful,” said Im Chan. “I didn’t know there was killing too. I didn’t expect it. In Cambodia, most everybody I liked got killed. I couldn’t believe I had to experience something like that again.”

“A lot of people look at me like I have no problems, but inside I’m very hurt. After the death of my daughter, I felt very hurt on the inside. There was another family who lost their daughter. They cried and cried, but for me, I couldn’t cry. I felt if I cried, nothing was going to work for me. I felt I had to be at tmut and keep control.

“I didn’t get mad about the incident,” she said, “but I felt regret that my first and only daughter, my lovely daughter, passed away. I just wanted to ask the school to help protect all the children.”

Im Chan and Rann trace many of the family’s later problems to the shooting. Indeed, though life went on, and Im Chan and Chun Keut had three more children, things never seemed to return to normal.

Chun Keut had cherished Ram as his first daughter, and he was inconsolable about losing her. Despite the family’s protests, he began drinking heavily. “There was no way we could tell him not to,” recalled Rann. Two years ago, Chun died from alcohol-induced liver disease.

And shortly after the shooting, Raa, then nineteen, devastated by the death of a second sibling, left home only to end up in a jail in Philadelphia for an unknown offense. Today a Polaroid picture of him sits on the living room coffee table of Im Chan’s four-bedroom apartment. “Please forgive me,” reads the caption. “I can’t smile. But still love you.”

Now, Im Chan feels the weight of the world, raising six children on $1,596 a month in welfare and social security. At the same time, she feels at a loss over how to impart good values to her children, since the corporal punishment she grew up with is forbidden in the United States.

“My children’s teachers always call me that my son or my daughter has problems in school,” she said. “I don’t know how to deal with it. In Cambodia, the government gives the rights to the parents more than the children. Whatever the parents say, the children tend to listen. Over here, it’s different. The children don’t listen to the parents. Whatever you do to the children, they will call the police. That’s why the parents can’t do anything to raise the children.”
So, she relies on at tmut.

“That’s something I have to live with to set an example for my children. I want to show them Cambodian values. I feel if I didn’t have at tmut, nothing would work out in the family. Even my neighbors wouldn’t want to talk to me.”

Rann sometimes worries about his mother. “My mom’s gone through a lot of hard times,” he said. “I feel really bad to see her by herself thinking about something she won’t tell me. But she still has us, and I guess that’s what motivated her to live.”

Indeed, Im Chan said her happiest moments are when her entire family comes together for a meal. But those are rare, because her children are often out of the house with their friends, and they prefer hamburgers and sandwiches to the Cambodian fare she prepares.

Sometimes, to comfort herself, she watches a video from her 1994 trip to Cambodia. She had raised money to build a school in her native village, and had returned for the ribbon-cutting ceremony. She appears in the video like a dignitary before thousands of Cambodians who walked from miles around for the event.

“After the death of my daughter, I felt I had to be at tmut and keep control.”

Im Chan also feels pleased about her son Rann, the only one of her children who she says doesn’t give her trouble. He is a model student. His 3.5 GPA in high school and his volunteer work in the Cambodian community helped him win a scholarship to nearby University of the Pacific. He also tutors children in English at the local community center.

Though the shooting left a deep impression on Rann, it may also have helped him set high goals for himself. He and other students received counseling at school to find ways to cope with their feelings.

“The way I coped with it,” he said, “was by thinking that there’s no way I could eliminate it, and so what could I do to change my family? If I could get higher education, if I could go to school and earn a degree and get a great job, it could maybe help to cover up the memories a little.”

But Im Chan has a different interpretation: “He has a lot of at tmut like me, and that’s why he’s able to succeed in his life.”
CAMBODIAN COMMUNITY PORTRAIT

by Miriam Gross

Human existence is suffering.
The cause of human suffering is desire.
Where there is no desire, there is no suffering.
The way to avoid suffering is the middle path.

—Buddha, The Four Noble Truths from
“Setting in Motion the Wheel of the Dhamma”

Introduction

The Cambodians (or Khmer)* have survived some of the most dramatic personal, social, political, and economic shifts of any group of refugees to come to the United States. Most have moved from peaceful rural villages whose core was the Buddhist monastery, to the killings of the Khmer Rouge, to years of immobility in the Thai border camps, to the postindustrial United States. They have experienced a lifetime of transitions supported only by their reconstituted families and the internal balance that Buddhism provides.

This review will attempt to show how the Buddhist worldview and personal psychology have shaped Khmer identity, experience, problem solving, and social organization and allowed the Khmer to survive the endless transformations of their lives. It will also briefly examine some of the main issues affecting Khmer life in America. Because the majority of the Cambodian refugees who came to the United States were originally from rural communities, this review will only discuss village life, not the middle-class urban experience in Cambodia. In addition, although there is a small but growing number of Christian Cambodian Americans, the number of Christians in Cambodia is very small and their affect on traditional Khmer culture is minimal. For this reason, this review will only address the effects of Buddhism on Khmer culture.

The high point in Khmer history, still remembered as the golden era by many Khmer, was the Angkor period from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries, when the Khmer controlled a region including most of what is now known as Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and parts of Malaysia. During this period, the empire was strongly influenced by Indian Brahmanic, Mahayana, and Theravada Buddhist traditions. In 1431 Siam (modern Thailand) invaded and sacked Angkor, and killed many of the artisans, intellectuals, and elite. Soon after, the Vietnamese destroyed the kingdom and tried to impose their own culture and language.²

---

*Technically, “Khmer” refers only to the majority ethnic group in Cambodia. However, because “Cambodian” and “Khmer” have become interchangeable in English, this review will use both terms to refer to any citizen of Cambodia.
Since then, Cambodia has been in a vulnerable position, pressured by its two stronger neighbors on each side. The Vietnamese in particular have long been viewed as Cambodia’s traditional enemy. In 1863, after signing a pact with the Vietnamese who controlled much of Southeast Asia, the French made Cambodia a protectorate. Despite nearly a century of French colonial rule, the Khmer remained more than 80% rural and 95% Buddhist. The French, who concentrated most of their attention in Southeast Asia on Vietnam, ruled Cambodia primarily through Vietnamese administrators and did not create a public school system.

In general, very little of village life was affected by outside influences. Almost all secular education outside the cities continued to be conducted by Buddhist monks who took in boys for a limited period of time and taught them moral values, Buddhist ritual, basic literacy, and manual skills. Boys who were interested could become novices and eventually become ordained as monks. By 1967 there were only 337 doctors trained in Western medicine for a population of 6.25 million. For this reason, almost all medicine was still provided by traditional healers called Kru-Khmer, who were strongly influenced by the Indian Ayurvedic medical tradition. In addition, possession by spirits and other spiritual ills were diagnosed and treated by monks and aa’cha, Buddhist laymen who had extensive previous training as monks.

Because the French had limited impact on Khmer society, it primarily retained its original organization. Although Khmer society did not have a caste system, traditionally it had three social ranks: (1) royalty, aristocrats, and high-ranking officials; (2) middle- and lower-ranking government functionaries and wealthy businessmen; and (3) rural peasants and lowest-level urban workers. Rural society was broken down into an additional five ranks. The Khmer language recognizes these differences by having five different registers: one for royalty and government officials, a second for monks, a third for elders, a fourth for equals, and finally, one for subordinates, children, and animals. When dealing with someone who was of a higher social rank, most people acted with great deference and respect. Frequently networks of patronage developed between higher- and lower-ranking families and individuals. However, most families within the village were considered fairly equal.

**Village Life and Community Organization**

Traditionally independent and self-sufficient Khmer villages were usually composed of fifteen to twenty-five houses occupied by nuclear families and a Buddhist monastery. Villagers cultivated rice, a type of agriculture demanding a high degree of cooperation between families and communities. The monastery in the village served as both the secular and the religious meeting...
place, and monks often provided spiritual counseling and social-work-type services for their community as well as religious and moral guidance.\textsuperscript{12} The aa’cha often became leaders and advisers since they had the benefits of both the moral and secular education of the monastery that emphasized detached neutrality and personal integrity, and the wisdom of life experience. They also helped with conflict resolution by discussing a situation separately with each person and then telling how to rectify the problem “following Khmer culture thereby achieving harmony and happiness.”\textsuperscript{12} Although a single leader, advised by the aa’cha and the village teacher, directed each village,\textsuperscript{14} decision making was consensual and no individual was ignored or forced to agree with group conclusions.\textsuperscript{15} Informal persuasion and negotiation helped people reach consensus. In addition, emotional appeals helped keep those who disagreed involved in the process. However, because both male and female elders were expected to be more knowledgeable, villagers deferred to them.\textsuperscript{16}

Most boys spent some time in the monastery, particularly those who lacked discipline or had problems such as too much alcohol consumption. In addition, many boys spent time as monks in order to show gratitude to their parents, especially their mothers. In the monastery, boys learned the self-control that would help them to act as moral guides and leaders in their future families.\textsuperscript{17} The belief was that this would lead to happy, harmonious families, which would in turn lead to a larger society with fewer of the conflicts and dissension that made people unhappy.\textsuperscript{18} Such a society would be successful both because of the morals of individual people, and because the integrity and foresight of their leader would guide the people in the same direction and lead them in righteous ways.\textsuperscript{19}

In general, an individual’s status, roles, and identity were determined by gender, age, position in the family, the parents’ position within the community, and the family’s socioeconomic position or rank in the wider Khmer society.\textsuperscript{20} Gender decided not only what role people would play in the family and community, but also where they would find sources of support and friendship networks. Women were primarily family focused and were always defined by their role as mother or daughter. They cared for their unmarried and married children or their younger brothers and sisters not only during their lives, but even after their death.\textsuperscript{21} Before marriage, most men went to live with their fiancée’s family for a few years in order to pay off the “bride price.” The bride price was the money or labor provided to reimburse the fiancée’s family for the loss of her labor. If the woman’s family discovered during this probational period that the young man was unacceptable, the marriage ceremony was never held.\textsuperscript{22} Divorce was very rare and was never condoned. After the probationary period, most new families tended to settle near the wife’s parents, and women gained support and advice from their female relatives. Most men, who were active in greater community decision making, were supported by lifelong friendships often made in their teens.\textsuperscript{23}
Although each gender had different roles and responsibilities to play, the primary determinant of rank and status in Khmer society was not gender, but age. An older person would always care for a younger one, even if there were only a few months’ difference between them. The oldest child, male or female, became both the nurturer and the leader of his or her siblings. The older person was expected to provide material help, advice, and nurturing. The younger person would offer loyalty, honor, and respect, and would listen to the good advice provided. The larger the age differential, the greater the mutual obligation.

It was felt that equality between people in a social situation was more important than getting ahead, because inequality could lead to jealousy and disharmony.

Obligation and duty were implicit to the system and were never institutionalized into a hierarchical structure. All individuals had a prescribed age- and gender-based role to play that provided them with their rank and status in the family and community and with their self-identity. Other family and village members tended to relate to individuals based on roles they played such as mother or monk, rather than on their unique personal characteristics and talents. Because behaviors associated with roles were clearly defined, if people didn’t follow their expected roles, then others would be unsure of how to react and often retreat from a situation. For example, a respectful young man was not in a position to give advice to an elder. He could not informally take on such a responsibility until he gained the formal status of an elder himself. Thus an individual’s roles and the status embedded within them simultaneously shaped both other people’s interactions with the individual and their own perceptions of themselves.

Education

Like the monasteries, schools tried to teach children cooperative skills, as well as reading and writing. It was felt that equality between people in a social situation was more important than getting ahead, because inequality could lead to jealousy and disharmony. In fact, competitive behavior was often viewed as antisocial. For this reason, Khmer teachers tended to praise the accomplishments of a whole class, rather than those of an individual. At the same time that schools tried to instill ethics, they also reinforced the obedience and discipline a child learned at home. Whether they were monks in the temple or educators in the slowly forming secular school system, teachers were treated like parents; they expected automatic obedience. Teachers and parents mutually supported each other’s rules. Children “belonged” to teachers, just as they did to parents. Children and parents tended not to question teachers because that would be disrespectful of their authority. By learning such respectful, disciplined, and cooperative behavior, children tended to fit seamlessly into close-knit family and village life.
Personal Happiness and Well-being

The Khmer believed that personal happiness should be every individual’s main goal in life. At the same time, happiness was dependent on the individual assuming a set of behaviors that cooperatively supported the family and the village. According to Buddhist philosophy, individuals were born in a karmic cycle of rebirth. For this reason, death was as important as life for many Buddhists. Respect for both the living and the dead was what made a person civilized.5 Merit or demerit from previous lives determined an individual’s suffering in this life. The only thing that balanced bad deeds were good deeds done both for oneself and for others, particularly those who had already died. Bad actions in this or previous lives could not be forgiven, and suffering was not a payment for them. Instead, it was believed, most suffering was caused by desire and attachment to greed, hatred or anger, ignorance, and the illusion that we are independent beings.6 Suffering existed to give individuals a chance to learn from previous mistakes. If they didn’t, their next life would be just as difficult as this one.7 Because errors of judgment and action would have repercussions for many lifetimes, the aggressive pursuit of self-discipline for oneself and one’s children was an essential goal.8 A mature and happy individual, on the other hand, was someone who was selfless, helped others, was quietly cooperative and noncompetitive, didn’t challenge authority,9 was self-contained and modest, and had an extraordinary degree of disciplined self-control.10 Those who were unable to control their stronger emotions recovered their inner serenity by going back to the monastery in order to meditate and gain distance from their problems.11

Being argumentative, having an aggressive speech style, and challenging authority not only could make one unhappy, but could also lead to self-delusion and disharmony in the family and the village. Because all individuals have their own personal beliefs and must make choices for themselves, it was self-deceptive to think one could change their minds.12 Further, trying to persuade people to agree with one’s own ideas was disrespectful because it implied that their convictions were less important than one’s own. Argumentative and uncooperative behavior not only hurt others, it also disrupted family and village harmony. Group harmony was often thought to be more important than individual conviction.13 Further, egotistic pursuit of unreachable desires caused dissension within the family. Such disharmony and selfish behavior not only looked bad to the community and could destroy family welfare, but it also could cause an individual unhappiness in this life and in the next. Not surprisingly, the first-person pronoun in Khmer originally meant “servant.” In a sense, service to the needs of others was embedded in the language.14

Post–World War II History

After World War II King Norodom Sihanouk won Cambodia’s independence from the French and attempted to maintain neutrality between the communist and noncommunist forces
surrounding him. He was unable to prevent the Vietnamese communists from establishing bases in Cambodia, and the United States from bombing them in 1968. All of Cambodia became embroiled first in the extension of the Vietnam War into Cambodia, and then in a civil war with the Khmer Rouge (Cambodian communists) fighting the noncommunist Cambodian government. By April 17, 1975, however, the Khmer Rouge succeeded in simultaneously taking over Phnom Penh and then the government. At first the people living in the city were delighted, thinking that the long war was at an end. Soon, however, many of the soldiers, who were often teenagers, began looting houses in some areas and chasing people out of the city, eventually completing a systematic evacuation of Phnom Penh.45

For the next four years the Khmer Rouge conducted a reign of terror in which they attempted to reeducate Cambodians and instill in them new cultural patterns and ideology. They started by torturing and killing most teachers, monks, artists, intellectuals, and members of the old governing elite. As for the common people, in addition to forcing loyalty to the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer Rouge tried to break up traditional family structure by sending children as young as six away to labor and reeducation camps. Sleep was limited to at most six hours a night. Food was a watery porridge composed of much less than one cup of rice a day, and people were forbidden to grow food to supplement this meager portion. Western medicine was not allowed. All families were split up into different camps and were forbidden to help siblings, parents, or grandparents.46 Trust in family and community members started to disintegrate. As one informal leader remarked:

> Usually between wife, husband—we rarely talk to each other. Because usually at night time the investigator would come and try to listen to what you say in the family whether you try to go against the party . . . So . . . you just stay quiet or sleep until the next morning you go to the fields and work. Just like that night and day. . . . Because if you say something wrong that person is going to tell other people so that the leader will come take you away and kill you. So people cannot speak to each other, cannot hug each other, tell each other how they feel. They just keep to themselves.47

In addition to the fight for survival, most people spent the reign of the Khmer Rouge desperately but secretly searching for lost family members. Out of an original population of 7 million Khmer, an estimated 2 million people (or 29%) had died of malnutrition and starvation,
unchecked disease, murder, and mines by the end of the Khmer Rouge era. Moreover, the traditional practice of cremating the dead was forbidden, causing many people to feel that the unhappy spirits of their relatives were stuck in this world, haunting them, unable to be reincarnated into a new life.

**Thai Border Camps**

In 1979 Cambodia’s traditional enemy, the Vietnamese, and Cambodian Khmer Rouge defectors overthrew the Khmer Rouge. Around 100,000 Cambodian villagers used the ensuing chaos to make a break through the jungle, land mines, and marauding soldiers for the Thai border where refugee camps were located. The severe famine of 1979–80 caused an additional 500,000 refugees to flee to the Thai border. Many remember seeing the bloated bodies of the dead as they trudged by. Border camps were run or monitored by either the United Nations or whoever’s faction was strongest. In the early period, 1980–83, the United Nations’ camps helped revitalize many of the refugees. Although food was limited and conditions were dangerous and difficult, people reestablished monasteries, schools, and traditional medical centers, and formed musician, dance, and sports groups. Camps also arranged formal or informal governing structures that help refugees negotiate the international bureaucracy and politics of resettlement.

By 1983 both newly arrived refugees and long-term camp residents who had not yet been resettled began to feel desperate. Fighting had started again in Cambodia and camp conditions were terrible: food supplies were meager and camp administrators were untrained Thai soldiers. Most important, resettlement policy, prompted by regional political dynamics, had changed, making eligibility for resettlement more stringent and making it very difficult to be recategorized from a “displaced person” to a “refugee.” Displaced persons had no legal international protection, which was a disaster for many fleeing Cambodians. After 1984 newly arrived refugees were no longer allowed into UN-run camps, so they stopped at the border and tried to buy their way in. Even when refugees were able to create the cultural and organizational structures that gave shape to their lives, they still felt hopeless, helpless, and completely dependent on unknown people to determine their future. People in the camps were often unable to leave and faced years of hardship stuck inside them. As of 1990 there were still 300,000 people living in Thai camps. After 1993 the United Nations encouraged people to return home even though some of Cambodia was still controlled by the Khmer Rouge and covered with land mines. Those who managed to come to the United States as refugees are constantly aware of the plight of those left behind.

---

3 Ibid.


10 Welaratna, Beyond the Killing Fields: Voices of Nine Cambodian Survivors in America, p. 32.

11 Ibid., pp. 265–266.


13 Duncan, Cambodian Refugee Use of Indigenous and Western Healers to Prevent or Alleviate Mental Illness, p. 170.

14 Wildflowers Institute Cambodian Facilitator Focus Group, 11/11/99.

15 Duncan, Cambodian Refugee Use of Indigenous and Western Healers to Prevent or Alleviate Mental Illness, p. 129.

16 Ibid.

17 Smith-Hefner, Khmer American: Identity and Moral Education in a Diasporic Community, p. 49.

18 Wildflowers Institute Cambodian Informal Leaders Focus Group I, 10/14/99.


20 Welaratna, Beyond the Killing Fields: Voices of Nine Cambodian Survivors in America, p. 268.

21 Wildflowers Institute Cambodian Informal Leaders Focus Group II, 1/30/00.

22 Duncan, Cambodian Refugee Use of Indigenous and Western Healers to Prevent or Alleviate Mental Illness, pp. 112–113.

24 Hopkins, Braving a New World: Cambodian Refugees in an American City, p. 73.

25 Wildflowers Institute Cambodian Informal Leaders Focus Group I, 10/14/99.

26 Duncan, Cambodian Refugee Use of Indigenous and Western Healers to Prevent or Alleviate Mental Illness, pp. 113–114.

27 Welaratna, Beyond the Killing Fields: Voices of Nine Cambodian Survivors in America, p. 270.


30 Ibid.


32 Hopkins, Braving a New World: Cambodian Refugees in an American City, p. 130.

33 Welaratna, Beyond the Killing Fields: Voices of Nine Cambodian Survivors in America, p. 263–265.


35 Ratliff, Caring for Cambodian Americans: A Multidisciplinary Resource for the Helping Professions, p. 35.

37 Male interview subject, age 46, as quoted in Smith-Hefner, Khmer American: Identity and Moral Education in a Diasporic Community, pp. 35–36.

38 Hopkins, Braving a New World: Cambodian Refugees in an American City, p. 130.


41 Wildflowers Institute Cambodian Informal Leaders Focus Group I, 1/39/00.

42 Welaratna, Beyond the Killing Fields: Voices of Nine Cambodian Survivors in America, p. 265.


44 Ibid., p. 99.

45 Hopkins, Braving a New World: Cambodian Refugees in an American City, p. 11.

46 Ibid., p. 12.

47 Wildflowers Institute, interview with Cambodian Informal Leader, 11/14/99.

48 Welaratna, Beyond the Killing Fields: Voices of Nine Cambodian Survivors in America, p. xix.
49 Ibid., pp. 251–253.
50 Ibid., p. 166.
51 Wildflowers Institute Cambodian Informal Leaders Focus Group II, 1/39/00.
52 Duncan, Cambodian Refugee Use of Indigenous and Western Healers to Prevent or Alleviate Mental Illness, p. 61.
53 Ibid., p. 61.
54 Ibid., p. 64.
A central virtue for the Lao and Khmu people is *pinong*, a sense of brotherhood, interrelatedness, or being in community. The Lao and Khmu communities in Stockton are organized around nine associations, including eight Lao associations and one Khmu association. Each association represents a living cluster, but membership is voluntary and some people choose to affiliate with another cluster, for example, if they have family members there. Both the Buddhist temple and the Christian church play important roles in strengthening the spiritual lives of the people. In addition to their religious worship, people gather at the temple for other activities such as cooking, to build *pinong*. The community leaders have a vision for a community center to foster *pinong* among a cadre of organizers who could then spread this virtue throughout the entire community, including the apartment villages where most of the people reside and the schools their children attend. The community center would have a hall for performances and other cultural activities and an area for training people in business practices, American culture, and parenting skills.

As depicted in the map, the community center and social hall would be located at the heart of the community, close to the temple. The Christian church is also nearby, showing its influence. A group of elders affiliated with the community center is involved in training younger leaders and maintaining traditional culture through storytelling. These elders include at least one representative from each of the nine community associations as well as other prominent community members. A women’s center nearby also fosters *pinong* through activities such as weaving, storytelling, and embroidery. The leaders envision a community garden, another place for strengthening relationships among community members.
For most of his life, Phou Phommachack thought he would die in his native village in the lowlands of Vientiane province in Laos. He had ten acres of rice fields and a three-story home where he and his wife raised their eight children. He traveled frequently to the capital city, Vientiane, to run his lucrative business shipping goods up and down the Mekong. There he had taken a second wife. But the village of Sanakham, where he enjoyed the respect and deference of his first wife and children, was still home.

It is a life that seventy-year-old Phommachack sometimes longs for especially after a taste of American-style freedom. Today, though he lives in a one-bedroom apartment in Stockton, California, Phommachack does what he can to retain traditional Laotian values. And as an elder in the Laotian community, he helps pass on traditional culture to the younger generations.

Phommachack is active in the local Buddhist temple, where one of his key functions is performing wedding rituals for young couples. Wearing a colorful Laotian cotton sash, he lights a candle and attaches a string to it, and as the bride and groom hold each end of the string, he summons their souls to love and care for each other.

“Some people want to adapt to the mainstream culture,” said Phommachack, “but in my opinion, I’m a Laotian. I was taught to carry on my culture.”

Living a traditional Laotian life, however, has been difficult for Phommachack since he left his homeland twenty years ago at the urging of his second wife. They arrived together in California in 1981.

Phommachack recalls a peaceful and harmonious life in the first few years, when their two children were born. But America presented a reversal of roles: His wife, a medical doctor conversant in English and thirty years his junior, was far more independent than he was. Her community college course load kept her away from home much of the time, while Phommachack stayed with the children.

Eventually, she came home so rarely that Phommachack grew suspicious. One day he followed her, and found her with another man.

“If I’d had a rifle I would have killed both of them,” he said, noting that that would be standard procedure in Laos. “They’re not going to put you in jail for that. It would be an example for society.”
“In Laos, a wife usually respects the opinion of her husband, because the husband looks over the family financially. There’s too much freedom here. Women and men share equally. Because women can work and earn some money, they can do whatever a man can do. They have the freedom to socialize.

“What she did was not right,” he says. “She went on and on with another person, and here I had a family.”

What happened next to the pair is what has happened to some 70% of Laotian couples living in the United States.

“My ex-wife, she filed for divorce,” recalls Phommachack. “When that happened, I got a letter from the court. I went there, but nobody could help me with a translation. So I went home.”

Later, as Phommachack tells it, he received a letter from the court saying he was already divorced. It included a restraining order forbidding him from going near his ex-wife or their children.

“I didn’t get a chance to say anything,” he recalled.

In Laos, divorces are rare. When they do happen, typically they are initiated by men, because whoever requests the divorce must pay a fine. The process is supervised by village elders. The American system, he says, is biased in favor of females.

At the time of his divorce, Phommachack was left with nothing. Even his initial application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) was turned down. “I had no money to buy food, and my children were gone,” he recalled.

Eventually, with the help of a social worker, he was approved for SSI payments. He has been living a frugal existence on $692 a month, just barely enough to cover his rent, utilities, food, and car payments. Forced to living such a meager existence only accentuated Phommachack’s bitterness about being abandoned by his wife.

Note: Phommachack’s dire circumstances and his disdain for American mores are common among elderly Laotian men. However, Phommachack’s luck recently changed in the most uncommon of ways.

In January, he and a friend spent $100 on lottery tickets. After our first interview with him, he found out that they had drawn a winning ticket. Not surprisingly, that stroke of luck brightened his outlook considerably. Though he said he is still waiting to collect his half of the prize from his
friend, a smiling Phommachack recently showed up at the local community center wearing a shiny new warm-up jacket and carrying a bank deposit slip for $1,786,077.

His first priority for his share, about $890,000, is to help build a new Buddhist temple for the Laotian community in Stockton. Then, he plans to buy a house and pay off his car loan. He hopes there will be enough left for him to make a trip back to Laos to see his family there. The money may also allow him to sponsor his children to join him in the United States. “I didn’t want them to come here,” he sighed, “but it’s what they want.”
Lao Community Portrait

by Miriam Gross

Introduction

Laos is one of the most ethnically diverse Asian countries. Although its population was estimated in 1999 to be just 5.4 million,\(^1\) it contains over sixty different ethnic groups speaking eighty-five languages and dialects.\(^2\) Laos is a mountainous country, and these ethnic groups live in the mountains. In general, each mountainside has the same pattern of settlement by these ethnic groups—stratification based on altitude.\(^3\) Usually, different ethnic groups will share more culturally and linguistically with their members on another mountainside at the same altitude (even if that mountain is in a different country) than they will with neighboring groups of different ethnicity who live slightly below or above them.\(^4\)

In modern times, the Lao have split the country roughly into three ethnic groupings: the lowlanders, the uplanders, and the highland ers.

The Lao Lum, or lowlanders, include the Lao, who are the largest ethnic group in Laos comprising just over 50% of the population, and the many different Tai ethnic groups,\(^5\) who make up another 15% of the population.\(^6\) The Lao Lum retain complete dominance culturally, linguistically, politically, and economically over the other Laotian ethnic groups.\(^7\) They have the best contiguous spread of farmland, mainly do wet-rice farming, practice Theravada Buddhism, and speak a Laotian version of Thai. The Lao emigrated to Laos from China starting in the eighth century\(^8\) and began the Laotian empire of Lan Xang in the fourteenth century.\(^9\) Their initial advantage was solidified by the French, who colonized Laos in 1890.\(^10\) In general, the French gave educational opportunities only to the Lao ethnic group, usually to those who previously held elite positions. Such elites were granted all governmental positions, even in those areas where they were a minority.\(^11\) Despite the French colonial presence in Laos, because the French primarily had contact only with Laotian elites, they had very little influence on the rest of society.\(^12\) Since most of the Laotian refugees who came to America were from rural societies, the review on the Lao that follows will focus on village life rather than on the urban, middle-class elites.

The second grouping is the Lao Theung, or uplanders, who reside at around 2,500 feet, and do swidden, or slash-and-burn, agriculture supplemented by hunting and gathering. They are animist or spiritualist, and speak Mon-Khmer languages, but generally lack a written language.\(^13\) The Lao Theung make up another 25% of the population.\(^14\) The largest of them (also the second-largest minority in Laos) is the Khuu, who are thought to be the original inhabitants of Laos,\(^15\) probably from around Luang Phabang.\(^16\) As the Lao, Thai, and Tai ethnic groups migrated to Laos,
the natives were pushed onto the poorer lands of the hill country and subjugated by the newer ethnic groups. The Khmu along with other midland ethnic groups were previously called kha, which means “slave” in Lao.

The last group is the Lao Soung, or highlanders, who inhabit areas at 3,000 feet and above. They primarily do slash-and-burn agriculture supplemented by hunting and gathering, and are animists and ancestor worshipers. The two most common highlanders are the Hmong (also called to Meo or Miao) and the lu Mien (also called the Man or Yao), who together make up 10% of the Laotian population. The highland ethnic groups are the most recent immigrants from China. Most have come to Laos since 1850. Some first passed through other Southeast Asian countries, which still have lu Mien and Hmong villages. Because of their isolation and semi-migratory lifestyle, they have retained their independence more than most other minorities in Laos.

The recent history of Laos has been complicated by two simultaneous wars with very different goals. In 1953 the Laotian population finally succeeded in gaining independence from France. This opened up Laos for the first war between the Royal Lao government, which represented the old, French-supported elite, and the Pathet Lao, a communist group that started before independence in 1949. The Pathet Lao hoped to create a new society that would change some of the age-old inequities among the stratified Laotian social classes and between the Lao and other ethnic groups in Laos. At the same time that this internal war was occurring, the United States started participating in the Laotian government and helped finance the Royal Lao Army in its battles against the Pathet Lao. The fight against the Pathet Lao became one more piece in the United States war against the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. Starting in 1964, the United States fight against the Pathet Lao began to have a striking impact on the rural population, particularly that located in Pathet Lao-dominated areas because the United States began major cluster bombing of Laotian villages.

Although the United States presence in Vietnam was the main focus in the American press, in fact the “secret war” in Laos made the Laotian countryside, where nearly 90% of the population lived, almost uninhabitable. Three million tons of bombs were dropped, more tonnage per capita than on any other nation in the history of warfare. Nonetheless, at the same time the Pathet Lao succeeded in taking over more territory. Villagers were faced with three choices: align themselves with the Pathet Lao, try to remain neutral, or join the Royal Lao
and the United States military efforts. Those who did join the Royal Lao Army felt betrayed when, after many promises, the Americans left them to their fate just as the Pathet Lao succeeded in conquering Laos in December 1975. Approximately 500,000 Laotians, most of whom were Lao Lum and Lao Soung villagers, left Laos either because their economic base had been destroyed due to mass bombing, or because of previous affiliations with the Royal Lao Army. Refugees crossed the Mekong River into Thailand and settled into Thai refugee camps waiting for years to be settled in a third country. About 350,000 Laotians ended up coming to the United States.

**The Lao**

Reflective of the strong influence of Indian culture, Laos had a highly stratified society. The Laotian language mirrored this stratification by having four different tones dependent on to whom one was speaking: one for royalty, one for superiors, one for equals, and one for inferiors. Since the royal family was endowed with semidivine roots, it was hard to argue with the king’s proclamations. Although the Lao royalty and through them provincial officials had total control over villages, except for taxes, and occasional military impressment and corvée labor, most villages were left alone to govern themselves. Most villagers tended to stay in the immediate world of their own and neighboring villages within which most families were relatively equal.

The Lao village, usually composed of thirty to fifty houses containing 150 to 300 people, functioned as a self-sufficient, independent entity, which provided its members with everything they needed for physical, moral, and mental well-being and identity. Village members helped each other throughout their lives. Although each family had its own fields, villagers would do labor exchanges during planting and harvest time. Each family would contribute equally in time, money, and labor to bigger village projects such as building roads or a school. Villagers would help each other during house raisings, and also during times of illness, death, and other emergencies. In addition, every true village had a Buddhist temple, or wat. The upkeep of the monastery and the bonses (monks) fell exclusively on the village and also helped bring members together as a single group.

**Formation of and Roles within the Family**

The formation of relationships between families also contributed strongly to villages becoming a single community. Laotians did not have last names until 1943, when the government required them. For this reason, most people knew their relatives only three generations back. Families did not form greater clan groupings based on shared family names. As 80% of marriages took place within the village, most of the village was related by blood or by marriage. Because children counted both their mother’s and their father’s families equally as relatives, they had a large number of people to call on for help. In this way, the village became like
a greater family. Most households in the village consisted of parents, children, and perhaps one child’s spouse and children. Occasionally relatives or close friends who became “uncles or aunts” also lived with the family. Relationships between children and parents were strong. Because of their religious belief in reincarnation (described later), these relationships were further enhanced as they were thought to represent the accumulation of many lifetimes of interactions.

Men’s and women’s roles within the family were clearly defined and, although different, were usually considered equal. The father of the family was considered the head of the household and represented the family at all village meetings. The mother often had control of the house, managed household finances, and sold family produce at the market. Couples usually discussed all problems and made major decisions together. Women were also allowed to inherit property, could be shamans, and participated along with other elders as advisers to the headman and families to help them solve conflicts. Although there was a sexual division between men’s and women’s work—men tended to do the heavier work in the fields and women to do more work at home—many tasks were done together and were interchangeable. For example, when counting families’ contributions to a labor exchange, everybody over sixteen, male or female, was counted as equal.

Youth were allowed a large degree of sexual freedom and generally decided on their own mates. However, if pregnancy resulted, marriage almost always occurred. Such liberty was allowed because it was often believed that the pair had been lovers in a former life and were continuing their relationship in this one. The engagement process and marriage ceremony were complicated and worked out between both sets of parents. As usual, the ceremony involved much laughter and horseplay as well as ritual. For example, the new groom had to figure out a way to pay off his new sisters-in-law in order to convince them to wash his feet before he was allowed to climb the ladder into his in-laws’ house and meet his new bride.

When young couples got married, they tended to live with the wife’s family for the first couple of years so that her first child could be born in a comfortable environment and so that the husband formed a close relationship with the wife’s family. This period also usually served as the young husband’s “bride price.” By working for his father-in-law for several years, he paid back some of the labor his wife’s family would lose after the marriage. If the young husband was found to be unacceptable, the marriage was terminated at this point.

After the couple moved out, much of the time they settled near the wife’s family. Usually the youngest daughter would continue living permanently in her parents’ house after marriage. The young couple would take care of the wife’s parents as they aged and would often inherit the house after their death. Because of these living patterns, women had a uniquely powerful role in Laotian village life.
Once a man succeeded in getting married, he was allowed to marry a second time. However, both second marriages and divorce rarely occurred. Only wealthy men had the means to pay a second bride price. Instead, it was common to have girlfriends in addition to one’s original spouse. Few women had boyfriends, and the repercussions for being found with one were severe. Divorce was allowed, but was extremely difficult for a woman to initiate because the person responsible for breaking up a marriage had to pay a large fine. Few women had sources of outside income available to them. However, almost all marriages survived and prospered because men’s and women’s roles were clearly defined and respected. In addition, marriages were actively supported by both sets of parents and, when needed, by the council of elders. All parents and elders were ready to mediate conflicts and encourage decisions based on the long-term needs of the family, rather than on the immediate interests of the individual.

**Getting an Education**

By living in the close confines of the village community, most children automatically assimilated appropriate behavior and skills. Children, who were mainly cared for by their grandparents, learned from listening to their stories and by actively observing and then slowly participating in the tasks of adults. Children were usually not forced to help their families or to learn any particular skill at home, at school, or in the temple. Further, they were usually not praised once they had successfully mastered a new ability. This was because it was believed that the successful completion of a task should be its own reward. In addition, because the capacity to do something was thought to be an innate quality, it was not useful to encourage or to praise. At the same time, the closeness of the community created an environment where children wanted to join their peers in helping to contribute to their families. When children did something wrong, they were rarely physically punished. Usually, they did not feel as if they had individually sinned or were morally bad. Instead, they knew they had brought shame to their family in front of the community. This was usually enough to keep them in line. Although a large degree of deviation was allowed in personal values and beliefs, in general, children wanted to grow up to be respected. Respect was gained through concealing displeasing emotions and being generous, cooperative, nonargumentative, and moderate, and through merit-making activities related to Buddhism such as becoming a bonze.

By becoming a bonze, many boys received an education in addition to that picked up around the village. In the temple they would learn discipline, moral values, Buddhist ceremonies and scripture, meditating, reading, writing, basic arithmetic, and many manual skills. Bonzes tried to teach boys to follow the eightfold path: (1–2) right views (or knowledge) and right intention, which were based on wisdom; (3–6) right speech, action, living, and effort, which were based on morality; and (7–8) right attention and concentration, which were based on learning techniques to concentrate the mind. Secular schools focused on teaching children knowledge. Knowledge was thought to be a pool of pragmatic information often used to develop a plan of
Education in the school or the temple usually embodied discipline and flexibility, two characteristics typical of Laotian village life. Understanding of what has always been right in the past. In addition to wisdom, the temple taught morality and meditation, thought to be the basis for the other steps on the eightfold path. For this reason, when there was a secular school available, its curriculum often seemed limited or even somewhat useless to villagers.

Education in the school or the temple usually embodied discipline and flexibility, two characteristics typical of Laotian village life. Both school and temple curricula were learned by rote. Teachers and bonzes were greatly respected, and discipline was strong. At the same time, it was the individual’s choice based on his innate ability whether he would apply himself, and whether he would continue his studies. These same characteristics were also true for those who became a bonze before they got married or when they were elders. The temple was a strict hierarchy mirroring the secular political system. In addition to the temple boys and novices, there were six different levels of bonzes. Despite this, although bonzes had to listen to and obey their superiors, rules were not rigidly defined and they could leave the monastery at any time.

The Lao Version of Buddhism

The Buddhism that was practiced in Laos was a unique intermingling of traditional Buddhist beliefs and spirit worship. Theravada Buddhism, originally from India, is thought to have been introduced in Laos by Khmer (Cambodian) monks in the fourteenth century. At that time Laos already had a strong religious base worshiping the phi, or natural spirits inhabiting the land, the household, the village, and many other places and people. Buddhist values and beliefs were added to traditional practices rather than replacing them. The phi continued to be included in all ceremonies, often by the Buddhist bonzes themselves. Once a year a celebration was held to particularly honor the village’s protective spirits. In addition, most households had altars to the phi who lived in and safeguarded the household. Most livestock were sacrificed to the phi before being eaten.

At the same time, with some alteration, traditional Buddhist ideas continued to be practiced. Such doctrine included a belief in a lifetime of suffering, reincarnation, doing merit-making activity in this life in order to determine the quality of the next life, and the ultimate goal of enlightenment. Many other Buddhist cultures believed suffering in this life encouraged behaviors
leading to a better next life. Many purposely avoided sensuality as a means of gaining enlight-
enment more quickly.\textsuperscript{90} The Lao, on the other hand, always believed in mixing merit-making
opportunities and the pleasures of the moment.\textsuperscript{91} It was felt that since gaining pleasure obviously
shows the individual’s success in eradicating suffering, which was also the reason for becoming
enlightened, it was a logical thing to do.\textsuperscript{92} Therefore, almost all Buddhist ceremonies and formal
occasions, such as funerals, included feasting, drinking, singing, storytelling, and active courting
by the youth. For the same reason, there was no point in working incredibly hard in order to
accumulate wealth for its own sake. In fact, hoarding a surplus caused a loss of prestige in the
community. Money was useful only in that it could help one gain merit and confer pleasure
through greater giving.\textsuperscript{93}

\textbf{The Basis of Traditional Healing}

Buddhism and worship of the phi were also intermingled when dealing with sickness. Humans
were believed to be composed of thirty-two souls, each of whom was present within a different
organ in the body.\textsuperscript{94} In fact, the Lao word for human, \textit{khon}, also means “to mix,” not only
because humans have been created out of multiple souls but also because they live within many
worlds and over many lives.\textsuperscript{95} When one soul left, that portion of the body became ill.\textsuperscript{96} Souls
could be called back by both bonzes and by shamans using ceremonies and herbs in order to
rebalance an individual’s original “mixture” so that they will be healthy.\textsuperscript{97} Curing a person
almost never involved cutting or operating since it was counterproductive to open up the body
and encourage an additional soul to escape.\textsuperscript{98} Mental illness was not recognized as a disease
in Laos. People were considered to be either normal or insane.\textsuperscript{99} Those who were disturbed,
upset, or angry were also thought to be out of balance. Balance was regained either by rituals
to call back the missing soul, or by going to the temple to talk with the bonze and to meditate.\textsuperscript{100}
At death, all thirty-two souls would disperse and then recombine with other spirits in order to
be reincarnated again.\textsuperscript{101} In addition to bonzes and shamans, some of the few available secular
teachers carried Western medical kits that they dispensed with varying degrees of skill.\textsuperscript{102}
However, few Laotians in the countryside had any experience with Western medicine.

\textbf{Leadership in the Village}

Although gender helped to establish one’s role in the family, age usually was the main determi-
nant of status both in the family and in the village.\textsuperscript{103} Younger children were always supposed
to respect their elder siblings.\textsuperscript{104} All children were expected to respect and obey parents and, to
an even greater extent, grandparents. In addition to formally serving on the council of advisers,
grandparents advised their children and helped them solve internal family conflicts. In general,
elders received almost all leadership positions in the village.
Most villages had a wide variety of leadership who served in many different functions. Although the chief bonze was the most important leader in the village, he generally did not involve himself in secular affairs unless they directly affected the temple. Bonzes also became leaders in that they officiated at all ceremonies and major celebrations of the life cycle, provided boys with education, and acted as advisers for problems that could not be solved in other ways. When they left the monastery, Buddhist laymen became respected elders in the community and continued advisory relationships formed with youth when they had been young disciples in the temple. In addition to the council of elders, the shaman, and occasionally a secular teacher, the main authority in the village was the village headman and one or two assistants, all of whom were voted in by the villagers. The headman was always the most respected male head of the household. He was usually somewhat wealthier than other villagers, which enabled him to contribute generously to celebrations. However, it was his moral stature, fairness, and generosity that caused people to choose him as leader. Although the leader was greatly respected, he was usually thought to be equal to his peers. This meant he had to create consensus through persuasion, rather than through authority. The headman, who was unpaid, had a specifically defined set of jobs including organizing a series of labor exchanges between families and for bigger village projects, settling disputes, welcoming strangers, announcing government directives, and referring problems. Headmen were generally elected for life.

Leaving Laos

With the rise of the Pathet Lao and the massive American cluster bombings, patterns of life in the village started to change dramatically. Thousands of people were killed or maimed. Fields were filled with unexploded ordnance that often blew up when people tried to work in the fields. Most people tried to work mainly at night. Eventually over 700,000 of the 1 million people located in Pathet Lao–occupied territories left their villages. Many of them crossed the Mekong River into Thai or UN-run refugee camps. The trip to the camp was extremely dangerous. Many Thai soldiers used the opportunity to randomly imprison, steal, or rape the refugees. Once in the camps, refugees discovered limited food, water, or medicine; extremely poor housing with almost no privacy; violence and rape by fellow refugees and by Thai administrators; and an overwhelming helplessness and dependence on UN provisions that was difficult for such independent villagers to accept. Most refugees spent years in the camps waiting and hoping to be accepted into the United States and unable to continue their lives.


4 Ibid.


7 LeBar and Suddard, p. 35.


12 LeBar and Suddard, p. 40.

13 Ibid., pp. 36, 42.


15 Tayanin, Minority Cultures of Laos, pp. 7, 10.


17 Ibid.

18 LeBar and Suddard, p. 42.

19 Ibid., p. 41.


21 Ibid., p. 41.


23 LeBar and Suddard, p. 41.


26 Proudfoot, Even the Birds Don’t Sound the Same Here, pp. 12-34.

27 Ibid., p. 28.


29 Proudfoot, Even the Birds Don’t Sound the Same Here, pp. 28, 33.


31 Proudfoot, Even the Birds Don’t Sound the Same Here, p. 31.

32 Ibid., pp. 30-35.

33 Ibid., p. xiii.

34 LeBar and Suddard, p. 74.

35 Joel M. Halpern, Government, Politics, and Social Structure in Laos, Monograph Series No. 4, Southeast Asia Studies. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1964, p. 35.


39 LeBar and Suddard, pp. 68-70.


41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., pp. 68-70.

43 LeBar and Suddard, p. 64.


47 Ibid.


53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 LeBar and Suddard, p. 69.
57 Luangpraseut, Laos Culturally Speaking, p. 32.
58 LeBar and Suddard, pp. 65–66.
59 Ibid., p. 66.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Wildflowers Institute Laotian and Khmu Informal Leaders Focus Group, 1/29/00.
66 Wildflowers Institute Laotian Elders Focus Group, 11/13/99.
67 Luangpraseut, Laos Culturally Speaking, p. 25.
68 LeBar and Suddard, p. 97.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., p. 98.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., p. 96.
73 Ibid., pp. 99–100.
74 Ibid., p. 78.
75 Luangpraseut, Laos Culturally Speaking, p. 38.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Halpern, Government, Politics, and Social Structure in Laos, p. 22.
79 Ibid.
81 LeBar and Suddard, p. 52.
82 Halpern, Government, Politics, and Social Structure in Laos, p. 22.
83 Ibid., p. 51.
84 LeBar and Suddard, p. 45.
85 Ibid.
87 LeBar and Suddard, p. 46.
88 Ibid.
89 Luangpraseut, Laos Culturally Speaking, p. 21.
90 LeBar and Suddard, p. 101.
91 Luangpraseut, Laos Culturally Speaking, p. 29.
92 LeBar and Suddard, p. 101.
93 Ibid.
94 LeBar and Suddard, p. 45.
95 Luangpraseut, Laos Culturally Speaking, p. 18.
96 Ibid., p. 47.
97 Whitaker, Laos, A Country Study, p. 70.
98 Wildflowers Institute Laotian and Khmu Informal Leaders Focus Group, 1/29/00.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 LeBar and Suddard, p. 45.
103 LeBar and Suddard, p. 98.
104 Ibid., p. 67.
105 Halpern, Aspects of Village Life and Culture Change in Laos, p. 131.
106 LeBar and Suddard, p. 53.
107 Ibid., p. 70.
110 LeBar and Suddard, p. 70.
111 Ibid.
KHMU COMMUNITY PORTRAIT

by Miriam Gross

You don’t have to cut trees just because you have a sharp jungle-knife;
You don’t have to persuade others just because you have a clever tongue.

—Damrong Tayanin,
“Social Values: Calmness and Restraint”

Introduction

For a child born into a Khmu village, much of one’s life and relationships in the human, natural, and spiritual realms was already preordained. The Khmu lived in isolated villages on mountainsides in Laos surrounded by jungles, tigers, poisonous snakes, wildfires, storms, and evil spirits. They eeked out a precarious existence hunting, gathering, and using slash-and-burn agriculture. The low-lands, although seemingly safer, until fairly recently contained people determined to humiliate and enslave the Khmu. For this reason, learning life’s essential survival skills; gaining the protection of the house and village spirits; following the extensive, calendrically based, taboo-driven prohibitions; maintaining family unity; and complying with societal roles were the only things that stood between the individual and obliteration. On the other hand, learning ancient wisdom and following taboos ensured the survival and even the success of the family and the village.

Ritualized Space

For most Khmu, their house, village, and its surroundings were integrated with the spirits of the land. For this reason a person’s house and village became holy or ritualized spaces intimately familiar and carefully organized to best meet the needs of both human and spirit inhabitants. Each house had its own set of protective ancestor spirits and the village as a whole had spirits of the land who would care for its members. Each family was under the protection of a totem such as a boar or an eagle who had originally helped an ancestor and would continue to protect the family if appropriate measures were taken. The typical house had three altars, two different hearths, and three different spaces for family meals depending on the occasion. Houses generally had two rooms, one for unmarried girls and one larger living space where the parents slept. For many Khmu, it was taboo to have anything associated with death or violence within the house because this would make the ancestor spirits who resided there unhappy.
The village, which contained at least three different family totem groups, was equally well organized. In addition to family houses, it contained family workhouses, common houses/guest houses, smithies, and an additional common “house” that was a communal offering built to shelter the village spirits. Communal offerings were rebuilt by the entire village yearly to represent the renewal of the village.  The carefully designed interior space of the village was defined by a perimeter consisting of three to four gates. Outside and surrounding the village were barns, more altars, and a ring of very large jungle giants that protected the village against storms and wild fires. In addition, the cemetery had four different areas: one for those who died normally, one for those who died by accident, one for those who died as children or who were mute, and one for burying the clothes of those who died far from home. Placement of the dead was very important to the Khmu because unlike their Laotian neighbors, they did not believe in rebirth.

Outside the village’s ring of large trees, there was an extensive set of fields that were used in a seven- to fifteen-year cycle. Before a field was used, it was burned so that the growth of the fallow years could fertilize the new plantings of dry rice and other vegetables. Infrequent use of the fields ensured their long-term fertility. Villages moved infrequently and usually settled only a few kilometers from their previous location. In addition to growing food in the fields, women went gathering, men went hunting using traps, and both went fishing. To succeed in these activities, people had to have extensive knowledge of hundreds of plants and animals, growth patterns, and likely habitats and behaviors. Every plant had a name and a use. Every stream had a name and a location. For example, one Khmu could remember the uses for each of seventeen different kinds of bamboo and could map out the location and name for eighty-six different streams in relation to his village. There were almost as many taboos for propitiating the spirits of the land as there were in the house and the village. For example, for many Khmu, it was taboo to cut down any trees by a stream because this would make the stream dirty and its spirits unhappy. All Khmu were especially careful to act respectfully before the spirits in the many sacred areas both within the village and surrounding it. Thus the land surrounding the village was as well known for its beauties and its dangers as were the members of one’s family. This knowledge led to security both in terms of success for hunting and gathering and in terms of spiritual and natural protection. In the spaces between the house and the village, and between the village and the more distant terrain of fields and jungles, an individual formed rings of physical, natural, and spiritual forces providing the security needed for survival.

**Ritualized Time**

Just as the space in and around the Khmu village had been charted and ritualized, so was time mapped out. The Khmu used a lunar calendar subdivided by a ten- and twelve-day cycle that ran simultaneously creating sixty possible combinations of days. Most days clearly defined which activities would be successful and lucky. Some days were good for starting, others for
ending, and others for continuing activities. Some were death days, when it was appropriate to make traps or go hunting; others were good for planting or building.\textsuperscript{18} It was taboo to do many different types of activities at one time.\textsuperscript{19} An individual’s birthday, which occurred every ten days, also determined what was appropriate for him or her.\textsuperscript{20} Thus almost every day’s activities were predetermined both in terms of time and location. The spirits would not become vindictive if a taboo was broken; they would simply stop protecting not only the individual wrongdoer, but also the wrongdoer’s entire family. This meant that a family’s protection was based equally on the efforts of all its individual members.\textsuperscript{21} Such extensive taboos, although complex and confining, were also liberating since they ensured the individual’s safety and gave the individual control over an unpredictable environment.

\textbf{Ritualized Relationships}

The relationships between people in the Khmu village were almost as formalized as those with space and time. Age and gender-based roles were clearly defined.\textsuperscript{22} At the age of about six or eight, boys would gradually move out of the family house to live in the closest common houses.\textsuperscript{23} While members within a household all had to share the same protective totem, membership in a common house was determined by proximity.\textsuperscript{24} This ensured that boys of different clans formed friendships at an early age. Most boys spent their days working with and helping their families, returning in the evening to sleep in the common house. By living in the common house, boys developed independence and learned skills and traditional stories from older men.\textsuperscript{25} Since trap making, a major male occupation, was forbidden in the household,\textsuperscript{26} most men stayed in the common house during their spare time. Girls continued living at home learning skills from their mothers until marriage. Although both genders often worked on the same task, such as planting, each had a specific role to play. For example, men dug the holes and women planted the seeds.\textsuperscript{27} At each age there were specific gender-appropriate activities and roles to be played.\textsuperscript{28} Elder people and siblings were always responsible for younger ones.\textsuperscript{29} The eldest son had a particularly dominant role within the family and was expected to lead, make decisions, and provide material support for his younger siblings. At the same time, the eldest son and his wife would be responsible for the care of his parents and would inherit the family household.\textsuperscript{30} Although the house was often considered the woman’s space,\textsuperscript{31} the father of the family and later his eldest son made all family decisions.\textsuperscript{32}
Elders were the most important people in the village. They were often both feared and respected, making all wider village decisions and solving conflicts that arose within and between families. Although younger people and women could chip in ideas during councils, the elders alone made the final decision. In larger group activities, elders also often directed activities. For example, an elderly woman often took the lead in terms of management of the fields. Each village had up to four additional sources of leadership: the shaman, the medicine man, the priest, and the village headman. Both men and women could be shamans, a position based on great knowledge since there were hundreds of different kinds of spirits, each of which required being dealt with by a different ceremony. Truly powerful shamans could provide services for up to twenty different villages. Shaman’s duties included learning magic for calling back sick people’s lost souls, and for chasing away or calling out evil spirits. The medicine man provided the herbal complement to the shaman’s spiritual healing. The priest, who had the only hereditary position, was thought to have a special relationship with the village spirits. He planned and officiated over the various communal annual ceremonies that were held in appreciation of the village spirits’ protective efforts.

The village headman was usually chosen by the Laotian government. Despite this, he was almost always a very well respected individual who tried to protect the village against the Laotian authorities. In addition to extremely heavy taxes, most of which went to line the pockets of petty officials and none of which were ever used to build roads, schools, or clinics for the Khmu, the Khmu were subject to corvée labor. They were often called away to work for free for the benefit of the officials who controlled their village. Moreover, they were forced to carry messages among the high-mountain peoples no matter how terrible weather conditions were on the mountainside. Many headmen tried to systematically underreport the size of the village population so that the whole village could pay taxes for the few on the tax rolls. In this way, people were rarely forced to sell their fields and starve. Since 1975 this situation has greatly improved. However, most of the Khmu refugees had left for America before they could experience this change.

Both because of their isolation and because of the treatment by the Laotian authorities, in the past the Khmu rarely went to officials with problems. Instead, they developed their own independent, self-maintained system of justice. Although they lacked prisons, they had an extensive defined system of fines that were used as punishment. Parents of the offender were always included in the discussion. The village headman and elders made all decisions regarding crimes and received a portion of the punishment money. They were also given personal apologies
for misbehaviors perceived to harm the village spirits as well as the family—such as out-of-wedlock pregnancy. For those Khmu to whom violence was taboo in the household, domestic violence was almost unknown. However, when a man did beat his wife, she went back to her parents. In order to get her back the husband paid a fine to the village elders and headman, and performed an expensive “apology ceremony” for his wife and her family. Often, merely the threat of elder involvement in a family argument was enough to resolve the conflict.

Marital Customs and Village Organization

Customs surrounding marriage were among the most complicated in the Khmu village and formed the baseline organizational structure for all village relationships. These customs also ensured that while power relationships within the family might be unequal, relationships between families in the village remained egalitarian even in the face of occasionally unequal wealth. Most villages had three different clans represented among their population: a clan’s totem was a plant, a bird, or a quadruped. The wife of a young man born into a plant totem group (for example, the fern) could only come from the bird totem group, preferably one’s mother’s brother’s daughter. At the same time, one’s sister could only marry somebody from disturbed by inappropriate marriages. The ill-luck and sickness the spirits could perpetrate ensured compliance with marriage customs. The father-in-law was one of the most respected figures in a man’s life, and many duties and gifts were required of him in order to receive his future wife. In fact one of the only reasons a man left his village, aside from trips to obtain salt, was to go to the lowlands and earn cash to pay the “bride price.” If a man did not have the money, he would often live with and work for his father-in-law for three to eight years before getting married. His father-in-law could dissolve the potential marriage at any time during this period. Although marrying additional wives brought high status, few men were wealthy enough to afford the additional bride price it required. When a man had two or more wives, the first one, referred to as “older sister,” took charge of the household. After marriage, a man usually moved back into his father’s house. Occasionally, the family might have enough resources to build a separate house for him.

On all major occasions, relationships among the triad of different clans were cemented and reaffirmed according to a ritualized series of gifts and duties. An individual’s main support system also came from this set of relationships. For example, these relationships would “give” an individual labor, food, or other goods. He in turn would pay them back with other “gifts.” Thus these relationships formed an individual’s insurance system; in a nonmonetarized economy they ensured that he could always draw on resources greater than those available to him in his own nuclear family.
Living in Laotian Society

Not surprisingly, once the Khmu left the village and its surroundings they felt great concern over their future welfare. In addition, at least in the past, the Khmu were treated as uncivilized primitives by the dominant Laotian population, and had in many cases integrated this sense of inferiority into their identity. Therefore, when Khmu entered the lowlands, many tried to hide and deny their identity, and assimilate as quickly as possible into the mainstream population. In this way, they simultaneously lost their inferior status and gained the protections the Buddhist religion had to offer. Further, it was almost impossible to maintain the village spiritual and structural organization without the presence of the land that held the spirits and the stable village environment that ensured the availability of permissible marriage partners.

Immigration History

When the communist Pathet Lao started actively promoting change in Laos, the Khmu to a certain extent became divided. Although a few tried to remain neutral, or joined the Royal Lao government party and were organized in the “secret army,” the vast majority joined the Pathet Lao in its attempts to overthrow the government. Three reasons prompted many Khmu to make this choice. First, a greatly admired leader of another Mon-Khmer ethnic group, Mr. Kommadam, had aligned himself with the Pathet Lao. Second, the Pathet Lao controlled most of the Khmu territory. Third, and most important, the Pathet Lao was the first group to reach out to the Khmu and promise them equality and participation in the political process.

As the Pathet Lao started moving through the hills, it became increasingly dangerous to belong to the Royalist cause. Khmu affiliated with the Royalists started escaping to the UN-run camps located on the Thai border. Approximately 3,000 Khmu, mainly classified as “Laotians,” joined the rest of the Southeast Asian refugees and came to the United States between 1975 and the early 1980s. Most Khmu tried to settle close to other Khmu communities who were from similar locations in Laos. This helped keep alive old bonds as well as facilitate communication since there are three different dialect groups in the Khmu language. Occasionally entire villages reformed themselves in a single apartment complex. Over half the Khmu settled in California. The largest community in the United States is in the San Francisco Bay Area; the second largest is in Stockton, which has approximately 2,000 Khmu mainly from north central Laos.

6 Lindell, Swahn, and Tayanin, Folk Tales from Kamnu, Volume V, p. 5.
7 Tayanin, Being Kamnu: My Village, My Life, p. 22.
8 Ibid., p. 3.
9 Ibid., pp. 12–14.
10 Ibid.
11 Lindell, Swahn, and Tayanin, Folk Tales from Kamnu, Volume V, p. 15.
12 Tayanin, Minority Cultures of Laos, p. 20.
14 Tayanin, Minority Cultures of Laos, p. 58.
15 Tayanin, Being Kamnu: My Village, My Life, pp. 48–51.
16 Wildflowers Institute, Khmu Social Service Provider Interview, 2/17/00.
17 Tayanin, Minority Cultures of Laos, p. 18.
19 Ibid., p. 105.
20 Tayanin, Being Kamnu: My Village, My Life, p. 4.
21 Tayanin, Minority Cultures of Laos, p. 46.
22 Tayanin, Being Kamnu: My Village, My Life, pp. 81–90.
23 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Lindell, Swahn, and Tayanin, Folk Tales from Kamnu, Volume V, p. 5.
28 Tayanin, Being Kamnu: My Village, My Life, pp. 81–90.
29 Wildflowers Institute, Stockton Facilitator Focus Group (Khm), 11/11/99.
30 Ibid.
31 Tayanin, Being Kamnu: My Village, My Life, p. 88.
32 Wildflowers Institute, Stockton Facilitator Focus Group (Khm), 11/11/99.
33 Tayanin, Minority Cultures of Laos, p. 48.
35 Ibid.
36 Tayanin, Being Kamnu: My Village, My Life, p. 87.
37 Ibid., p. 19.
38 Ibid., pp. 18–20.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 38.
42 Ibid., pp. 21–22.
43 Ibid., pp. 38–44.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Tayanin, Minority Cultures of Laos, p. 48.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., pp. 49–50.
50 Wildflowers Institute, Khmu Social Service Provider Interview, 2/17/00.
51 Tayanin, Minority Cultures of Laos, p. 49.
52 Wildflowers Institute, Stockton Facilitator Focus Group (Khm), 11/11/99.
53 Tayanin, Minority Cultures of Laos, p. 27.
54 Ibid., p. 31.
55 Tayanin, Being Kamnu: My Village, My Life, p. 16.
56 Tayanin, Minority Cultures of Laos, p. 29.
57 Ibid., p. 28.
58 Ibid., p. 45.
59 Tayanin, Being Kamnu: My Village, My Life, p. 32.
60 Ibid., pp. 104–107.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Wildflowers Institute, Khmu Family Focus Group, 11/13/99.
66 Tayanin, Being Kammu: My Village, My Life, p. 89.
68 Lindell, Swahn and Tayanin, Folk Tales from Kammu, Volume V, pp. 5–6 and Tayanin, Being Kammu: My Village, My Life, pp. 34–35.
69 Tayanin, Being Kammu: My Village, My Life, p. 31.
71 Ibid.
73 Lindell, Swahn and Tayanin, Folk Tales from Kammu, Volume V, pp. 5–6.
74 Tayanin, Minority Cultures of Laos, p. 56.
78 Ibid, p. 553.
79 Tayanin, Minority Cultures of Laos, p. 30.
80 Proschan, “Khmu,” American Immigrant Cultures: Builders of a Nation, p. 553.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
Population

- In 1997, China (including Hong Kong) and the Philippines were the leading countries of origin after Mexico for foreign-born residents in the United States. Each contributed 1.1 million people.¹

- In July 1998, 36.2% percent of the population in San Francisco County were Asians and Pacific Islanders (APIs).²

- From the 1990 census to July 1997, the API population in San Francisco County increased at the fastest rate, 24.5% (Table 1). The major increase in the API population came from migration (74.2%).³

Table 1. Race/Ethnic Population Estimates for San Francisco County, April 1990 to July 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>BLACK</th>
<th>NATIVE AMERICAN</th>
<th>API</th>
<th>HISPANIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APRIL 1990</td>
<td>723,959</td>
<td>338,578</td>
<td>76,343</td>
<td>2,635</td>
<td>205,686</td>
<td>100,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY 1997</td>
<td>777,384</td>
<td>320,044</td>
<td>77,257</td>
<td>2,749</td>
<td>256,174</td>
<td>121,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGE SINCE 1990</td>
<td>53,425</td>
<td>-18,534</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>50,488</td>
<td>20,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT CHANGE</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>-5.5%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- According to the 1990 census data, Asians and Pacific Islanders composed 29% of the San Francisco City population. Among them, 18% were Chinese (Figure 1).⁴

Figure 1

San Francisco City Population by Race/Ethnicity

• The total Chinese population in the United States was 1,645,472, or 22.6% of the API population in 1990.5

• San Francisco County had 127,140 Chinese, or 18% of the California Chinese population, and 7.7% of the U.S. Chinese population in 1990.6

• Between 1980 and 1990, the Chinese population grew by 116.3% in California.7

• In the San Francisco Bay Area, more than half of the Chinese were new immigrants. The Bay Area has the largest Chinese population center in the United States.8

• Among those speaking API languages at home in San Francisco City, 34.3% of adults (18 to 64 years) and 59% of elderly (65 years and above) did not speak English well or not at all.9

Economic Status

• Among legal permanent residents, 2.8% of Chinese under 65 and 36.2% of Chinese over 65 received public assistance in 1990.10

• Based on 1990 census, the Chinese in California had a family median income of $43,282, which was higher than that of whites. However, there was also a higher percentage of Chinese families living below the poverty line (10% vs. 6.2%).11

• The San Francisco Bay Area is estimated to have 1,500 Chinese restaurants employing 15,000 people who are mainly new immigrants from China and Hong Kong. Working hours are often twelve hours a day, six to seven days a week. The owner and chef often work fourteen hours a day, seven days a week. Gross salary for full-time restaurant workers is $1,500–$3,000 per month, including tips.12

• San Francisco is estimated to have 350 Chinese garment factories employing 15,000 workers. About 100 factories are located in Chinatown. Average wage is $150–$200 per week.13

• In San Francisco Chinatown 74% of housing was built before 1950 and used lead paint. Chinatown is one of most densely populated neighborhoods in the United States with 228 persons per acre, 7.2 times higher than the city average.14
**Education**

- Education has a bipolar distribution among Chinese Americans in the United States. While the number of Chinese with bachelor’s degrees (37.5%) was higher than that of whites (25.4%), the number of those who were illiterate or had 0–4 years of education (10.3%) was four times greater than whites (2.6%) in 1990.\(^{15}\)

- During the 1999–2000 school year in the San Francisco Unified School District, about a third of the student population was Chinese (29.3%), followed by Latino (21.5%), African American (15.6%), white (11.7%), other nonwhite (12.3%), Filipino (6.9%), Korean (1.0%), Japanese (1.0%), and Native American (0.7%).\(^{16}\)

- During the 1997–98 school year, 41.4% of students enrolled in the San Francisco Unified School District were Asians, excluding Filipinos; however, only 19.9% of the teachers are Asians.\(^{17}\)

- During the 1997–98 school year, the four-year school dropout rate among Asian students, excluding Filipinos, in the San Francisco Unified School District was 7.2%. This was higher than the statewide four-year dropout rate of Asian students (6.3%), but lower than the overall rate (11.7%).\(^{8}\)

- In 1996, the top languages spoken among San Francisco’s Limited English Proficiency (LEP) students were Spanish (35.35%) and Cantonese (34.99%). The percentage of LEP students enrolled in elementary school for 1996 was 17.4%. The percentage for middle school students was approximately 25.5% and for high school students, 23%.\(^{19}\)

- Chinese juveniles referred to detention in San Francisco County in 1996 were 4.6% of the total.\(^{20}\)

**Health**

- A study of insurance rates among California’s APIs during 1996–97 indicated that Chinese had low rates of job-based coverage (58% vs. 69% for non-Latino whites), high uninsured rates (30% vs. 15% for non-Latino whites), and low Medi-Cal coverage (1% vs. 7% for non-Latino whites).\(^{21}\)

- The leading causes of death of APIs and Chinese were different from those of the total population, especially in terms of homicide and suicide in the total of seven selected reporting states (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUSE OF DEATH, AGE RANGE 25–44 YEARS</th>
<th>ALL RACES</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>ALL API</th>
<th>CHINESE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIV INFECTION</td>
<td>1ST</td>
<td>1ST</td>
<td>5TH</td>
<td>4TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCIDENTS</td>
<td>2ND</td>
<td>2ND</td>
<td>2ND</td>
<td>2ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANCERS</td>
<td>3RD</td>
<td>3RD</td>
<td>1ST</td>
<td>1ST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEART DISEASE</td>
<td>4TH</td>
<td>4TH</td>
<td>3RD</td>
<td>3RD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOMICIDE &amp; LEGAL INTERVENTION</td>
<td>5TH</td>
<td>5TH</td>
<td>5TH</td>
<td>5TH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUICIDE</td>
<td>5TH</td>
<td>4TH</td>
<td>4TH</td>
<td>5TH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- Nearly 70% of respondents to the NICOS Chinese Community Health Study identified gambling as the greatest problem plaguing the San Francisco Chinese community.22

- In an analysis conducted for the Committee on the Health and Adjustment of Immigrant Children and Families, the percentage of foreign-born Chinese mothers with low-birthweight infants was lower (3.8%) than that of U.S.-born Chinese mothers (4.8%).23

- In a study conducted by the Vietnamese Community Health Promotion Project, 45% of Chinese and 51% of Vietnamese women had never received a pap smear; 47% of Vietnamese women had never had a breast exam.24

- Based on average annual age-adjusted cancer incidence rates in California, between 1988 and 1992 Chinese men in San Francisco contracted liver cancer 8.6 times more frequently than whites (30.2 vs. 3.5 per 100,000).25

- Based on the 1992–94 aggregated California State Behavioral Risk Factor Survey (BRFS), 13% of APIs were at risk for hypertension; Chinese had a 15.7% prevalence rate.26

- Hypercholesterolemia rates were higher for Chinese (41% for males, 38% for females) than for other California adults in 1990 (16% for males, 18% for females).27

- Infant death rate was 3.9 per 1,000 for Chinese as compared with 7.2 per 1,000 for whites; 87.9% of Chinese women receive prenatal care.28
• In 1995, immigrants accounted for 7,930, or 35%, of total U.S. tuberculosis cases. Two thirds of immigrants with tuberculosis were from seven countries: Mexico (22%), the Philippines (13%), Vietnam (12%), China (5%), Haiti (5%), India (5%), and Korea (4%).

• In a 1990 study of the San Francisco Bay Area, 30% of Chinese women reported experiencing domestic violence.

• According to a 1994 study, Chinese had the lowest rate of teen pregnancy in California, 0.3%.

7 Ibid.
12 B. Wong, Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship.
13 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
31 Dumbauld, McCullough, and Sutocky, Analysis of Health Indicators for California Minority Populations.
Man Mei Cheung’s name comes from the Chinese words man, or vine, and mei, or fern. “That means I have a lot of vitality and strength,” she points out. It’s hard not to agree with that statement after an encounter with Cheung, who’s full of warmth and spirit with no sign of bitterness for the years she suffered from disability and discrimination.

Though her family was too troubled about having a disabled daughter to be truly sympathetic toward her, Cheung said her strength was nurtured on the kindness and affection of the many friends who supported and encouraged her.

Born in 1956, the second child of an intellectual family, Cheung contracted polio a year later. By the age of four, she was still unable to walk.

Around that time, China was undergoing a period of great political upheaval, and Cheung’s father, a scholar and businessman, was in danger. Telling authorities in his native Guangzhou that he was taking Man Mei for medical treatment, he escaped with her to Macao, where he had a close friend. The friend sent Cheung and her father to live with his sister.

“But handicapped people weren’t welcome,” recalled Cheung. “The whole family would be looked down on. So my auntie said, ‘Put her in an orphanage.’ In the orphanage I cried for about one week straight. I was left in a room alone, and nobody paid any attention to me. They gave me food. They didn’t even care if I ate it or not."

Then one day a blind boy came to comfort her. “He told me, ‘This is our fate. Crying is no use.’ He really liked me. I was very moved. From that time on, I almost never cried. I’ll always remember that boy.”

After more than a year in the orphanage, Cheung had received only one visitor—her auntie’s grandson. Nevertheless, the nuns running the orphanage discovered that she wasn’t a true orphan and sent her away.

Her father, who had left Macao for work in Hong Kong, promised to pay the reluctant auntie to care for his daughter. Man Mei was given a spot underneath the steps, a bed made from two fruit cartons, and a diet of leftovers. Completely unable to walk in those days, she was reduced to crawling on the floor like a dog. “It wasn’t much different from being an orphan,” recalled Cheung.

She would stay with her auntie for most of the next twenty years.
One day, when Cheung was six or seven years old, an old woman from Shanghai took
pity on her. “She said, ‘Nobody loves you. God loves you.’ She gave me a cross. It was precious
to me. It demonstrated that somebody loved me.” But soon after, one of the grandchildren took
the cross.

When Cheung complained, her auntie yelled, “Who do you think you are? You’re father
hasn’t given me a cent.”

For the rest of the day, Cheung angrily refused to eat. “Even if I would starve myself,
I wasn’t going to eat anything. If there wasn’t a share for me, I shouldn’t eat.” Guests came
over, and the auntie was embarrassed that the child wasn’t eating, so she confessed to Cheung
that she was only kidding about not receiving any money.

But the incident convinced Cheung that she needed to take care of herself. “I thought I
shouldn’t rely on other people,” she said. “I even thought of going out and begging.”

Around that time, Cheung began working at home making fireworks, wicker chairs, and
beaded clothing. She wasn’t allowed to eat until she finished her work. “To this day I don’t eat
breakfast, and I’m afraid to eat pumpkins. At that time, every meal was pumpkins.”

When she began earning her keep, Cheung no longer felt ashamed of being disabled.
“I realized very early on that crying doesn’t solve problems. No matter what you’re facing,
fear doesn’t get you anywhere. So from a very young age, I wasn’t afraid of people laughing
at me. Whether or not they laughed, I was still disabled. Since nobody loved me, I learned
to love myself.”

Her fondest memories are of her stay in a Guangzhou hospital, where she had eleven
operations. She was around eleven or twelve years old.

“Even though there were no nurses to care for me after each operation, and no medica-
tion to ease the pain, those were the happiest days of my childhood,” said Cheung. “There was
a lot of love there. Everybody was disabled. There was no prejudice. If you had something to
eat, you shared it. Life was worry-free.”

By the time she was released two years later, she was able to walk short distances.
When she went back to live with her auntie in Macao, she began attending school. Already
around thirteen years old, she completed six grades in four years, graduating number one in
her class. She worked in the evenings after school. She continued living with her auntie, but
they became more like roommates.
During her years in Macao, Cheung recalls her father visiting only three times. She would visit her mother and siblings in China once a year over Spring Festival, but never stayed more than three days. “It wasn’t very warm,” she recalled. “They were so afraid of me, so I had to learn to be strong and independent. It’s not that they didn’t love me, it’s just that they were uncomfortable about my disability.”

Instead, she thought of her classmates and teachers as her family. They and others—the blind boy, the Shanghainese woman—gave her the love and support she needed. “The people I’ve loved the most in my life have been my friends,” she said.

Cheung went on to finish high school, becoming a highly successful worker in Macao, holding three jobs, and earning more than anyone in her family. She worked as a special education teacher, an advertising layout worker, and a seamstress. At the sewing factory, she met Cheang Daisen, a cutter, but didn’t marry him for years.

“I had gotten used to my freedom,” she said.

She opted to join her parents, who by that time had emigrated to the United States and were living in San Francisco. “My family made me feel very disappointed. Ten days after I got here, my mother said, ‘Don’t expect me to take care of you,’” recalled Cheung.

So, with almost no help from her parents, Cheung signed up for English classes, found a job, and located an empty room to live in. Then she agreed to go back to China to marry Cheang. Within a few years, they’d had two children—Philip, now ten years old, and Jackson, seven.

She supports her family with social security payments and her husband’s salary from janitorial work at Pier 39. She has served as a board member of Wu Yee Child Development Center, a community advisory board member for the Chinatown Public Health Center, chairperson of Disabled People for an Accessible Chinatown, and a volunteer for the Independent Living Resource Center.

She appreciates Americans’ open-mindedness toward disabled people. “Here, disability is just disability,” said Cheung. “People say hello to me on the street.”

“I think I’m pretty lucky. The difficulties I’ve faced I’ve had people to help me. I confronted a lot of prejudice, but I didn’t care. I just let people see my abilities. I’m pretty optimistic. This is still a good world.”
Chinese students headed for Massachusetts, Shanghai, 1872.

Chinese Students in America in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries

As part of its efforts at modernization (see p. 99), the late Qing government sanctioned initiatives to promote overseas study. One such initiative, championed by Yung Wing (Rong Hong, 1828–1912), was the Chinese Educational Mission to America. Yung had received a missionary education in Macao and studied in the US in 1847–54, becoming the first Chinese graduate of an American university (Yale). Influential officials such as Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang (see p. 99) lent support in the expectation that the students would acquire specialized training in such fields as military science, shipbuilding and engineering, and on their return they would help build railroads and telegraphs, develop modern mining, and establish an armaments industry. However, Yung Wing, who became a naturalized US citizen, entertained quite different hopes for the mission, seeing it as an opportunity for Chinese students to immerse themselves in Western culture and adopt its values.

Between 1872 and 1875, 120 Chinese boys (aged between 12 and 16) went to the US, where they were initially enrolled in high schools throughout the Connecticut valley in New England. The boys were supposed to stay for a period of 15 years, but conservative Chinese officials brought the mission to an abrupt end in 1881, and recalled the students before they had completely forsaken traditional Chinese values for American ones. Official Chinese ire at the US government’s refusal to allow a select group of students to enter the naval and military academies at Annapolis and West Point had been exacerbated by a growing trend of anti-Chinese immigration legislation in America.

Only two students at the time had actually graduated from college; one of them, Jeme Tian Yau, became China’s first railway engineer, although in subsequent years some former members of the mission entered the diplomatic service and took up posts in naval, mining and railway administration. One such former member was Tang Shaoyi, who entered government service during the last years of the dynasty and eventually became the first prime minister of the Chinese Republic in 1912.

A project which American officials and educators hoped would continue where the aborted mission had left off, facilitating the future peaceful expansion of American influence in China, arose from the United States government’s decision in 1908 to remit the surplus of its Boxer Indemnity funds to fund Chinese government scholarships for overseas study in the US. The indemnities had been exacted for damages to foreign life and property suffered during the anti-foreign Boxer uprising in 1900. The American government had exacted a sum in excess of the total of legitimate claims, and it was this excess that was remitted in 1908.

Before 1908 the numbers of Chinese students had been small: 50 in 1903 and 150 in 1905. A number of American educational institutions had also individually offered scholarships to Chinese students; in 1907, for example, ten male Chinese students went to Yale and Harvard, while three Chinese women were able to attend Wellesley College. The Boxer scholarships helped to boost the Chinese student presence.

Competitive examinations were held in 1909, 1910 and 1911 to select students for such scholarships. One successful candidate in 1910 was Hu Shi (1891–1962), who was in the US for seven years, initially studying Agriculture and Botany at Cornell University before transferring to Columbia University to study Philosophy. A prominent advocate of literary reform during the May Fourth Movement, Hu was China’s ambassador to the US in 1938–42. (He was to take up residence in New York upon the Communist takeover of China.)

In 1911 Qinghua College, a special school staffed by American instructors and teaching an American-style curriculum, was opened in Beijing to prepare Chinese scholarship holders for their sojourn in the US. It sent its first group of 16 graduates in 1912. By 1929, when the college was reorganized as an autonomous university and the practice of automatically sending all graduates to the US was ended, some 1,268 Qinghua graduates had studied in America. Overall, the Chinese student population in the US increased from 650 in 1911 to 2,600 in 1923. Since Qinghua graduates were all male, scholarships were separately offered to women on the basis of competitive examinations, and in 1914–29, 53 such scholarship holders went to the US. Overall, there were 640 women students there in 1925.

Qinghua students in the US during the period 1909–29 mostly studied engineering, the social sciences, science and business, a subject distribution that similarly prevailed amongst other Chinese students there. A large majority of those studying there before 1945 hailed from the prosperous coastal provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Furthermore, students primarily came from the business, professional and governing classes. 

Paul Bailey
The Chinese in the United States are the largest Chinese community in the Western world. Their presence there dates back to the early years of the nation. American immigration policy, events in China and US-China relations have been the main factors in the community's growth in size and complexity.

**The Pioneers: 1785–1848**

In 1785, the Pallis, a China trade vessel from Canton, dropped anchor at Baltimore. The three Chinese in her crew were the first recorded Chinese arrivals on American soil. Occasional crewmen continued to stop briefly on the east and west coasts of North America. Others came as students, merchants, servants, circus performers and the like. But up to the mid-19th century, less than 50 Chinese lived in the continental United States.

The China trade also brought Chinese to Hawaii. By the late 1820s, 30 to 40 Chinese, many of them merchants, were living in Honolulu. Enterprising Chinese also installed small cane mills to start the sugar industry in the Islands. However, the Chinese population was still small at mid-century.

**Unrestricted immigration: 1848–82**

The discovery of gold in California in 1848 attracted a huge influx from places all over the globe, including China. California's Chinese population jumped from approximately 50 in the late 1840s to more than 25,000 by 1852. Immigration continued during the next three decades and by 1880, there were more than 100,000 Chinese on the US mainland. Many were Cantonese villagers from Guangdong's Pearl River Delta, with the majority hailing from Siyi, the 'Four Districts' on the delta's west flank (see Part I). The largest number originated from Siyi's Xinning (now Taishan) county. Many of those who became labourers came indentured by the credit-ticket system.

Many early Chinese went to the mining areas. As new gold strikes occurred during the last half of the 19th century, Chinese miners also migrated to different parts of the American west and even across the border to Canada. When the gold fever subsided in California at the end of the 1850s, the state turned to developing its economy using Chinese labour extensively. Since almost all were able-bodied males, the Chinese made up nearly 25 percent of California's physical labour force even though they were only about a tenth of the total population. Chinese labour was also used in other western states and territories, though to a lesser extent than in California, as they started to develop.

From the 1860s to the 1880s Chinese labour helped build the western sections of the transcontinental railroads, as well as trunk lines in the West. Upon completion of the railroads, many Chinese labourers settled in towns along the routes. Chinese also migrated via the transcontinental railroads to the central and eastern parts of America, so that by 1890 Chinese were in every state and territory.

In the west, particularly in California, Chinese labourers contributed greatly to the development of the economy. They reclaimed marshlands; constructed roads, rock walls, water flumes and reservoirs; worked borax deposits; mined quicksilver and coal. They were used extensively as farm labour. In many locations they were also tenant farmers, and commercial crops like...
Table 5.30

CHINESE IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>IMMIGRATION</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td>HAWAIIAN KINGDOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>41,397</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1852–60)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>64,301</td>
<td>1,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>123,201</td>
<td>11,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>61,711</td>
<td>21,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>14,799</td>
<td>22,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1891–99)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>20,605</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>21,278</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>29,907</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>4,928</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>16,709</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>9,657</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>34,764</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>124,326</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>270,581</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

US population figures are for all states and territories. Alaska and Hawaii statistics are included only after they became US territories. Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867 but population statistics were unavailable until the 1890 census. Hawaii was annexed in 1898. Its population was included as part of total US population from 1900 on.


Sugar beet and celery owed their success to Chinese horticultural skills. In addition to developing California's shrimp and abalone fisheries, Chinese were the mainstay of the Pacific Northwest salmon canneries. They also comprised the majority of workers in light industries such as woolen mills, shoe and boot, slipper, cigar-making and garment-making in the San Francisco Bay Area. Many other Chinese worked as domestics or laundrmen.

In Hawaii white planters began sugar production in the 1830s and soon dominated sugar manufacturing. To ease a labour shortage on the plantations as production increased, planters began importing Chinese contract labourers in 1852. As Hawaii's economy grew, stimulated by the flourishing sugar industry, it attracted many Chinese immigrants. Some worked as rice growers while others went into coffee, agricultural produce, fish, poultry and livestock. Still others were the shopkeepers and skilled workers of Hawaii's growing middle class. Unlike on the mainland, Chinese in Hawaii were predominantly from Xiangshan county (now Zhongshan, Zhuhai, Doumen), while a sizeable minority was from Hakka-speaking areas in the Pearl River Delta. From their native Guangdong province, Chinese introduced many plants to Hawaii.

Early Chinese immigrants customarily left their families in China. Thus most immigrants lived a bachelor's life. They would remit funds periodically to China to support families whom they would return to the village to visit every few years. Most intended to retire to China when they had accumulated sufficient savings, although many were unable to realize this dream. Among the small number of women were the wives of merchants and professionals, as well as some domestic servants, but a significant proportion were prostitutes. During this period most institutions in the Chinese community were patterned after those in traditional China, although a very small minority were influenced by Western concepts, usually acquired from Christian missionaries.

Chinese congregated and formed Chinatowns in many towns and cities. On the mainland, San Francisco became their economic, political, and cultural centre, the headquarters of a hierarchical structure consisting of native-place (huiguon) and clan associations (see Part III). Besides overseeing mutual aid and social control, native-place associations exhume and shipped the bones of the dead back to ancestral villages for proper burial. They collectively formed the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA), the so-called Chinese Six Companies that acted as a spokesperson for Chinese on mainland America. In Hawaii that role was played by the Honolulu and the United Chinese Society. Merchants and labour contractors provided the leadership in these organizations.

More egalitarian in spirit were the secret societies, also called 'tongs' on the US mainland. These were the chief challengers to the native-place associations' leadership of the community. Secret society members often had a hand in the businesses that flourished in a bachelor society, namely prostitution, gambling and narcotics, among other anti-social activities. On the mainland these organizations proliferated, and rival groups' struggles to control spheres of interest often erupted into the notorious 'tong wars.'

Local anti-Chinese sentiment had been evident since Chinese first appeared in California, but demonstrations of such feelings were limited until the economic depression of the 1870s left thousands unemployed and agitators blamed Chinese for taking jobs away. Labour unions spearheaded an anti-Chinese movement in California that soon enveloped the west. The political pressures it generated forced Congress to pass the first Chinese exclusion act in 1882. This banned the entry of Chinese labourers – exempting only diplomats, tourists, merchants, teachers and students (see box). Chinese were also barred from being naturalized as American citizens. During the next decades the law was extended with ever stricter provisions. After the US annexed Hawaii, exclusion was extended to the Islands.

Exclusion: 1882–1943

Exclusion reduced the influx, but many Chinese found a way around the laws. Some were smuggled in or jumped ship. More entered claiming exempt status or citizen status. In order to determine the validity of such claims, immigration officials detained and interrogated Chinese applicants at entry ports. At San Francisco, the principal port of entry, a detention facility established on Angel Island by the authorities processed thousands of arrivals between 1910 and 1940.

As labourers died or departed for China, numbers of
Chinese declined, reaching their nadir in 1920 on the mainland. The drop in the predominantly male labour population, plus the growth of an American-born generation, led to a gradual decrease of the male/female ratio on the mainland from a high of 2,679:100 in 1890 to 285:100 by 1940. Chinese became increasingly concentrated in urban areas, and were at their most numerous in California, Hawaii and New York.

At the turn of the century, the Chinese community began to establish institutions patterned after Western models such as chambers of commerce and civic organizations. As the bachelor society gradually changed to one based on family, the power of secret societies, native-place and clan associations waned. A sense of community gradually came into being, and many communities established CCBAs to deal with matters of common concern.

During this period many employers refused to hire Chinese. On the mainland Chinese were concentrated disproportionately in the service industry, and domestics and laundrymen became stereotypical Chinese occupations. Others entered the restaurant business, where chop suey and later fortune cookies became well-known items on menus. The Chinese also operated stores selling groceries, agricultural produce and meat to non-Chinese, especially non-white, customers. These operations were particularly numerous in California, Hawaii, the American southwest and the Mississippi Delta region. Some communities also had a flourishing underground economy consisting of gambling and the lottery.

From the turn of the century through the 1930s, there were Chinese who purchased apple crops for processing in areas such as Sebastopol and Watsonville. In the Stockton area, Chinese farmers produced quantities of potatoes, and one Chin Lung was known as the Chinese potato king. Other farmers continued growing fruits and vegetables for the market. In the San Francisco Peninsula, they turned to cut flowers, specializing in asters and chrysanthemums. However, on the mainland the dwindling Chinese labour force could no longer play a significant role in Californian agriculture. Similarly, in Hawaii other Asian immigrants supplanted Chinese plantation labour and farmers.

At the turn of the century, some Chinese entrepreneurs began to shift from commerce to industrial and financial enterprises. However, a lack of capital and an unfriendly environment made it hard for major enterprises to compete and survive. San Francisco's Canton Bank (founded 1907) failed in 1916, and Hawaii's Chinese American Bank (founded 1915) had to reorganize in 1933. Similarly, the San Francisco-based China Mail Steamship Company went bankrupt in 1923. Canneries operating in the San Francisco Bay Area at the turn of the century were gone by the 1930s.

Among the few major mainland enterprises to flourish were the National Dollar Stores (which established a chain of department stores) and Wah Chang Corporation (which traded in antimony and tungsten from China). In Hawaii, where white sugar interests dominated the developing economy but Asians formed a majority of the population, many Chinese enterprises were able to compete and flourish. One successful entrepreneur was Chun Quon, whose firm C. Q. Yee Hop went from selling meat at the turn of the century to being a large conglomerate in the 1930s, which included a cattle ranch, a hardwood products company, a brewery and a real estate company.

During this period the increasingly American-born Chinese population was greatly influenced by Western institutions, particularly the public schools and Christian churches. A Chinatown subculture mixing features of Chinese and Western societies began to emerge. The American-born also formed their own social organizations, patterned after Western models. Meanwhile, American-born women, influenced by Western concepts of women's equality, exhibited a greater degree of independence and social consciousness than women in traditional Chinese society.

In multi-ethnic Hawaii, Chinese began entering the professions, and a Western-educated Chinese middle class started to emerge at the turn of the century. By the 1920s a majority were citizens and had begun to take an active part in civic affairs. In 1926 Yew Char and Dai Yen Chang became the first Chinese to be elected to Hawaiian public office. On the more colour-conscious mainland, however, Chinese found it harder to enter the professions or even get clerical work in mainstream society. Nor did citizens become a majority in the population until 1940. Participation in the American political process lagged correspondingly.

Yet some Chinese were able to transcend the racial discrimination isolating them from the larger society. At the beginning of the century, Ng Poon Chew frequently lectured on the Chautauqua and Lyceum circuits and to American organizations on China and the Chinese. In the 1920s and 1930s Yun Gee became a well-known figure in art circles in San Francisco, New York and Paris. In the 1920s the cinematographer James Wong Howe and actress Anna May Wong carved out careers in the film industry, although Howe's artistry was not officially
recognized until he won an Oscar in 1955. In 1940 Dong Kingman won acclaim for his water-colours. During the 1930s and the war years, the China-born immigrant Lin Yutang wrote a stream of novels, translations and non-fictional works that helped mould the image of China and Chinese in the minds of many Americans.

Other Chinese, however, were frustrated by the apparent lack of a future in America. They empathized with the rising nationalism in China, and participated in the reform and revolutionary movements in the hope that a strong China would help improve their status abroad (see Part IV). Many supported the Kuomintang, the party that eventually became the dominant political force in China and overseas Chinese communities. Some Chinese Americans went to China to join government or military service, or to work as professionals. Others invested in businesses and enterprises in Hong Kong and mainland China. They also donated generous sums to build schools, libraries, roads and hospitals, usually in their native areas.

The interest in events in China was reflected in a lively Chinese-language press in San Francisco, Honolulu, New York and Chicago; these expressed a range of political opinions. By the 1930s radio broadcasts had also started in Honolulu and San Francisco. Chinese schools helped to nurture nationalist sentiments, countering somewhat the Americanization of the younger generation. A small minority went to China for their education.

Chinese Americans were particularly supportive of China in its attempt to resist foreign aggression. In the 1930s, Chinese in America not only donated money to support China’s fight against the Japanese but also demanded that the Kuomintang government halt the civil war and unite the nation to resist Japan. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Chinese in America dug even deeper into their pockets to provide much-needed financial support for the mother country.

**Restricted immigration: 1943–65**

World War II was a turning point for Chinese Americans. Many served in the American armed forces or in the merchant marine. Thanks to the wartime labour shortage, Chinese were hired for skilled and technical positions formerly closed to them. By this time the Chinese were a small minority, no longer the prime target of American racism. Moreover, China’s resistance to Japanese aggression had created a favourable image of the Chinese among Americans. In a move designed to counter the propaganda of the Axis powers and to encourage China to continue to fight Japan, Congress repealed the Chinese exclusion acts in 1943. Although the law assigned only a token annual immigration quota of 105 to Chinese, Chinese regained the right of naturalization. After the war Congress passed legislation allowing war veterans to bring Chinese wives to America. From 1945 to 1950, almost 8,000 Chinese women, comprising the overwhelming majority of Chinese arrivals, entered the country.

In the meantime, the Communists won the civil war in China against a Kuomintang government beset by inflation and corruption. But instead of recognizing the newly inaugurated People’s Republic of China (PRC), America continued to have diplomatic relations with the Nationalist regime in Taiwan. Furthermore, in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the PRC and the US were on opposing sides. The hostility between the two nations, together with the anti-Communist hysteria in America, enabled the Taiwan government to strengthen its control over the Chinese there.

With the change of government in China, Congress passed legislation allowing several thousand Chinese students, visitors and seamen to remain in America. Subsequent legislation admitted about 30,000 Chinese refugees between the 1950s and the early 1960s. Many were non-Cantonese professionals, entrepreneurs, intellectuals and ex-government officials of Nationalist China. Beginning in the late 1950s, many Taiwan and Hong Kong students also came seeking higher education. When they completed their studies, most sought to stay in America.

Restricted to an annual immigration quota of 105 after World War II, many Chinese resorted to entering America under fraudulent identities. The federal government began investigating and prosecuting such cases during the late 1940s. In 1955 Hong Kong consul Everett Drumright issued a report charging Chinese with organized immigration fraud. But this practice had been so pervasive that the government faced the prospect of tying up the courts for years if it were to prosecute such cases. Instead, immigration authorities, together with community leaders, eventually worked out a programme under which Chinese confessing their true identities to immigration authorities would be allowed to gain legal immigration status. Some 20,000 Chinese went through this programme.

During the same period discriminatory barriers in American society against the Chinese and other minorities were gradually lifted. In the postwar boom Chinese began to find job and business opportunities in mainstream society. The number of Chinese entering professional and technical
occupations increased by two and a half times between 1940 and 1950, and by three and a half times between 1950 and 1970, becoming some 26 per cent of all working Chinese. In 1970 another 21 per cent were in sales and clerical occupations.

Many made their way to the pinnacle of their field. Among the most outstanding were I. M. Pei, the world-famous architect (see p 62); and Chen-Ning Yang and Tsung-Dao Lee, joint winners of the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1957.

Others achieved a reputation in writing and music. In the 1950s, mainstream publishing houses brought out the autobiographical writings of American-born Pardee Lowe and Jade Snow Wong. C. Y. Lee's Flower Drum Song, a novel which addressed the cultural conflicts faced by Chinese Americans, became a Broadway musical in 1958 and a motion picture in 1961. In 1953, Hawaii-born Dai Keong Lee, who first became known in the 1930s, composed the music for the stage production Teahouse of the August Moon. Singer Yi-kwei Sze and composer Chou Wen-chung also launched their careers in the 1950s.

About a third of the Chinese, however, worked in low-paying service occupations such as laundries and restaurants, or were machine operators in garment factories. Except in Hawaii, few Chinese worked in skilled blue-collar jobs because craft unions resisted the entry of minorities. But by the 1950s and 1960s, public pressure had forced some unions to admit token numbers of minorities.

In the post-World War II period, the businesses most accessible to Chinese were those requiring only modest capital outlays namely laundries, grocery stores and restaurants. Before the advent of automatic washing machines and permanent press fabrics in the 1950s, there were about 10,000 hand laundries in the US in 1949. In 1949, there were approximately 2,000 Chinese-owned grocery stores. In the postwar boom many of these expanded into supermarkets, particularly in the American southeast and southwest, in California's Central Valley and Hawaii. In California, the southwest and Hawaii, some grew into shopping malls.

The restaurant business grew from about 4,300 eating places in 1949 to about 5,900 in the mid-1970s, about half of them in California and New York. Upscale restaurants catering to the middle class arose. Eateries offering regional styles of cooking other than the long-established Cantonese cuisine, became more numerous.

Garment making has long been a major Chinatown industry. San Francisco was its centre, but with the increase in immigration — and therefore labour supply — after the mid-1960s, many garment factories opened in other Chinatowns, and by the 1970s their number in New York had exceeded that in San Francisco.

Many Chinese Americans chose higher education as the road to upward mobility. In addition, many Taiwan and Hong Kong students and scholars stayed in the country. Thus by 1970, a quarter of the Chinese-American men had college degrees, twice the US average. During the postwar boom, some became entrepreneurs, establishing industries based on high technology. One was Wang Laboratories, founded in 1951 by An Wang, this became a leader in marketing mini-computers and word processing equipment in the 1970s.

Hawaii-Chinese businesses also flourished. A 1972 survey showed that Chinese-owned firms in Hawaii grossed an average of US$162,807 per firm, almost double that of the US$82,250 earned per mainland firm. Hung Wo Ching, for example, was a major entrepreneur who took over the bankrupt Trans-Pacific Airlines in 1958 and transformed it into the profitable Aloha Airlines. Chinn Ho and his Capital Investment Company (founded 1945), played a major role in land development. The rise of Chinese and other Asian financial interests put pressure on existing white-dominated institutions to appoint more Asians, including Chinese, to managerial positions.

Only a few Chinese survived in the agricultural sector. A few farmers in California, Florida, New Jersey and Long Island in New York still grew vegetables, principally for the Chinese-American market. There were also some big farmers. In the San Francisco Bay Area Chinese flower nurseries enjoyed a measure of prosperity until imported cut flowers and increasing production costs brought about a decline in the 1970s.

Reflecting increasing investment activity in the community, new Chinese-American financial institutions were set up, often in partnership with non-Chinese investors, on the mainland and in Hawaii. These were small to medium in scale and their financial dealings were usually limited in scope.

As their economic and social status improved, many Chinese began to live outside the ethnic neighbourhood, among the general population. Chinatowns declined, while the power and influence of the traditionalist Chinese associations continued to recede. Even as these organizations groped for ways to be relevant to the changing Chinese community, the younger generation was rapidly losing its knowledge of the Chinese language and Chinese customs. Chinese schools and Chinese newspapers declined. This change was particularly rapid among Chinese in Hawaii and those living in mainland suburbs and in small towns.

The sojourner mentality was replaced by a Chinese-American outlook. Traditional Chinese observances lost their religious significance, but gained a commercial purpose as Chinese Americans started exploiting Chinese customs to promote business. In 1950, for example, the Honolulu Chinese Chamber of Commerce organized the Narcissus Festival to attract visitors to Chinatown during Chinese New Year. This was followed by the inauguration of the Chinese New Year Festival in San Francisco in 1955.

Chinese Americans continued to play prominent roles in Hawaiian politics. When Hawaii attained statehood in 1959, Hiram Fong was elected senator. Up to the mid-1990s this was the highest electoral position reached by Chinese Americans. On the mainland, some Chinese Americans also began to be appointed to minor city commissions and judgeships. In 1946 Wing Ong in Arizona became the first Chinese on the mainland to be elected state assemblyman.

Immigration on an equal basis: after 1965

In the half century after World War II ended, the Chinese population in America grew more than tenfold. This growth was particularly rapid after Congress
dropped the country's racially discriminatory immigration policy and passed the Immigration Act of 1965. The act granted applicants from all nations, including China, equal treatment, with an annual immigration quota of 20,000 each. In 1982 Congress passed legislation assigning a separate 20,000 immigration quota to Taiwan; and in 1987 it gave a 5,000 quota to Hong Kong.

Many students from these two places obtained permanent-resident, then citizen, status. During the 1980s the Taiwanese community in the US grew more than tenfold, from less than 20,000 to more than 200,000 in the mid-1990s. Many continued to come on student visas. In the 1990s the number of Taiwan students consistently exceeded 30,000, and Taiwan ranked third among countries sending students to the US in 1996. Visitors from Taiwan also arrived and stayed. Firms and governments in Hong Kong and Taiwan sent representatives to America as commercial ties expanded.

From the 1960s onwards, thousands of ethnic Chinese relocated to America from troubled spots like Cuba, Central America, Peru, Burma, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Korea. The biggest influx was from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (see pp 233, 148 and 170). By 1990 almost a million Indochinese refugees had arrived in America, about 30 to 40 per cent of them ethnic Chinese. A high percentage of these refugees belonged to the Cantonese and Teochiu speech groups, but there were also a significant number of Hakka, Hokkien and Hainanese speakers. The flow from other Southeast Asian countries was similarly polyglot, reflecting the linguistic composition of the Chinese population in each sending country. Immigration from Latin America was mostly Cantonese. The few who emigrated from Korea, however, were Mandarin speakers tracing their origins to Shandong and other provinces in northern China (see p 341).

Direct immigration from mainland China, down to a trickle for almost three decades, greatly increased from the late 1970s, spurred by the normalization of US-China relations and the relaxation of the latter's emigration policy. As cultural exchanges between the two countries developed, students and visiting scholars, too, arrived from China to study alongside their Taiwan and Hong Kong counterparts. The size of this group exceeded 40,000 in the early 1990s, and ranked first among foreign students of all nationalities in 1992. In 1992, in response to the June 4, 1989 Tianamen Incident, Congress passed legislation enabling China students who had arrived before April 11, 1990 to apply for permanent-resident status. By the June 30, 1993 deadline, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service had received more than 30,000 applications. Additionally, expanding commercial and cultural ties between the two nations led to the stationing of numerous representatives and staff members of PRC agencies and corporations in the US.

Students apart, peasants and working class Chinese have found their way from China to America. Most arrived as legal immigrants; others were smuggled in by a clandestine worldwide network involving secret societies (see box p 268 and Part II).

Up to the mid-1960s, the Chinese-American community consisted overwhelmingly of Cantonese from the Pearl River Delta. The post-1965 immigration drastically changed that profile. The great influx of newcomers, many of whom were lacking fluency in English, has created a number of sub-communities differing in regional origin. Cantonese, Mandarin and English are the languages most often used in inter-group communication.

For the distribution of Chinese by speech or place of origin, no accurate figures exist, only orders of magnitude. Although the Cantonese are no longer as overwhelmingly dominant as before, they still accounted for the largest group in the
mid-1990s. Chinese from Taiwan were next. People of Fuzhou ancestry number about 150–200,000. Teochius, Hakkas and Chinese from Guangxi number about 100,000 each. The Hainanese and Hakka groups (excluding those from Taiwan) each numbers 30–40,000. The remainder trace their ancestry to other regions in China.

Eligible newcomers swelled the ranks of existing native-place and other voluntary associations. Those originating elsewhere formed new native-place associations. Chinese also established organizations based on the country where they last resided. A few new clan associations also appeared. All these served primarily a social function; however, they also facilitated the newcomers’ adjustment to the American environment by providing mutual help and support. The increasing number of educated immigrants is reflected in the growing number of clubs formed by the alumni of universities and middle schools in mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Alumni clubs facilitated networking also among Chinese from other countries, especially those from Vietnam and Burma.

From the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, the Chinese population grew to an estimated two million, making it the largest Asian group in America, though still only about 0.7 per cent of the total population. Among destinations, California, home to four out of every ten Chinese in America, consistently ranked first throughout the postwar decades. Hawaii had ranked second for many decades, but was bumped into third place in 1970 by New York, where about a fifth of the total Chinese population settled. None of the other 47 states has more than 5 per cent of the total Chinese population.

Contemporary Chinese are overwhelmingly urban. Whereas 75.2 per cent of the total US population lived in urban areas in 1990, 97.6 per cent of the Chinese did. However, only 53.3 per cent of the Chinese lived in the central cities. With the great influx of newcomers, many Chinatowns that had declined as Chinese moved out to other areas became bustling places in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The number of Chinese in the New York and Los Angeles metropolitan areas grew rapidly enough to rival that of the San Francisco Bay Area. New concentrations of Chinese businesses arose in locales such as Los Angeles County’s San Gabriel Valley, Orange County’s Westminster, New York’s Flushing and Brooklyn, Bellevue near Houston, Richardson near Dallas, Chamblee near Atlanta, and San Diego.

San Francisco and Honolulu were the only two metropolitan areas where Chinese were more than 10 per cent of the population. The highest percentages, however, were found in the suburban cities of Monterey Park, Alhambra and Rosemead in Los Angeles’ San Gabriel Valley.

With the high influx of immigrants, the ratio of foreign-born local-born rose between the mid-1960s and mid-1990s from about half to seven-tenths of the Chinese population. For Chinese aged 16 and over, the proportion is even higher at eight out of every ten. Of the foreign-born, 56.8 per cent were newcomers who had arrived in the United States in the ten years before 1990. According to the census, six out of ten Chinese reported not being able to speak English very well, and 82.9 per cent of those five years and older also spoke a language other than English. The immigration of more females than males since the end of World War II has resulted in a continuous decline of the male/female ratio from 189.6:100 in 1950 to 99.3:100 in 1990.

The high proportion of new immigrants explains why the Chinese have been less given to interracial marriages than such other Asian groups as the Japanese and Filipinos. Still, out-marriages have increased markedly since the late 1960s, especially among the more Westernized. They were at their highest among the predominantly American-born Chinese in Hawaii, where as early as the 1980s approximately three out of four marriages were to partners other than Chinese. In Los Angeles during the same period, the proportion was about half, while in New York, where the population was predominantly first-generation, it was less than three in ten.

The decades since the 1960s have seen the growth of a Chinese-American middle class with a strong presence in managerial, professional and white-collar occupations. In Hawaii, the rise of Asians as important components of the business establishment in the 1970s, narrowed the gap between the proportion of Asians, including Chinese, and that of whites in decision-making positions. On the mainland, however, the Chinese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Florida</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Census of Populations, General Population Characteristics, various years; Table 3.31

Photos of relatives left behind in China prominently displayed in immigrant’s home in New York.
still have lower incomes and job responsibilities than those of white colleagues with similar qualifications. Many Chinese ascending the corporate ladder soon hit a ‘glass ceiling’ that prevents further progress to top managerial positions. Equality of opportunity still has to be fought for.

In the mid-1960s the push for equal rights by minorities forced the federal government to launch the War on Poverty. Many communities initiated programmes targeting their social and economic problems. In the Chinese community the increase in immigration coincided with the onset of the federal programme. There was a scarcity of adequate housing, jobs, child and health care as well as a pressing need to help the newcomers adjust to their new surroundings. In many immigrant families, anti-social and criminal behaviour among the young greatly increased as cultural and generational conflicts exacerbated the deterioration in parental discipline and authority.

Programmes to tackle these problems were initiated and staffed by Western-educated professionals and activists. Many were Hong Kong immigrants or were of the generation raised in America after World War II. As these people gained experience organizing the community and dealing with the mainstream establishment, they became a significant force in the community. Some of these activists soon went beyond community programmes to make common cause with the emerging Chinese-American middle class to pursue equal opportunities in the mainstream.

This common pursuit was reflected in heightened feelings of community and ethnicity. Many became concerned with Chinese-American issues and the Chinese-American image. Groups such as Chinese for Affirmative Action (founded 1969) and Organization of Chinese Americans (founded 1973) emerged to fight for civil rights and affirmative action. In 1974 San Francisco Chinese activists won a US Supreme Court ruling in a landmark case – the decision in Lau versus Nichols led to a nationwide mandate for bilingual/bicultural education not only for the Chinese but for other non-English speaking minorities.

In their bid for improved political and social status, Chinese Americans formed political coalitions with other minorities, particularly as groups of Asian Americans. On the Pacific Coast students pushed for Asian American Studies programmes to be established in universities. In that climate of activism, students from Hong Kong and Taiwan were spurred to organize the Protect Diao-yutai Movement in 1970 to protest Japanese claims to the Diao-yutai (islands also claimed by China). Some activists from this short-lived movement went on to join forces with others – those tackling local issues in the Chinese community.

Pressures brought to bear during the 1970s by activist groups resulted in changes in mainstream American institutions. Doors began to open for Chinese and other minorities in television and radio, journalism, law enforcement, the performing arts and other fields. Increasing numbers of qualified Chinese Americans were promoted to managerial or prominent positions in mainland institutions and businesses during the 1980s. Among the most visibly successful was Connie Chung, a broadcast journalist who became an anchor for national news coverage on television.

Chinese Americans also became more visible in mainstream officialdom. Many became members of municipal and county government boards and commissions. Others were appointed to municipal, state and federal judgewhips. Still others became state and federal officials (although Chinese have yet to attain full cabinet rank). In the military a few were promoted as senior officers.

As Chinese Americans became increasingly active in mainstream politics, many formed coalitions to campaign successfully for local electoral office. A few were elected to state offices. Until the mid-1990s the highest elected office attained by a Chinese on the mainland was Gary Locke, who became Washington’s state governor in 1996. As yet no other Chinese has followed Senator Hiram Fong to the US Congress.

As is natural for first-generation immigrants, the politics of the sending country continues to command attention. The contest between Taiwan and China, each with its partisan supporters, had polarized the community. But as tension in the Taiwan Straits relaxed during the 1980s, so did that in the community. Kuomintang repression on Taiwan had forced dissidents to take refuge abroad in the US and other countries. In America some Taiwanese worked with American politicians to pressure the Taiwan regime into democratizing the island. Others lent their energies to the Taiwan independence movement. Some Chinese Americans of Taiwan origin actively supported the various political factions that burgeoned after Taiwan lifted martial law in the late 1980s and allowed political parties other than the Kuomintang on the island.

A few dissidents came to the US from China in the 1980s. Their ranks were augmented by the flood of dissidents taking refuge abroad after the Tiananmen Square Incident of June 4, 1989. However, disunity and power struggles within their ranks as well as the improving economic picture in China have prevented them from being more than just a minor irritant to China.

**Economic life**

By the 1970s the laundry business was declining. By the 1980s the garment manufacturing industry was also retreating before the competition posed by imports. However, in 1995 there were still 2,300 small garment factories concentrated in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay Area and other large cities. The restaurant business, meanwhile, has continued to flourish and

*Jeffrey Yong, Chinese-American founder of Yahoo! Inc., an Internet media company.*
expand. Of the estimated 20,000 restaurants in the mid-1990s, most, though not all, served Chinese food, with some offering Japanese, Western and other cuisines. There were also Chinese running fast food chain operations. One of the largest, comprising Panda Express and Panda Inn, had 138 outlets in 18 states in 1994.

The increasing Asian immigrant population gave rise to a greater demand for Asian goods. Chinese businesses were among those importing large quantities of Asian, particularly Chinese, food items, house wares and utensils. First Taiwan and Hong Kong immigrants, then Chinese from Indochina, established supermarkets and shopping malls offering a rich variety of Chinese, Southeast Asian and American groceries. A few grew to be chain operations. One of the largest is the Ranch 99 supermarket chain; founded in 1984, this was operating 19 branch stores in California and one in Nevada by the mid-1990s.

Real estate has remained a favourite object of ethnic Chinese investments. That had been the case with Chinese Americans when they improved their economic status during the 1950s and 1960s. By the 1970s and 1980s, new immigrants, as well as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Southeast Asian sources, were injecting even larger amounts of capital into this sector. The real estate business boomed in many regions receiving ethnic Chinese investment. The competition for land use led to rent increases and inflated real estate prices in some areas. Investments also led to the rapid development since the 1970s and 1980s of new concentrations of Chinese businesses.

Chinese-American entrepreneurs are now found in practically all sectors of the American economy, although there remain areas where they are particularly concentrated. Beginning in the early 1970s, many Taiwan immigrants entered the hotel and motel business in Southern California. By 1987 they were operating about 500 such businesses, accounting for about 40 per cent of the motels in the region. Chinese Americans, mostly new immigrants, founded numerous electronic, computer, high-tech and engineering firms. The largest is Computer Associates International, a software company founded by Charles Wang. Many of these corporations have established ties to entrepreneurs and companies in the Far East.

Another sector penetrated by Chinese Americans in the 1970s is the trade in semi-precious stones. Of this, their share had grown to 10 per cent by 1990. Yet another example of the breadth of Chinese-American involvement in the US economy is the influx of Chinese-owned Nautica Enterprises and La Chine Chasse into the respective mainstream markets for men's and women's wear. Agriculture, on the other hand, has attracted few Chinese, and newcomers to the field have chosen to market specialty crops such as mushrooms, ginseng and longan.

The improved economic status of the Chinese, their known propensity for saving, the increased business links with, and the continued influx of large amounts of capital from, the Pacific Rim countries — all this has not only caught the attention of American financial institutions but also stimulated the establishment of Chinese-owned banks. Since the early 1970s new banks have appeared in San Francisco, New York and Los Angeles, followed by those set up in the 1980s and 1990s in smaller communities such as Houston, Boston and Chicago. Investments in these institutions have come from both domestic and foreign sources, not all of them ethnic Chinese.

Businesses from the Far East have also followed the flow of capital across the Pacific. Their local partners have often been Chinese Americans. Apart from firms such as Taiwan's Acer Computer and Formosa Plastics, these businesses have included hotels, real estate, and the American branches of major Taiwan, Hong Kong, mainland Chinese and Southeast Asian banks.

Continuing the trend since the 1960s, 1990 figures show that the Chinese population aged 25 years and over in 1990 had a high education level, with 40.7 per cent having a bachelor or higher degree as compared with 20.3 per cent among the total population. Similarly, the percentage of the Chinese working population in higher income professional specialty occupations was almost one and a half times that of the population as a whole. Chinese were especially numerous in health and dental care, engineering and technology, academia and education. Many stand out. Two examples are Samuel Ting, winner of the 1976 Nobel Prize for Physics, and Yuan T. Li, co-winner of the 1986 Nobel Prize for Chemistry.

Professional specialty occupations, together with managerial, technical, sales, and administrative support (including clerical occupations) accounted for about two-thirds of the Chinese working force, a proportion surpassing that of the population at large. Little wonder that some observers in the academic and mainstream press have characterized Chinese (and other Asian Americans) as a 'model minority' that has bettered itself by perseverance and hard work. In doing so they have helped fuel a new stereotype.

About a quarter of the Chinese workers, mainly first-generation immigrants, did not have a high school education. Of these, many men ended up working in unskilled occupations such as those in the service sector, while women found employment as machine operators in the garment industry. Owing to past exclusionary practice by unionized labour, Chinese, except those in Hawaii, are grossly under-represented in the categories of skilled workers and craftsmen.
Cultural activities

The flood of newcomers reversed the decline that Chinese cultural and recreational institutions had been suffering since the 1950s. Chinese cuisine, fashion, popular and traditional music, choral singing and karaoke, operatic and vernacular drama, martial arts and kung fu, lion and folk dances, tai chi and qigong found constituencies in the community and even in mainstream society. Cultural groups proliferated. In some communities multi-purpose facilities were established for Chinese recreational activities.

Chinese religious institutions also enjoyed a revival. To the few surviving joss houses were added temples dedicated to Huang Daxian, Che Gong and Guan Gong, deities transplanted from Hong Kong. These were joined by shrines to the Queen of Heaven and Bentougong, deities introduced by the Chinese from Vietnam.

Chinese Buddhism has also expanded greatly. Earlier Buddhist institutions in America included the Chinese Buddhist Association of Hawaii and Buddha's Universal Church of San Francisco. But the number proliferated with the arrival of Taiwan and Southeast Asian newcomers. Generous donations, from Taiwanese in particular, went into the construction of the Hsi Lai Monastery in Los Angeles County in 1988, among other such places. Another active group, the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu-Chi Foundation, founded an American branch in 1985. This Taiwan organization actively supported many charitable causes and by the 1990s had established offices in several American cities.

There were many Christians among the new immigrants, and as the Chinese population increasingly diversified, some churches scheduled services in different Chinese dialects as well as in English to serve their congregations better. New churches conducting services in Cantonese, Mandarin, Hakkien and other varieties of regional speech also appeared. Evangelical in character, many of these did not engage in the social action of the older churches.

Chinese-language newspapers, whose readership shrank in the 1950s and 1960s, have enjoyed a new lease of life. By starting a North American edition in the early 1960s, Hong Kong's Sing Tao Daily became the first foreign-owned newspaper to establish a beachhead in the United States and Canada. The venture proved a success when the paper's circulation expanded with increased immigration in the 1970s.

Drawing on a talent pool readily provided by immigrants and students literate in the Chinese language, Chinese newspapers improved both in literary style and reporting. San Francisco and New York have remained the two principal centres of Chinese journalism, with Los Angeles laying claim to third place by the 1980s. During the 1970s and 1980s, numerous papers competed for a share of the rapidly growing Chinese market. However, by the late 1980s many community-based dailies had ceased publication in the face of soaring costs and limited returns. In the 1990s Sing Tao and World Journal (Shijie ribao, a subsidiary of Taiwan's leading newspaper United Daily News, or Lianhe ribao), dominated the market, with separate editions published in several North American communities. Two other papers competing for the national market are China Press (Qiao bao), connected to China interests; and International News (Guoji ribao), originally founded with capital from Taiwan but sold to an Indonesian-Chinese immigrant during the 1990s.

Many community-based publications chose not to compete directly with the national dailies. Instead they targeted niche audiences, publishing less costly weekly or monthly editions. Such papers, proliferating in smaller communities, have been able to succeed where dailies would have failed. Also published are a few magazines.

Some papers focus on community news and events,
others advocate a particular political line. The range of publications is wide. Chinese from Indochina have their own newspapers (the *Vietnam-Chinese Newspaper*, founded in 1980 in Los Angeles, being one of the first to appear), as do dissidents from Taiwan and China. And just as the PRC students, visiting scholars and immigrants who settled in the US in the early 1990s issued their own newsletters or periodicals, so did Buddhists, evangelical Christians and other interest groups.

Journalists and novelists writing in Chinese can find a market for their work in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and even China. Two of the first Chinese-American novelists to reach a wide audience in East Asia are Helen Yu, better known to her readers as Yu Lihua; and Kenneth Pai, better known in the Chinese world as Bai Xianyong (see box in Part IV, both of Taiwan origin. Immigrants from China and Indochina have also added to the literary output. In some communities in America writers have formed different literary and poetry societies to maintain liaison and provide mutual support.

The growth of the Chinese population has fostered the rapid expansion of the Chinese-language media. Chinese television programmes were started in the early 1970s in Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco. By the next decade such programmes had also appeared in other communities. The programming material (mostly serial drama) on which Chinese-language radio and television has relied heavily, used to come from Taiwan and Hong Kong, but by the 1980s and 1990s, PRC and even Southeast Asian productions were being broadcast. Chinese-language television programmes have also stimulated the opening of videotape rental and sales outlets. As a result, Chinese cinemas, a legacy of the 1930s, are no longer the thriving places they were in the 1950s and 1960s.

No less than their predecessors, new immigrants want their progeny to preserve their Chinese heritage. Chinatown Chinese-language schools, in decline since the 1950s, revived. New schools, often formed on the initiative of concerned parents, emerged in Chinese communities outside Chinatowns. By the mid-1990s the number of Chinese schools had increased to more than 600 from the 40 or so that had existed in the 1950s.

Since many Chinese residents outside Chinatowns do not live within easy walking distance of the schools, many schools operate on weekends only. Mandarin rather than Cantonese is the language of instruction in most schools. Most schools taught traditional Chinese characters, but since the early 1990s a growing number of schools is favouring the simplified script or is teaching both forms.

In the 1990s the language curriculum of some Chinese schools succeeded in gaining recognition from local boards of education as being equivalent to language courses offered in local public high schools. In 1994 Chinese also became one of the foreign languages in which college applicants could choose to be examined in the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). Language apart, school subjects cover also Chinese culture, knowledge of which cannot be taken for granted among pupils highly assimilated to American society.

Since the 1960s, the numbers of both American- and foreign-born Chinese showing a high degree of acculturation to Western society have grown significantly. Yet while these people's behaviour and aspirations conform to norms set by mainstream American society, they themselves are set apart by their physical appearance. This has enhanced group consciousness and interest in Chinese-American history. The need felt by many to define the place of the Chinese American in American society and culture has manifested itself in the formation of such groups as San Francisco's Chinese Historical Society of America (founded 1963) to research and promote the contributions of Chinese to American history, and the Chinese Culture Foundation (founded 1965) to promote Chinese and Chinese-American culture.

The interplay of Chinese and American elements has produced a culture, which, when considered together with the experiences and traditions of other Asian minorities, is often described as 'Asian American.' Among vehicles for this culture are Los Angeles's East West Players (founded 1965), New York's Basement Workshop (founded 1971), San Francisco's Kearny Street Workshop (founded 1972) and Asian American Theatre Company (founded 1973).

American- and foreign-born immigrants alike have contributed to the definition of this evolving culture. Chinese-American themes are explored in the work of fiction writers such as Maxine Hong Kingston (see box in Part IV, p 135) and Amy Tan. Numerous other writers have expressed their feelings as Chinese Americans in poetry. Yet others have written for the stage. In 1972 Frank Chin's *Chicken Soup for the Chinese American* became the first play by a Chinese American to be performed in the mainstream theatre.

Christine Choy, Lori Ding and Arthur Dong won awards in the 1980s for producing documentaries probing aspects of the Asian-American experience, while the work of the feature film director Wayne Wang has succeeded in crossing the boundary between Chinese-American and mainstream American cinema (see p 132).

In dance and music, too, some Chinese artists have aimed at cultural integration. Chiang Ching and Lily Cai, both dancers of PRC origin, have synthesized Chinese and American forms and techniques in their choreography. Asian-American heritage inspired the performances of Taiwanese immigrant H. T. Chen (Chen Xuetong) and his contemporary dance company, Chen and Dancers, in the 1980s and 1990s. Experimentation with American jazz and Chinese music characterized the work of Jon Jang in the 1980s.

Some Chinese Americans are part of the mainstream cultural scene. The renowned cellist Yo-Yo Ma was from the start a player on the world stage, not a 'Chinese' musician but an international performer. Nor is the work and reputation of the Shanghai-born film actress Joan Chen confined to purely Chinese circles. The 1988 Tony Award for best play and best performance went respectively to David Henry Hwang's *M. Butterfly* and the actor B. D. Wong. Dennis Dun's reputation as a film and television actor in the 1980s went beyond the Asian-American theatre. Maya Lin won mainstream recognition as the architectural designer of the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial in 1982. Ding Shaoquang, a first-generation immigrant, was commissioned by the United Nations to design several commemorative stamps and first-day envelopes in the 1990s.
LITTLE FUZHOU

In ten short years, from 1985 to 1995, the Fuzhou community in New York grew from a tiny enclave at the junction of East Broadway and Division Street in lower Manhattan into the largest and most concentrated Chinese speech group in the city. The two-block stretch of East Broadway running from Confucius Plaza, under the Manhattan Bridge overpass to the intersection with Pike Street is what some call Little Fuzhou, the axis through which all immigrants, the vast majority brought by people-smuggling networks, have passed before settling in the immediate vicinity, in satellite communities up and down the east coast, or in isolated outposts - generally restaurants - throughout the country.

It is here, next to the traditionally Cantonese Chinatown with which it competes for space, that one finds clusters of mostly men gathered outside employment agencies scrutinizing Chinese-language blackboard listings for dish-washing and garment-assembly jobs; the banks, some of them underground, that hold savings and send remittances back to China; the all-purpose fuzu gangs, or "service companies," ranging from those that help clients navigate American government bureaucracies to those that sell forged and fraudulent documents; the native-place associations; the travel agents, immigration lawyers, restaurants and other businesses which utterly depend on a Fuzhou-speaking clientele.

Little Fuzhou would probably still function more or less as it does had its population somehow come by legal means, especially since most of those arriving before mid-1994 acquired - through general immigration amnesties, fraud and benefits offered only to PRC citizens - the right to work and reside in the United States. Besides, the sewing machine operator without an employment authorization card (an excellent facsimile of which, in any case, has always been easily obtained from black-market document vendors) has never earned appreciably more than a worker with one. Both are paid by the piece.

With a 15- to 20-fold income differential between Fuzhou and America, a year's labour in an American restaurant or sweatshop becomes a strong magnet indeed. There have been two principal changes in the pattern of employment, one in individual careers, and the other in the type and location of jobs. The objective of most non-skilled, clandestine migrants has remained constant, namely to move through three stages of work as quickly as possible: first, to reimburse relatives and friends who had used to pay professional smugglers; second, to then save as much capital as possible; three, to bring relatives to the US (by any means available) and to start one's own business, graduating from wage labourer to entrepreneur. What has changed is the amount of time it takes to complete these phases.

The initial group of seed migrants, men who arrived between World War II and 1970, wound up working as waiters, dishwashers and cooks, often in non-Chinese restaurants. Most had no smuggling fees to pay since they had jumped ship, but they needed several decades to raise sufficient capital to proceed to stage three. The next wave of migrants paid off their relatively modest interest-free smuggling debts in about two years, and were able to accumulate enough cash - working 12-14 hours a day, six days a week, with savings rates typically 90 per cent - to bring family and start a business within a decade.

The most recent wave of smuggled Fuzhou speakers, beginning around 1991, have faced several additional hurdles. The cost of passage increased so much that it soon took four or five years, rather than two, to pay back debts that now often carry interest rates of 20-25 per cent. Higher expenses - despite living eight to a room, sleeping in shifts and subsisting on noodles - meant lower savings rates, and an influx of job seekers during the peak migration years of 1991-93 meant depressed wages, which bottomed out at about US$800 a month for an entry-level position in a restaurant or garment factory in 1993.

The second change over time has been in the kind and location of work available. With the arrival of more women after 1979, the number of registered garment factories in New York's Chinese communities increased to over 500 by the early 1990s, creating an important interface with the mainstream US economy. The other important shift was the territorial expansion of Chinese restaurants, especially fast-food or take-out joints, first into the greater New York area, and then into every state in the Union, including Alaska. This geographic growth ensured that a continuing flow of unskilled labour would be able to find jobs, albeit in far-flung outposts that made these workers expatriates twice over, first from Fuzhou, and then from Little Fuzhou. Wages, at least, were 20 to 40 per cent higher than in New York to compensate for such isolation.

When yet another employment opportunity emerged, it was not without a certain irony. Starting in the early 1990s, hundreds of Chinese peasants who had escaped the back-breaking drudgery of agricultural work in China found themselves working on vegetable farms in New Jersey, including several owned by a Fuzhou businesswoman named Zheng Cuiping, whose other interests included real estate, banking (sending back remittances) and - a line of work from which she claims to have retired - people smuggling.

There are two umbrella groups competing for the fealty of the community, the Fukien American Association (Meidong Fujian Tongxianghui), and the United Fujianese of America Association (Fujian Gongxuesuo). The first, established in the early 1940s by a group of ten men, is by far the larger, with some 20,000 dues-paying members, each representing a household, in 1996, 80 per cent of them in the greater New York area. The membership of both associations is 99 per cent Fuzhou natives, mostly from towns and villages (such as Changle) in the countryside around Fuzhou (see pp. 33). Association officials estimate that there are 150,000 Changle residents alone in the US, and acknowledge that "over half of them" came by clandestine means, certainly an underestimate. They also point out, with some pride, that Fuzhou speakers are to be found in all 50 states and Puerto Rico.

Besides offering services typical of community associations - modest scholarships for exceptional students, a trust fund for the family of fireman killed while on the job in the neighbourhood, small loans to individuals in distress - the Fukien American Association also functions in the traditional role of a Chinatown 'tong,' one affiliated with a street gang called upon from time to time to act as enforcer or protector. The association's hired muscle, according to the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service investigators, was and may continue to be the Fuk Qing, or 'Fuzhou Youth,' most of whose leadership was convicted in 1994 of crimes ranging from extortion to murder.

One of the primary sources of income for the Fuk Qing, and other splinter gangs that have filled the vacuum after the 1994 convictions, is holding newly arrived clandestine immigrants hostage, collecting the outstanding portion of their smuggling debt, generally 90 per cent of a fee that escalated from US$10,000 in 1980 to US$40,000 in 1996. A few days, a week, a month - depending on when payment is made - in a deliberately threatening and uncomfortable 'safe house' is a tribulation that nearly all smuggled migrants have endured, but almost all have survived. Beginning in 1994, gangs added kidnapping-for-ransom to their criminal repertoire, demanding that payments be made in China by victims' relatives to gang confederates. These crimes became so common in 1995 as to create an atmosphere of terror, which abated somewhat - as did the number of kidnappings - after a joint Sino-US investigation led to the highly publicized arrest of gang members who were later convicted of killing one of their captives.

There are also many village-based groups, including the Sanshan, Mawei and Houyu associations. In the case of Houyu, a two-surname coastal village in Changle at the mouth of the Min River, there are two associations representing the 70 per cent of the village population that has reconvened in Manhattan and Long Island, with scattered families in Philadelphia and Washington. Indeed, the Zheng and Zhang clans brought not only their families but their centuries-old feud with them to America, a tension that has flared periodically into violence over the years, including armed clashes during the Cultural Revolution and the aftermath of an ill-fated, cross-clan betrothal in New York in 1993 that was cancelled after a dispute over the seating arrangements at the banquet. Some Houyu natives have even built applications for political asylum on fear of persecution by opposing clan members. In general, relations between rival associations are complicated and tense, but cordial - all groups invite each other's representatives, for example, to elaborate Chinese New Year banquets.

Marlowe Hood
FILIPINO AMERICANS
by Ying Ying Meng

Population

- In 1997, the Philippines and China (including Hong Kong) were the leading countries of origin after Mexico for foreign-born residents in the United States. Each contributed 1.1 million people.¹

- From the 1990 census to July 1997, the Asian and Pacific Islander (API) population in San Mateo County increased at the fastest rate, 32% (Table 1). The major increase in the API population came from migration (62%).²

Table 1. Race/Ethnic Population Estimates for San Mateo County, April 1990 to July 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>BLACK</th>
<th>NATIVE AMERICAN</th>
<th>API</th>
<th>HISPANIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APRIL 1990</td>
<td>649,623</td>
<td>393,088</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>2,349</td>
<td>105,559</td>
<td>114,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY 1997</td>
<td>711,695</td>
<td>386,027</td>
<td>34,035</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>139,207</td>
<td>149,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGE SINCE 1990</td>
<td>62,072</td>
<td>-23,000</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>33,648</td>
<td>35,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENT CHANGE</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>-1.8%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- According to 1990 census data, the majority of the population in Daly City of San Mateo County, California, was API. The API population (44%) was larger than the white population (40%) (Figure 1).³

Figure 1

Daly City Population by Race/Ethnicity

• Among the API populations in Daly City, Filipinos were the largest subgroup; 27%, or 24,950, of the total population in Daly City in 1990 were Filipinos (Figure 1).4

• The total Filipino population in the United States was 1,406,770, or 19.3% of the API population in 1990. San Francisco and Daly City together had 9.2% of the California Filipino population, and 4.8% of the U.S. Filipino population.5

• Between 1980 and 1990, the Filipino population grew by 104.2% in California.6

• According to 1990 census data, 64.4% of the Filipinos in the United States were foreign born.7

• Based on the San Francisco South of Market Family Resources Survey in 1996, Filipinos composed the largest ethnic group, 61% in the South of Market area (zip code 94103); whites were the second largest at 24%. Correspondingly, 57% of the population spoke Tagalog.8

**Economic Status**

• Per capita income of API population ($13,809) in 1989 in Daly City was lower than that of whites ($16,488) and of blacks ($15,373).9

• Census data for 1990 showed that 5.2% of Filipino families lived below poverty level in the United States, compared with 10% of the overall population.10

• Among legal permanent residents, 1.1% of Filipinos under 65 and 34.3% of Filipinos over 65 received public assistance in 1990.11

**Education**

• In the Jefferson Union High School District of Daly City, 29% of the enrolled students in 1997–98 were Filipinos, while 2.5% of the teachers were Filipinos.12

• The four-year school dropout rate among Filipino students was 4.7% in the Jefferson Union High School District of Daly City, which was higher than the other Asian students (0.7%), but lower than the overall rate (6%).13

• In 1990, 83% of Filipinos 25 years old and older were at least high school graduates; the national rate was 75%.14
• As of 1990, 83% of Daly City’s API population 25 years and older were at least high school graduates.¹³

**Health**

• A study of insurance rates among California’s APIs during 1996–97 indicated that Filipinos were more likely to be uninsured (20%) than non-Latino whites (15%) because few of them had privately purchased insurance and Medi-Cal (Medicaid in California).¹⁶

• The leading causes of death of APIs and Filipinos were different from those of the total population and of whites in seven selected states (Table 2).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause of Death, Age Range 25–44 Years</th>
<th>All Races</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>All APIs</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIV Infection</td>
<td>1¹⁰</td>
<td>1¹⁰</td>
<td>5¹⁰</td>
<td>4¹⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidents</td>
<td>2¹⁰</td>
<td>2¹⁰</td>
<td>2¹⁰</td>
<td>2¹⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancers</td>
<td>3¹⁰</td>
<td>3¹⁰</td>
<td>1¹⁰</td>
<td>1¹⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart Disease</td>
<td>4¹⁰</td>
<td>4¹⁰</td>
<td>3¹⁰</td>
<td>5¹⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide &amp; Legal Intervention</td>
<td>5¹⁰</td>
<td></td>
<td>5¹⁰</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide</td>
<td>5¹⁰</td>
<td>4¹⁰</td>
<td>3¹⁰</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


• A study of the effect of migration on risk of breast cancer among Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos living in California showed that Asian Americans born in the West had a breast cancer risk factor that was 60% higher than those born in the East.* Furthermore, this risk doubled after a decade of residence in the West.¹⁷

• Based on average annual age-adjusted cancer incidence rates between 1988 and 1992 in California, lung cancer incidence was highest among Southeast Asians (70.2 per 100,000), Filipinos (59.9 per 100,000), and Koreans (54.9 per 100,000).¹⁸

• Cervical cancer incidence was higher among Filipinos, 11.8 per 100,000, while the incidence rate among whites was 7.5 per 100,000, according to average annual age-adjusted cancer incidence rates between 1988 and 1992 in California.¹⁹

---

*West includes the United States and its Pacific territories as well as Canada, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. East includes most of Asia (not the former USSR or the Middle East) and the islands in the Pacific Ocean.
• Based on the 1992–94 aggregated California State Behavioral Risk Factor Survey (BRFS), 13% of APIs were at risk for hypertension. Filipinos had the highest prevalence of hypertension (24.5%).

• According to a study done in 1991, among registered Kaiser patients in California, hypercholesterolemia was high among Filipino males, 29.8%.

• A study using 1980 census data showed that Chinese-origin and Filipino-origin elderly women who were less acculturated were more likely to live with others than those who were more acculturated.

• An analysis of singleton live births between Asian and white women who delivered in California during 1992 indicated that Filipino women had an increased risk of giving birth to a baby with very low or moderately low birth weight.

• In an analysis conducted for the Committee on the Health and Adjustment of Immigrant Children and Families, the percentage of foreign-born Filipino mothers with low-birth-weight infants was lower than that of U.S.-born Filipino mothers, 6.1% and 6.9%, respectively.

• Consistent with the pattern of low birth weights, infant mortality rates are also lower for infants of immigrants than for U.S.-born Filipino mothers, 4.8% and 6.8%, respectively.

• In a 1990 study of the San Francisco Bay Area, 20% of Filipino women reported experiencing domestic violence.

• According to a San Francisco–based study, Filipino youth (18 years and under) had the highest pregnancy rates among Asians. The rate among Filipino youth was 6.7%, the rate for white youth was 8.5%.

---

4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
8 TODCO, South of Market Family Resources Survey. TODCO, 1996.
The traditional settlement and leadership patterns of the Filipino people have persisted through centuries of colonialism, social upheaval, and natural disaster, predating even the use of the term “Filipino.” For centuries the people have lived on riverbanks, lakeshores, along the seacoast, or in the hinterlands, near mountain streams, settling in villages, or barangay, of thirty to a hundred families related by blood or common dialect. These close-knit communities practiced cooperation and mutual support in their economic, social, cultural, and political lives. They were governed by datu and bayani (courageous leaders responsible for the overall well-being of the community), as well as babaylans (healers and spiritual leaders) and pandays (masters of technology of material well-being).

Today, the traditional village communities exist simultaneously with the plaza complex, or municipio, the living landmark of Spanish colonialism. Under the Spaniards, resettlement tended to destroy kinship-based communities and separated the people from their traditional leaders. The plaza community revolved around a central area, with an imposing church, friar’s convento, municipal hall, and mansions of the ruling elite and other wealthy, urbanized Filipinos. The plaza became the center of intervillage activities such as fiestas, electoral campaigns, religious activities, and cultural performances. It was where people came for basic health, social, and government services. At the same time, it also became a focal point for political demonstrations.

Note that the barangay originally served as the center of gravity or “core” area for Filipinos, but this role eventually was taken over by the plaza, which developed its own language and dialects, culture and traditions.
Immigrant Filipinos have brought to their new environment both the barangay structure and the plaza complex of their homeland. In Daly City and other cities, Filipino families pool their resources to buy or maintain a house and lot, preferring to locate them near other Filipinos. But unlike the barangay in the Philippines, the new neighborhoods lack a sense of community, with few connections or bridges between people. Though Filipinos constitute more than 30% of the population of Daly City, there are few Filipino service providers and agencies linking the people from their “island.” To rekindle the barangay spirit, and reaffirm their Filipino identity, Filipinos tend to visit the fragmented and dispersed “structures” of the old plaza. They form community through their churches, congregations, and prayer groups; their family and clan gatherings; and their regional, hometown, and alumni associations.

San Francisco’s South of Market (SOMA) area functions as a plaza, where Filipino services (including health and education) are available for seniors, families, and youth. The area is also the center of gravity for cultural and religious activities. However, the SOMA residents tend to be low-income, less-educated renters who come from villages in the Philippines. In terms of culture, values, and familial relationships, they are barrio folks threatened by the increasing gentrification of the neighborhood.
The transformation of Bullet Marasigan’s name offers a glimpse into her complex identity as an immigrant from the Philippines. Born Violeta Atienza, she was known as “Bolet,” the Tagalog nickname for Violeta. But she opted for a catchy English substitute. “When I was in high school,” she recalled recently, “I wanted to be different, so I decided to call myself Bullet. The name stuck.”

The surname Marasigan comes from her husband. And few years ago, she began writing her name “Bulletx,” after a Filipino numerologist told her the “x” would put her name into balance, bringing her good luck.

As the story of her name suggests, Marasigan was a savvy citizen of American society with roots deep in her Filipino culture, an iconoclast with traditional leanings, a dissident who defers to her elders. She was a community leader as comfortable lobbying for legislation as she was summoning her ancestors to help heal the ailing, a straight-talking community leader with an easy laugh and a clever wit.

Those traits contributed to her success in the last forty years as an advocate for Filipino people in both the United States and the Philippines. In this country, she worked as a social worker for Filipino veterans, retired farmers, and youth. And her seventeen years in the Philippines as an outspoken human rights advocate and opposition leader earned her a year in a military jail.

Her values were a product of both American and Filipino culture, and even her Filipino sensibility was broad in vision, embracing the elite Westernized strata of her family as well as the indigenous roots of her island culture.

Marasigan was born in rural Quezon province, where her father was a judge and her mother the founder of a school. She remembers her father as a compassionate man who would cry after sending someone to jail or defeating an opponent in court. He ran a literacy program for prisoners, and every year on his birthday he would prepare bag lunches for the prisoners. Deotimo Atienza would sometimes bring promising students from poor villages to live with his family and attend school. This kindheartedness left an impression on Bullet.
Though her father’s crying episodes amused her, Marasigan wanted to be a lawyer like him. “I saw him as a just person always helping the poor. But my mother said, ‘If you are a lawyer, you will not marry well,’” she recalled.

She eventually settled on social work, and after graduation from the University of the Philippines, got a job with the country’s Peace and Amelioration Fund, where she underwent what she calls her “baptism” to the country.

“That’s when I realized that we had a lot of problems of discrimination,” said Marasigan. “When I was a student, I didn’t know problems, because I didn’t have any.”

In 1959 she came to San Francisco for graduate school. “Rich people in the Philippines go to America after college for their master’s,” said Marasigan. “You had money and you could study.”

San Francisco State University was embroiled in a student strike over ethnic studies, and Marasigan became steeped in the 1960s protest spirit. After graduation, she went to work for the International Hotel in Chinatown, advocating for elderly Filipinos as they fought for fair welfare payments and struggled against landlords who were threatening to terminate their lease.

But there was another reason she didn’t head straight back to the Philippines: She and her new husband, Pedro “Pete” Marasigan, had begun having children—four girls, and later, a son. In keeping with her parents’ wishes, she chose a Filipino husband.

“I did listen to my parents,” she said. “A lot of Filipinos my age listened to their parents.” When she returned to the Philippines in 1971, it was again because she was listening to her parents.

“They felt we would be better off in the Philippines. We had no helpers. They gave us a house. They gave us a car. I had four girls. I was afraid they’d get pregnant here.”

Marasigan was grateful that her children learned Tagalog and Filipino culture at the same time they witnessed the intense politics of the time. Marasigan took them to demonstrations, and all of them became involved in the student movement.

Marasigan ended up staying for seventeen years, becoming a cause célèbre in the United States during her 1981–82 imprisonment for opposing the Marcos government.

When she returned to the United States, it was again for family reasons. Her husband had already come back to earn money to put the children through college. When it was time for the girls to return to the United States, Marasigan reluctantly came along.
“The way I am now is mostly because of my I-Hotel experience and all the experiences I had with the National Council,” she recently reflected. “They made me brave. I’m not afraid anymore if I do advocacy work. Filipinos have this internalized oppression. That’s why if there are things to advocate in the community, I’m there. My best contribution will be to advocate for peace and justice.”

In addition to her devotion to advocacy work, Marasigan returned from her homeland bearing more traditional gifts—including a Christian form of spiritual healing, a service she began offering free to her community.

“The way I am now is mostly because of my I-Hotel experience and all the experiences I had with the National Council. They made me brave. I’m not afraid anymore if I do advocacy work.”

When she puts her small thin hands on a sick person she would begin burping spontaneously to eliminate the bad energy. Then she silently uttered a prayer in a combination of Tagalog and Latin. “I can’t explain it,” she said of her healing art. “It’s very intuitive. When somebody’s sick and I start to touch them, I burp. When I stop burping, I’m done. When I heal people, I also get healed.”

Marasigan extended her healing work to the broader Filipino community by performing “opening rituals” at community events. She would light candles and blow into a conch shell, summoning the spirits of their ancestors to bless the conference or workshop.

“I’m trying to recover who we are,” she said. “We used to have a lot of opening ceremonies. When the Spaniards came, they banished them.”

Marasigan also envisioned creating a gathering place for Filipino Americans in San Francisco, a plaza styled after those of the Spanish colonizers, but re-infused with traditional Filipino culture.

Her own reconnection to those indigenous roots seemed to help Marasigan see the magic in life, as happened earlier this year in the Philippines, where she spent her sixty-first birthday. “I went into the ocean in the early morning,” she recalled. “When I came out, I saw a white heart-shaped stone. I was so happy. I was thanking the ocean, thanking the land and the air. It must be the ocean’s birthday gift to me. “Full of plans for the future, she had no idea it would be her last birthday. About three months after her trip to the Philippines (and shortly before this publication went to print), Marasigan died in a freak accident. She had just stepped out of her car when it rolled down the San Francisco hill and killed her.
More than a thousand people attended a series of memorial services in the San Francisco area to celebrate her life. The last of those services was held at San Francisco City Hall and attended by a host of city luminaries. In true Marasigan style, the session began with an “opening ritual” and included a call for a school to be named after Marasigan in San Francisco, where no schools bear Filipino names.

The following day, her family took her body back home to the Philippines to be cremated. It had been her wish to die there, by the sea. “This is my country, but there’s no place like home.”
Ang hindi lumingon sa pinanggalingan ay hindi makakarating sa paroroohan.  
(One who doesn’t look back where he came from will not arrive at his destination.)  
—a Filipino proverb

To understand the invisible gravity that brings Filipinos together in a community in the United States is to learn the saga of the Filipino family, its life courses, and the formation of cultural and interface zones and patterns in new environment. This paper seeks to reintroduce the Filipino from our perspective on history as well as to spark a process of rediscovery of our people and our community in America.

“For the Sake of the Family”

Some 2 million U.S. residents are expected to have identified themselves as Filipinos in the 2000 census. Family ties are the underlying reason for most Filipino migration to the United States, and family-based immigration is the main channel. Others receive employment or business visas to come to the United States for financial reasons to support their families, whether back in the Philippines or in the United States; still others are the children or descendants of Filipinos who served in the U.S. military or who came to the United States in the first half of the twentieth century to work on farms, in canneries, or at other menial jobs in the cities. Elderly Filipino World War II veterans who were granted citizenship in 1990 are too old to join the workforce. Nevertheless, their entry to the United States and the minimal benefits that accompany it offer economic improvement for their families in the Philippines as well as the prospect of their children and grandchildren joining them here.

This migration “for the sake of the family” is a double-edged sword; to better the life of family members, often it is necessary to leave the family (the core) behind and live in the interface overseas. Thus, migration tremendously impacts the family, both in the core and the interface. The twentieth-century version of migration is “piece by piece,” meaning families must be separated before they can be reunified in the United States. Reunification rarely fully re-creates the core family system that Philippine families had in the homeland. Still, Filipino immigrants living
in transition and in the interface, in different generations and waves of migration, tend to build
communities that strengthen their ties to one another. Like the force of gravity in the universe,
these communities serve to renew their cultural core and reconstruct families and communities.

Mislabeled and Misunderstood

Filipinos, although long viewed as the most Westernized and Americanized among Asian
Pacific Islander Americans in the country, are arguably the most mislabeled, misinterpreted,
and culturally marginalized of API communities. They have been called everything from “sleeping
giant” and “invisible minority” to “forgotten Americans.” Filipinos are Asians, but in Asia, they
are still discriminated against, and in the United States they’re not considered Asian because
they are not Japanese or Chinese. U.S. government publications still classify the “Philippines”
in the “Pacific Islands” category. At other times, Filipinos are considered Southeast Asian, but
confusion arises because they are not from Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos. They have Spanish-
sounding names, so sometimes they are classified as Hispanic.

The misinterpretation can be exacerbated by the fact that Filipinos tend to communicate
indirectly, as psychologist Melba Padilla Maggay writes:

One aspect that foreigners (non-Filipinos) find especially
difficult is the very high level of ambiguity in the way she (Filipina)
communicates. It is hard to know exactly when a Filipino is saying
“yes” or “no,” when she is offended and when she wants something.
It would seem that the interplay of verbal and non-verbal messages
is so complex that the outsider (non-Filipino) is left bewildered,
wondering when he will ever have the competence to crack the wall
of silence that divides him from the inside of the culture.1

But the difficulty lies not only in the inscrutability of the Filipinos’ interactive patterns,
a mere communication problem, but also in the tendency to view Filipinos and Filipino history
from a fossilized Eurocentric and colonial perspective. Accordingly, “the academic neglect of
Filipinos stems from the erroneous assumption that the Philippines lacks an ‘authentic’ indigenous
culture; that most anthropologists have ignored the Philippines because they perceived it as
‘too Westernized,’ with ‘no culture’ of its own,”2 writes Yen Le Espiritu, an ethnic studies professor
in California. Filipino American scholar Oscar Campomanes posits an “institutional invisibility
of the Filipinos Americans, which is connected to the historical amnesia and self-erasure regarding
the U.S. colonization of the Philippines.”3

Filipinos interpret their history from two perspectives: the pantayo, or insider, perspec-
tive, which covers those aspects of history and culture important to Filipinos themselves, and the
pangkami perspective, which focuses on explaining their history to foreigners who may hold
negative preconceptions.4 This split corresponds to the two Tagalog terms for “we”—tayo,
which includes the person being addressed, and *kami*, which does not. Just as a family conversation changes when guests leave the house, so too the pantayo perspective carries more intimacy, truth, and openness. It implies the need to use their own (Filipino) language as their medium of communication.⁵

**Cultural Foundations: Kapwa and Bayan**

A fundamental Filipino cultural concept is *kapwa*, the unity of “self” and “others,” a sense of “fellow being,” a recognition of shared identity or inner self shared with others. “Anyone looking for a core concept that would help explain Filipino interpersonal behavior cannot help but be struck by the super ordinate concept of *kapwa,*” wrote Filipino psychologist Virgilio Enriquez.⁶ The Filipino immigrant is fond of asking a newly introduced Filipino, “*Taga saan ka sa atin?*” The question, literally “Where are you from in the Philippines?” is an essential part of Filipino identity formation. The usual response consists of one’s family name and the community he or she belongs to or identifies with. In my case, for example: “I am Canlas of San Fernando, Pampanga, but we moved to Quezon City when I was in my teens.”

The question, posed without malice or sense of intrusion, elicits a response that facilitates discovery of a common bond, or *ka.* *Kababayan,* for example, are town mates (*ka + bayan,* or town) and *kamag-anak* (*ka + mag-anak,* or family) are relatives. Filipinos naturally seek out levels and degrees of connectivity to build *kapwa* and sociocultural affinity that contextualizes their interaction and establish rapport.

Again, in my case, for example, likely follow-up questions would be, “Are you related to the Canlas of Santo Tomas?” “Do you know the Calalangs in San Fernando?” “Was your family ever in Tondo, Manila? My mother’s mother is from there and she’s a Canlas,” and so on. Chances are the person asking me will discover that our grandparents were cousins or our parents attended the same school, for example, and say: “Ah, it’s a small world, we’re related!”

This emphasis on place of origin dates back to long before Filipinos were even known as Filipinos, a time when our ways of life, culture, and identity were tied to settlement patterns and environment. Settlements tended to be located along rivers, lakeshores, and seacoasts, and even those in the hinterlands tended to parallel mountain streams. In fact, names for various Filipino ethnolinguistic groups and geographical locations are derived from bodies of water. For example, Tagalog means “native of the river”; Kapampangan are “people of the riverbank”;
Cebu comes from Sugbu, meaning “riverbank”; and Lanao, Maranao, Maguindanao, and Mindanao all come from danao, “lake of flooded areas.” This water-based culture, coupled with a sacred view of the mountains, constituted the material basis of the beliefs, customs, and traditions of the ancestors of Filipinos. The houses (bahay) were usually located near people’s source of livelihood, along the shore in coastal communities, and closer to the fields in the interior. People lived together in barangays of thirty to a hundred families, and social organizations developed around kinship and neighborhood connections.

Their sense of community, or bayan, is deeply rooted in extended family relationships and neighborhood bonds. The core traditions of family-based communities as expressed in their language and culture, leadership, and governance structures, and spiritual and social life have persisted for centuries despite colonialism, social upheaval, and natural disasters.

The connection between family and community is transparent in the lexicon. The term bayan is relative. Today, it may mean “motherland,” Inang Bayan; “nation-state,” Bayang Pilipinas; “town” or “municipality,” Bayan ng San Roque; “town center,” kabayanan; people or fellow citizen or belonging to the same ethnolinguistic group or region, kabayan or kababayan. The protector of the community is Bayani, while bayanihan, usually symbolized by a group of people carrying a house to another place, is a valued practice of cooperation, self-help, and mutual support among neighbors and extended families. Balikbayan is community and family renewing, either physically or spiritually to one’s homeland. Filipino returnees and tourists in the Philippines are called balikbayans.

Identity Formation and Interaction

The archipelagic nature of the Philippines, estimated at around 7,107 islands, with a land area slightly larger than Nevada’s, is thought to be a key determinant in the proliferation of family-based communities belonging to more than seventy-five ethnolinguistic groups and speaking more than a hundred languages and dialects. As members of clans, barangays, or federations of barangays, Filipinos’ ancestors developed secret codes to communicate with one another and oral traditions that symbolized their idealized unity, the foundation of their core values and culture. Each member of the community was both maker and consumer of art and culture, storyteller and listener, performer and audience. Oral traditions such as legends, epics, and riddles emphasized familiar subjects so that metaphor could be easily decoded.
Integral to the cultural core and identity formation of the barangay was an indirect method of expressing one’s inner thoughts. Inner feelings, *damdamin* and *pakiramdam*, were guides to day-to-day interaction. Indirect communication was assumed to generate internal unity, intended to cultivate a clan or ethnic identity that would make one different from those belonging to other groups. It also precluded conflicts and disagreements from surfacing in the open. Feelings typically expressed in the community or among family members were those that furthered cooperation and unity.7

**Leadership Formation and Governance**

Our ancestors’ societies were principally family-based barangay. However, with their exposure to peoples with complex socioeconomic structures from mainland Asia—Chinese, Arabs, Muslims, Indians—and for sociopolitical factors like defense against piracy and war, in certain strategically located areas bigger barangays attained the level of confederations or ethnic states. Authority figures bore titles like *raja*, an Indo-Arabic term for the head of a confederation; *sultan*, a Muslim ruler; and *datu, lakan*, and *bayani*, Tagalog names for barangay leaders. The *babaylan* were the healers and spiritual leaders, while the *panday* were the skilled masters of technology and the community’s material well-being. There was incipient class stratification and structure in barangay confederations that originated from a system of dependency, not outright slavery.8

The central roles and attributes of the datu-bayani-babaylan-panday leadership and governance of the ancient communities continued through generations. The datu (chieftain) and his bayani (ward leaders) were responsible for the “wholeness” and overall well-being and protection of the community. They were expected to be the most courageous, ablest, and strong willed in the community in providing leadership and protection, not very different from the fatherly and eldest son qualities in a family. But they were also bearers of good human relationship, attributes typical of mothers and daughters.

Feasts, rituals, and community celebrations were directly related to the socioeconomic activities of ancient communities such as planting and harvest, fishing and hunting. Cultural activities forged community solidarity as well as promoted the redistributive principle and thanksgiving: the families who had more shared with those who had less.
The bayanihan, or cooperative spirit, had its moral basis in the religious idea of anītu, the totality of ancestors, or guiding spirit of the community. The datu-babaylan leaders had sanction from anītu as they transmitted the wishes of the ancestors to the living and those of the living to the ancestors. Datu and babaylan roles were passed according to bloodlines and ancestral traditions, while bayani and panday attained their leadership roles in recognition of their skills, training and expertise, and community values.

**The Interface and Resettlement in the Colonial Setting**

Filipino prehistory dates back to around 250,000 B.C., the pre-Austronesian era, when the first humans were found. The Austronesian era, from 9,000 B.C. to 200 A.D., saw the development of extended families. From 200 to 1565, the so-called proto-Filipino period, there emerged a regional particularization characterized by the formation of ethnic groups and confederations of barangays.

Filipino history is a story of struggle against colonizers and the formation of one nation, *Inang Bayan*. As one of the foremost Filipino historians, Renato Constantino, put it:

> The Filipino people have had the misfortune of being “liberated” four times during their entire history. First came the Spaniards who “liberated” them for “enslavement of the devil,” next came the Americans who “liberated” them from Spanish oppression, then the Japanese who “liberated” them from American imperialism, then the Americans again who “liberated” them from the Japanese fascists. After every “liberation” they found their country occupied by foreign “benefactors.”

The period from 1565 to 1572 marked a major turning point in Philippine history, the beginning of 333 years of Spanish colonialism. The seven-year conquest defeated the leadership of the barangay and ethnic states. With the takeover of Manila in 1572 by Spanish colonizers, the entire islands they called Filipinas (after King Philip II of Spain) fell under the king of Spain as a colony and royal possession, making Filipinos royal subjects.

The living landmark of the Spanish colonial policy of reducción (the process of resettlement) is the plaza complex. The policy was implemented to “divide and conquer” the Filipinos and further the destruction of the ancient kinship-based communities (*kamag-anakan*). In the new colonial society, people were uprooted from their homes to form new and larger barangays, reducing the number of villages for easier administration and separating the people from their traditional leaders. The plaza’s physical position as community center with imposing structures of the church, the friar’s convento, the municipal hall, and the bahay-bato (mansions) of the ruling elite expressed its role as the purveyor of colonial culture. Transforming itself as the center of power, commerce, and religious culture, the plaza complex attracted local elite, the *principalia* and
*cacique*, and the urbanized Filipinos and *ilustrados* (educated elite). The Filipino leaders in the plaza became instrumentalities, appendages, and collaborators of the foreign ruler (the Spanish, followed by the Americans and the Japanese) and wealthy families.

The Spanish colonization of the Philippines created three distinct people: the colonized barangays, whose people became Christian (i.e., Tagalog, Kapampangan, Ilocanos, Visayas, etc.), the unconquered Muslims (Maranao, Maguindanao, Tausug, etc.), who began to spread around the islands during the fourteenth century, and the unconquered barangays (i.e., Igorots, Lumads, Mangyans, Aetas, etc.) who continued to practice pre-Hispanic traditions. Spanish colonialists recruited tribes to fight one another.

The new barangays, then called pueblos, were organized into provinces that unified people for administrative purposes, but not in consciousness or spirit. Mobility was restricted. Residents of one pueblo were isolated from other pueblos. After permission was obtained, the men could go out with passports for three months. An 1849 colonial decree required the standardization of all Filipino family names based on a catalog of Spanish surnames. Beginning in 1883, all residents were required to have a *cedula personal* (identification certificate) and pay a graduated poll tax. These colonial policies had a lasting effect on the grassroots or local level: surnames and localities were attached to an individual’s identity. At the same time, the ancient family system continued to thrive in the new communities.

**Filipino Identity and National Consciousness**

The term “Filipino” is a historical construction of identity and consciousness from top to bottom. The first group of people to identify themselves as Filipinos were the Philippine-born Spanish to differentiate and distance themselves from the more powerful *Peninsulares*, the Iberian Peninsula–born Spanish. Later the name included the *mestizos*, or the offspring of mixed marriages between natives and Spanish or Chinese, and the *ilustrados*.

The revolution of 1896 and the declaration of independence on June 12, 1898, hastened the emergence of a Filipino nation and the unification of the people in the pueblos and plazas, including the communities in the mountains and far-flung areas, in their struggle to be free. Though the main action occurred in metropolitan Manila and neighboring provinces, people throughout the islands saw the struggle as their own. The momentous turning point produced national heroes and history, a guiding consciousness that would foster national unification and national identity.

Then entered the United States, the new colonial master, through its declaration of war against Spain over Cuba; U.S. forces sailed into Manila Bay and extended President McKinley’s Manifest Destiny and “Benevolent Assimilation” to the newly established and fragile nation.
The U.S. Congress “purchased” the Philippines from Spain for $20 million.\(^{13}\) For the United States, a late bloomer among empire builders, the Philippines was useful both as an economic and a military base in the Far East.\(^{14}\) The price: 120,000 U.S. troops subdued the Filipino national struggle, and by the end of the Philippine-American War, an estimated one-sixth of the 7 million Filipino citizens had perished due to starvation, disease, and murder.\(^{15}\)

By co-opting the local elite, giving them government posts and positions of relative advantage for their own personal benefit, rather than trying to fulfill the needs of the majority of Filipinos,\(^{16}\) and through educating the Filipino people, the American colonizers took the shortest and most comprehensive route to pacification and Americanization of the Philippines.\(^{17}\) In 1901, six hundred American teachers arrived in the Philippines aboard the USS Thomas (later called the Thomasites) and began to institute a universal education system taught in English and based on the American educational system.\(^{18}\) As Filipino historian Renato Constantino put it, “Education became mis-education because it began to de-Filipinize the youth, taught them to regard American culture as superior to any other, and American society as the model par excellence for Philippine society.”\(^{19}\)

For two decades before 1900, the Filipinos experienced the birthing of national identity and consciousness from years of colonialism. In the next two decades, Filipino nationalism was suppressed by the new colonial master.

### Immigration of Filipinos to the United States

U.S. historical records date the earliest arrival of people from the Philippines to 1700, with the entry along the southeastern coast of Louisiana of Filipinos believed to be descendants of Filipino seamen who had escaped from Spanish galleons.\(^{20}\) However, the largest migration of Filipinos in America happened after the adoption of the 1965 Immigration Act, which abolished national origins quotas and permitted entry based on family reunification and occupational characteristics. The Filipino census count grew from 2,700 in 1910 to 122,000 in 1950, to 343,000 in 1970, and to 1.4 million by 1990. The post-1965 migration was influenced by two other significant immigration periods: 1906–34, the “Manong Generation,” and 1945–65, the “Postwar Generation.”

The 1906–34 immigration of manongs (older brothers) was composed mainly of young (in their teens and twenties), single, uneducated or poorly educated men from the rural areas of Ilocos and Visayas.\(^{21}\) They were recruited to work in sugar plantations in Hawaii, agricultural farms in California, canneries in Alaska and Washington, and at other menial jobs. White American men viewed them as competition for jobs and women. Though U.S. nationals by virtue of the Philippines being a colony of the United States, they were not allowed to vote, own property, start businesses, or marry Caucasian women.
The core value of building families was deterred by the sex imbalance (20 men to 1 woman in 1920; 14:1 in 1930). Some of the manongs had left wives and children behind in the Philippines, others married later in life, usually to younger women, whether in America or back home. But a significant number remained isolated, lonely, and poor, suffering racial, social, and economic discrimination. In spite of their misfortunes, these pioneer immigrants managed to send part of their hard-earned money to family in the Philippines, built Filipino social and church organizations, organized and joined trade unions, and formed a mutual aid and support system. A San Francisco “Manilatown” developed on Kearny Street near Chinatown and became a gathering place for urban Filipinos as well as migrant workers. According to Lemuel Ignacio, an organizer of immigrants South of Market:

I am told that there were no Pilipinos on welfare lines during the Depression. Because of their highly communal life they pulled together their inner strength and resources to survive when the economy of the United States collapsed.

The 1945–65 period included more women and children, mostly the families of World War II veterans or men recruited to work in the U.S. military. Others immigrated as professionals and students, gravitating to key cities, where they built communities with social and professional organizations, church groups, and cultural centers. They formed their support system and bayanihan traditions. They had an easier time adjusting to American institutions and ways of life, in spite of the economic and racial discrimination they experienced.

By the late sixties, when the U.S. port of entry was opened to professionals and skilled workers and their families, the U.S. labor market was demanding professionals and educated workers. Other factors playing a significant role in the massive influx of Filipinos during this period were (1) the deteriorating Philippine economy and dependency on the U.S. dollar; (2) the inhospitable political climate, particularly under Marcos and martial law; (3) the cultural Americanization of the Filipinos; and (4) the relatively welcoming environment of the United States.

**Community Issues and Needs**

Although Filipinos have a long history in America and are one of the largest immigrant groups, they have a surprisingly small voice in politics and very few services have been dedicated to assisting them. They have received fewer culturally based health and education programs because it was incorrectly assumed that all were fluent in English, but this alone does not explain the less prominent position of Filipinos compared with other Asian immigrants. In 1993, the Executive Report of the Pilipino Health Task Force concluded that Filipinos in San Francisco suffered from a general lack of access to health care as evidenced by their low utilization rate. The task force found a number of health and mental health threats to the Filipino community, including high rates of inadequate immunization, tooth decay, and teen
pregnancy; the highest number of reported HIV cases among Asians; a disproportionate death rate due to heart disease; and a high incidence of tuberculosis. Inadequate Filipino-specific data and inadequate numbers of Filipino staff were among the barriers to the provision of services.26

A further study of Filipinos in San Francisco’s South of Market area concluded that personal relations and cultural and linguistic competency of the service providers significantly affected the utilization of services by Filipinos. The study found that word-of-mouth referrals and face-to-face interactions were among the best outreach approaches and that socioeconomic status as well as family relationships helped determine the patterns of service utilization.

**Issues and Concerns in the Interface**

Immigrant Filipinos have brought to their new environment both the barangay structure and the plaza complex of their homeland. Filipino families pool their resources to buy or maintain a house and lot, preferring to locate them near other Filipinos. But unlike the barangay in the Philippines, the new neighborhoods lack a sense of community, with few connections or bridges between people. There are few Filipino service providers and agencies linking the people from their “island.” To rekindle the barangay spirit, and reaffirm their Filipino identity, Filipinos tend to visit the fragmented and dispersed “structures” of the old plaza. They form community through their churches, congregations, and prayer groups; their family and clan gatherings; and their regional, hometown, and alumni associations. However, the Filipino service providers in community-based agencies may function as bayani (protector/advocate) of emerging Filipino community.

American-born and -raised Filipino youth, children of mixed marriages, and, to a certain degree, newly arrived youth are in the interface. They tend to create distance and be disconnected from their parents’ core values and family traditions, including language, culture, and identity. They gravitate more among their peers. Under a different cultural environment, Filipino immigrant parents tend to continue the child-rearing practice they learned in the Philippines. Without the conveniences of support system of relatives and nannies, compounded with their economic sustenance, often they leave their children by themselves and have the television and toys be their common “companion.” Dr. Aurora Tompar-Tiu, an expert of Filipino mental health, posits:

A conflict-provoking cultural gap may appear when older children and adolescents of first-generation parents start becoming assertive about their westernized inclination toward individuality. Parent and grandparents become deeply hurt and angered by the children’s perceived lack of respect and ingratitude. This perception can lead to outright estrangement between parents and children, to acting-out behavior in the children, to depression in the parents and even to physical abuse.27
In the school, however, newly arrived youth experience the difficulties relating with American-born Filipino youth. They both confront profound questions of identity and social affirmation, as told by a recently arrived immigrant when he was in high school:

I was ridiculed because my accent reminded them of their parents. . . . I considered the locally raised Filipinos “Americans.” . . . They thought I was not good enough, and I thought the same of them. . . . I didn’t want to be friends with them, but because they didn’t want to be friends with somebody who was their own but not really theirs. 28

Furthermore, Filipino youth are often unable to fit comfortably into the American mainstream. One Filipina youth explained the dilemma she observed while living in a mainly Caucasian town:

To be able to fit in, you have to act like everybody else so you won’t get left out and your feelings won’t get hurt. . . . It’s also wrong. . . . because they are pushing themselves away from themselves. When they move back over here (to a Filipino area), they’re like, “Oh, I’m Filipino now.” . . . People can be so fake. You can be twenty-five and you still don’t know who you are. 29

The generation gap, resentments, and conflicts of immigrants and American-born breed culturally divided camps that “can emerge within an older ethnic minority, where the schism between immigrants and American-born painfully reveals itself in conflicting positions on issues facing the community. For now, immigrants and American-born alike still respond to Filipino identity.” 30

Core and Interface

The Filipino family system and culture thrive in America. Because the majority of Filipinos are foreign born, they brought with them enormous strengths and assets of their cultural core, particularly their family ties, kapwa (shared identity) and bayan (community). They speak their own languages in addition to English. They belong to communities and organizations—church, regional associations, professional clubs, alumni associations, cultural groups, and the like. In a few areas, like Los Angeles and San Francisco, agencies with a culturally and linguistically competent staff cater primarily to Filipinos.

Filipinos, wherever they may be, “draw upon the accumulated wisdom of the cultural heritage and have their own ways of solving problems.” 31 They rekindle bayanihan spirit in their new community—the valued practice of cooperation, mutual support, and self-help in bringing about community projects and activities as well as the spirit of helpfulness among
neighbors in a community. Filipinos, it is said, are pliant as bamboos; they can withstand
the fiercest storm, embrace the soothing breeze, sway with wind, and even kneel to touch

They rekindle bayanihan spirit in their new
community—the valued practice of coopera-
tion, mutual support, and self-help in bringing
about community projects and activities
as well as the spirit of helpfulness among
neighbors in a community.

the ground. In other words, Filipinos are flexible and adaptable, and their lifestyles can eas-
ily be altered or modified to fit conditions. With the improve-
ment of communication and transportation technology, the
Filipino family system and culture remain closely connected to the
homeland. The culture of balik-

bayan (returning to one’s homeland) evolved in the form of sending packages to the
Philippines, visiting the country, and developing cultural exchange programs and students’
study tours. The cultural bridge between the two national settings greatly enhances the Filipino
culture core in America.

The core characteristics of the ancient Filipino family are still fundamentally intact,
despite being transplanted abroad. Family remains the basic unit of the Filipino community.
Its language, values, history, and traditions are the kernel of its cultural core. In America,
where the interface is far greater than the core, the challenge is finding the elixir for renewal
and strength from both our history and our day-to-day life.

1 Melba Padilla Magay, Understanding Ambiguity in the Filipino Communication Patterns. Quezon City, Philippines: Institute for Studies
in Asian Church and Culture, 1999, p. 11.
5 Ibid., p. 8.
6 Virgilio Enriquez, From Colonialism to Liberation Psychology. Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines, 1992, p. 43.
7 Veneracion, Agas ng kayumangi, p. 20.
8 Ibid., p. 21.
15 Ibid.
16 David G. Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe; Singapore: Institute
17 Espiritu, Filipino American Lives, p. 3.
22 B. Lasker quoted in Tapar Tiu, Depression and Other Mental Health Issues, p. 9.
23 Lemuel Ignacio, “Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders: Is There Such an Ethnic Group?” San Jose, Calif.: Pilipino Development
24 Wildflowers Institute Filipino Facilitator Training Focus Group 1, 10/6/99.
29 Wildflowers Institute Filipino Youth Focus Group, 11/1/99.
31 Wildflower Institute working paper.
The Lu Mien people of Oakland, California, have transplanted their traditional leadership structure to the American setting. The current structure was designed by a group of elders shortly after the Lu Mien arrived in the Bay Area as refugees. Their goal was to maintain unity in a new environment.

As depicted in the map, the community founded a nonprofit organization known as the Lao Lu Mien Culture Association (LIMCA) with a thirteen-member board. LIMCA represents the Lu Mien people to the outside community, and functions as their center of gravity. LIMCA members are also focused on building a community center to further unify their people.

LIMCA members were key in establishing an informal leadership structure that mirrors the structure the Lu Mien people have lived within for centuries. The challenge was to adapt this structure to life in Oakland, where the Lu Mien do not have their own separate villages, but rather live scattered among people of other ethnicities. LIMCA leaders decided to divide the Lu Mien based on their home villages into eight districts of fifty to eighty families each. Each district has chosen one to four leaders. These twenty-one district leaders, together with four senior leaders, form the Oakland Lu Mien Community Council. The two senior leaders, including two members of LIMCA’s board, make up the central council. The council functions as a communication channel for the Lu Mien, who have no written language. The leaders are also responsible for settling disputes and helping community members resolve other problems. Those that cannot be settled by district leaders are brought to the central council.
When Kao Chiem Chao became a leader of the Lu Mien people in the Bay Area, he was following in the footsteps of his father, who was chief of Orange Tree village back in Laos from before Chao was born.

Their situations could hardly look more different.

Chao’s father, Saengchiam Saechao, wore loose-fitting black cotton garb and regularly walked the daylong route from Orange Tree to the city of Namkheng, where he represented the village’s thirty extended families before the Lu Mien people’s High Council. Son of a middle priest, Saechao was a small merchant by profession. Though never formally elected, he served in the leadership role for some forty years, until his death in 1994.

Chao, forty, wears button-down shirts and V-neck sweaters and drives daily roundtrips between Oakland and San Francisco to hold down a full-time hospital interpreter job and a half-time position as a medical records technician. In his spare time, he also leads the 5,000-person Lu Mien community as chairman of the Oakland Central Council. Elected by secret ballot, he will leave the post in 2003 because of term limits. He is also a board member of the non-profit Lao Lu Mien Cultural Association.

Despite the outward differences, however, Chao says his role is very similar to his father’s role in Orange Tree village.

“He taught me a lot,” said Chao, who has early memories of villagers stopping by the house to seek his father’s assistance in settling disputes. “He always said, ‘Be fair.’ You cannot just listen to one side or the other. The truth is always somewhere in between.”

Like his father, Chao often finds himself staying up until the wee hours trying to resolve family disputes.

Recently, he got involved in mediating a marital spat between a young man and a woman who suspected each other of having affairs. The man’s parents had gotten involved and began calling Chao every day to help.
So, on a Sunday afternoon, the man, his wife, his parents, his brother and sister-in-law, two district leaders, as well as an Lu Mien priest all came to Chao’s house.

“I tried to find out who is right or wrong,” he recalled. “It wasn’t one or the other, they just didn’t communicate enough to understand each other. They both admitted they made mistakes. They need to pull out some firewood and let the fire die down a little.”

The couple made up, but not until after midnight, forcing Chao’s family to prepare dinner for the whole gathering. “That has happened many, many times,” said Chao. “Sometimes I say my labor is more than money can buy. It’s kind of tiring sometimes. But, in the end, when you see good results, that makes you proud of yourself. I saw my father do that many, many times.”

Chao’s father was selected in the traditional Lu Mien way: “They just thought that he was an honest man, and he cared about people, so they chose him,” said Chao, who seems to share his father’s modesty. “So far the Mien have never had anyone volunteer and say, ‘I want to be this or that.’”

Chao’s most vivid memory of his father’s leadership was the secret meeting he held in Namkheng in 1975 to announce a plan to evacuate the entire village to protect the men from being sent to re-education camps by Vietnamese communists. The next night, after tricking the communists into leaving the village, Saechao led the 360 villagers through the forest in silence to the bank of the Mekong River, where Thai boat drivers were waiting to ferry them to safety.

Chao and his family spent the next five years in a Thai refugee camp, and it was there that Chao first became a leader. Traditionally, leaders have to be over thirty years old, but because he spoke Thai, the hundred Lu Mien people in his building within the camp pressed him into action interfacing with Thai officials.

Later, Chao served informally as an organizer for the Lu Mien in the Bay Area, and when he turned thirty, he was formally elected Council chairman by a majority of the 3,000 Lu Mien people in the area.

Chao believes he was chosen because he understands both the older Lu Mien generation and the younger generation’s American ways. “The elderly don’t adjust as quickly here,” he said. “Sometimes illness is not just disease. The language barrier can make them sick. The environment can make them feel sick.”

The Central Council, composed of Chao and three other leaders, oversees eight districts, which each have one to four leaders. The districts are not determined geographically; rather, they are networks of people from the same village.
“In Laos, when there’s a problem, there’s no place else to go. No matter what, you have to resolve it within your village. Here, some people go directly to the police, but most say, ‘Since we have our own community, we'll see if it can be resolved there first.”

Marital problems are just one kind of difficulty that the leaders deal with. “Sometimes people cannot find a house because a family member is involved in a gang and the landlord wants to evict them,” said Chao. “You have to help them find another place. Or maybe that individual has to move out.”

One time, when a Mien family’s son was shot near an elementary school, the council helped the family by comforting them, raising money, organizing the burial ritual, and interpreting for police investigators. Another time, when a Mien infant who had been removed from his parents by authorities later died in foster care, Chao and other leaders organized a protest at San Francisco City Hall.

Though his father has always been his prime role model, Chao says leaders here have to be open to the American system. He has introduced innovations such as term limits, for example. “You’ve got to train somebody else,” he said. But he also admits that he looks forward to some down time when his term expires. “I know it still won’t end,” said Chao. “Our Mien people are like an extended family. They don’t care if you’re in the position or not, they come to you anyway.”

Chao also supports the notion of allowing women to be leaders. “So far, it’s all men,” said Chao. “Next term, maybe each district will have to have one woman. It’s better for women to deal with women if they have a problem.”

Still, there will always be a need for male leaders, as only they can perform religious ceremonies. “If there’s fighting between two teenagers, we don’t just say, ‘Shake hands and never fight again.’ We do a blessing and sacrifice a chicken.”

Even Chao’s surname is an indication of his openness to change: He shortened it from Saechao to Chao because Americans were always separating the two syllables.

But despite his adaptability, Chao’s vision of leadership is still the one he learned from his father.

“Here they have campaigns to be the leader,” said Chao. “In our culture, even if you’re a leader, you don’t want to be a leader. It’s more what you do than what you say. That’s the only way you get respect from the community, because you’re a family man and you work like everyone else.”
IU MIEN COMMUNITY PORTRAIT
by Miriam Gross

It is more serious to do wrong against the spirits than against the government. With the government, you can usually come to an agreement. If you do wrong against the spirits, you will die.

—Lu Mien “Song for Making Good”¹

Even though we are separated by the ocean, our hearts are still together.

—Lu Mien folk song²

Origins

One day around 2440 B.C., the battle between Ping Huang (Ping Wang), the emperor of China, and the King Kao (Kao Wang) was not going well.³ The emperor offered the hand of his third daughter in marriage to anyone who could chop off the head of his enemy. Many tried, but the only one who could manage it was P’an Hu (King Pan), a three-colored dog who hung around the emperor’s court. Although the emperor was not happy, he fulfilled his promise and gave the dog his daughter. Then the dog and the emperor’s daughter went away to live in the far-off mountains. They had six sons and six daughters who became the forefathers of the twelve clans of the Lu Mien.⁴

Throughout Chinese history the Lu Mien, who were called Yao by the Chinese, a name which means “barbarian,”⁵ were harassed by provincial authorities for being a minority. The Lu Mien are thought to have been converted by missionaries to Taoism between 1234 and 1279⁶ and to be influenced by Buddhism as well.⁷ In the second half of the fourteenth century they were driven from Nanking (Nanjing) and took a trip on the China Sea to Canton where they spread across the southern Chinese mountains, reaching Yunnan and many of the countries in Southeast Asia.⁸ The northern and southern parts of Laos were settled by Lu Mien in two separate waves: the Southern Mien arrived in the 1840–50s, the Northern Mien mainly after the turn of the century.⁹

The Lu Mien remained a more cohesive group organizationally and culturally than almost every other tribe, despite their dispersion over thousands of miles of territory.¹⁰ One of the main reasons, in addition to their descent from a single ancestor, King Pan, was that they shared an extraordinarily strong culture and common vision of reality. They believed in an existence in which
the living and the dead were two opposite poles of a single universe.\textsuperscript{11} Although originally
the two worlds were completely intermingled, now they were separated, but only by a piece of
paper.\textsuperscript{12} Sacred and secular activities and time were still thought to be inseparable.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, the spirit
and human worlds were intimately connected and affected the everyday reality, leadership
selection, economic and social organization, and mental and physical well-being of each other.

**Relationships between the Human and Spirit Worlds**

The Lu Mien human world consisted of three sets of relationships. The first was among family
members and between fellow villagers. Because families normally grew to sixteen to twenty-five
members\textsuperscript{14} before they fissioned due to internal conflicts, family life became a complex web
of interrelations in which each person had an assigned place and role to play. In addition,
the family interacted with the other members of the village, some of whom were not part of
their extended family or their clan. The second set of relationships was between the family and
the natural world. Natural events often made the Lu Mien livelihood insecure. At the same time,
many wild animals such as tigers still roamed free on the mountainside, making it dangerous to
leave the village alone. Finally, although somewhat protected by their isolation, the Mien
always had to develop a relationship with the majority government. Many Mien headmen were
elected by the government and had to successfully juggle village concerns and the often over-
bearing demands of the provincial authorities. Trained by centuries of interactions with Chinese
provincial authorities, Mien tended to politely and graciously discuss problems when dealing
with officials, made sure that all parties saved face, and had a written contract specifying every
detail of agreement.\textsuperscript{15} However, when outside circumstances became particularly untenable,
the Lu Mien would move on.

Mirroring the human world, the spirit world consisted of three different types of spirits.
The ancestor spirits (indoor spirits) lived in houses in a village and were the closest and most
protective of their family.\textsuperscript{16} In order for the ancestor spirits to survive happily, living family
members had to sacrifice animals (although never dogs) so they would have food to eat, and
burn paper money so they could buy things in their world.\textsuperscript{17} In return, the ancestor spirits would
protect the family from other spirits, and help family members when they were ill. Because the
support and succor of ancestors was so important to well-being in the human world, families
kept a register listing ancestors up to nine and sometimes even twelve generations back.\textsuperscript{18}
After nine generations it was assumed that ancestors had been reborn.\textsuperscript{19} All children born,
adopted, or married into a family were added to the register to ensure that ancestors knew
whom to protect.\textsuperscript{20} The second type of spirits were those associated with nature (outdoor spirits).
Like natural forces in the human world they were unpredictable and often malevolent.\textsuperscript{21}
Except for the annual outdoor ceremony to propitiate the natural spirits, most rituals were held
indoors and focused on the particular ancestors of the household.\textsuperscript{22} The last set of spirits were
the most distant and the most powerful. They were part of the Taoist celestial government that
included up to thirty-three levels of hierarchy with various divisions and subdivisions and appeared to be modeled on the Chinese provincial court system. Like any governmental agency, petitioning for assistance required writing formal memoranda and contracts. Such contracts to both the ancestors and the celestial government were written by the higher-ranking Lu Mien priests who learned an ancient version of Chinese characters especially for this task. Because the priests were the only ones who could both see and communicate with the spirit world, it was their duty to resolve disputes between the two sides.

**Advantages of the Priesthood—Protection and Healing**

By becoming a priest, any male individual ensured greater protection and healing for his family. He could not only mediate directly with the spirit world, but could also receive a set of spirit warriors and messengers who would accompany and help him in his endeavors. Perhaps the most important benefit was that only those who reached the higher levels of the priesthood received salvation and were comfortable in the hereafter. Priests could also conduct ceremonies both to cure people who were currently ill, and to prevent them from becoming sick. Shamans who served as mediums and families knowledgeable in healing herbs also helped in curing ceremonies. People became sick because their souls left their body—usually due to an angry spirit. Individuals were thought to have ten souls. Three resided in the body and were located in the head (knowledge), the heart (compassion), and the legs (strength). The other seven could wander more freely from the body and protected the first three. While all children’s souls were easily scared away from their bodies, the souls of unborn children were particularly fragile because they resided in a recognized series of household objects (they moved each month) and had only a very partial affinity to their future body. When people died, their souls had to be purified so that they could ascend to their appointed place in the spirit world.

**Working Together to Succeed**

Although it was clearly to the great advantage of the family to produce priests, and to hold healing and other ceremonies, all were dependent on hosting and participation in extraordinarily expensive ceremonies. Equally expensive were “bride price” and marriage ceremonies, which often involved hosting hundreds of people for many days. Bride price was paid to reimburse parents for the emotional loss of their daughters. Marriage ceremonies were important because they created a relationship between two families. Marshaling such extensive wealth took the concerted and unified effort of an entire family. The more people in each family lineage working and living frugally together, the more likely a family would succeed.
Once families had developed the appropriate amount of human resources, they supported themselves and made extra money in a variety of ways. Most people raised livestock and worked in the fields growing rice and vegetables for food and poppies for opium production. Until 1959 production of opium was legal in Laos and became the Lu Mien’s major cash crop as well as that of other hill tribes. Although opium was used medicinally to help with severe pain, few Lu Mien ever became addicted. Because of the use of fallow fields, soil depletion caused most Mien villages to move only every ten to fifteen years. In addition to farming, some Lu Mien worked as blacksmiths, silversmiths, and traders. Merchant Mien often worked together with or acted as middlemen for the Hmong who lived higher up on the mountain. They sold products to lower-level tribes and to the Lao and usually used contracts to ensure business was conducted without contention. Finally, if a family already had higher-level priests or shamans as members, it gained wealth through payments received by the family for their services.

### Getting Married and Forming a Household

The process of getting married and forming a household was one of the most important aspects of Lu Mien life. Lu Mien couples generally chose each other and were allowed to marry if their astrological signs written in the Book of Days, which was based on the Chinese calendar, matched up. Very few Mien married non-Mien because it was considered difficult to bridge the cultural differences involved. Generally, unmarried daughters were given a separate bedroom and allowed to quietly host their suitors. All children born during this period were considered members of their grandfather’s household and often remained there after the daughter got married. Young women who came to their in-laws family already having had a baby received a higher bride price since they were of proven fertility. If a young man’s family did not have the resources for the bride price, he would go live with and work for his father-in-law, six years for half the bride price, and twelve years for the whole bride price.

Once young men got married, they continued living with their parents and brought up their children in the supportive environment of the extended-family household. Because most couples married when they were very young, it was assumed that they would learn parenting skills and gain the maturity they might not yet have as teenagers from their parents. In addition to children, grandchildren, and occasional relatives, households were swelled by many adoptions (particularly those unable to have children themselves). Although the Lu Mien adopted other Mien, many of their adoptions were from other tribes or from the Lao. Because ancestors could be reborn anywhere, an adopted child could well be a member of one’s own lineage.
In addition, the Mien always felt that cultural identity far outweighed race in bringing family members together.\textsuperscript{52} Approximately 6–10% of all Mien children were adopted.\textsuperscript{53} Thus by working hard together as a large and unified family, the Lu Mien ensured their success at achieving what was important in both the human and the spirit worlds.

**Role of Women**

Although all Lu Mien worked hard, women had an especially labor-intensive life. Women usually worked in the fields all day, tended the children, cared for elders, cooked, and cleaned the household. In their spare time, women worked together on the honored task of embroidery. In Lu Mien society women were considered subservient to men.\textsuperscript{54} Men always ate first at the table.\textsuperscript{55} Although all children were referred to by their birth order and father’s name, only girls received no personal names of their own.\textsuperscript{56} Women were not expected to involve themselves in decision making\textsuperscript{57} and could not become priests, shamans, or leaders. Because women were considered impure, participation by women could make the spirits angry and cause retaliation on the family.\textsuperscript{58}

**Child Rearing and Education**

Each child was born into a family with an assigned role in life.\textsuperscript{59} Roles were based on gender, age, and position in the family. Family members were generally called by kinship terms, for example, younger brother’s wife, so that their responsibilities and privileges were automatically known.\textsuperscript{60} The most powerful people in the house were the father and his oldest son. In general, older people always took responsibility for younger ones and men were always more powerful than women. Children needed to learn their position and role quickly and cooperate whole-heartedly in the family venture of gaining wealth and position in both the spirit and human worlds. Because children’s behavior was thought to be directly reflective of their parent’s upbringing, misconduct could affect the status of the family in front of the whole community.\textsuperscript{61} Therefore sons were taught by fathers, and daughters by mothers, the appropriate way to act and talk in order to maintain propriety.\textsuperscript{62} Usually if children did not pay attention, parents punished them first by not giving them what they wanted, and then by hitting them with a bamboo stick.\textsuperscript{63} As one parent put it, “It hurts a lot but it only hurts on the skin. . . . We hurt them because we want them to be respectful and to be accepted by society.”\textsuperscript{64} Conflict was actively discouraged between siblings. When adult sons were unable to get along in a large household, the father generally asked one of them to leave.\textsuperscript{65}

Most children were reared by grandparents and watched over by older siblings. Generally children learned by watching and participating in family activities. In addition to agricultural, trading, smithing, and embroidery skills, most children learned chanting. Chanting was the third Lu Mien language (in addition to spoken Mien and literary ancient Chinese) and
was also a form of Chinese—although less ancient than the written language. It was used in ceremonies to communicate especially profound ideas or indirect messages and to communicate with visitors whose own version of spoken Mien had undergone a linguistic shift. In addition to these basic survival skills, boys whose families had the resources would become acolytes of priests in order to learn the many complicated ceremonies and study the script necessary to communicate with the spirit world. Finally, some individuals learned and then specialized in making the religious paintings needed to change a normal room into a Taoist temple. Such paintings had been refined to suit the lu Mien’s migratory lifestyle.

**Selecting Leaders and Solving Problems**

In order to become a leader in the lu Mien community, priesthood was obligatory. This was because if a family was successful at producing priests, it proved that it had the benefit of very powerful ancestors who not only protected the family, but also were smart enough to choose good souls to be born into it. Further, it proved that the family head, the oldest male in the lineage, was an extremely competent individual who could successfully mediate in both the spirit world and the complicated universe of the extended household. Such individuals completely controlled and coordinated the families resources, made all decisions in the household, and represented the lineage in the council of patriarchs and elders who made consensually based decisions for the village. Once a family succeeded in producing leaders or headmen who served the community for both its religious and its secular needs, the family’s position in the community often became semihereditary. The headman directed village-wide celebrations, maintained security in both the human and the spirit worlds, and presided over the meetings of the council of elders. Even so, the headman’s role was not to become the village authority or to judge disagreements that arose, but to suggest various alternatives for resolving issues quickly. Thus although the family was organized in a strong hierarchy and family members were restricted to specific roles, relationships between family patriarchs were fairly equal, and patriarchs were expected to act independently including conducting their own external relations with the outside world.
The council of elders helped adjudicate all village problems including those of community members who acted against societal norms of behavior. Generally those who had acted deviantly were levied fines in silver, and they and their family were ostracized until they paid up. After all, “What is the use of putting a man into prison or executing him if he can be made to work and repair the damage he had done? Later on he may leave prison and start the same thing again.” However, this simple-seeming system was complicated by the influence of the spirit world. Families of those who went against societal norms tended to experience the wrath of the spirits through bad luck and sickness. Because both conducting ceremonies to appease the spirits and paying fines were very expensive, only a very rich man could get away with serious wrongdoing. When a family was unable to pay a family member’s fines or for some reason found a village uncongenial, the entire lineage would move away.

Those priests who had the wealth, prestige, skills, and compassion sometimes became high-level leaders over a large area. Such higher-level priests and headman also helped bring together the Lu Mien beyond their immediate village neighborhood. Higher-level ceremonies required large numbers of higher-level priests to officiate. The arrival of priests/leaders from hundreds of miles facilitated communication between distant groups and helped the Lu Mien maintain cultural continuity as they migrated farther and farther from their homeland.

Changing Life of the Lu Mien

The comprehensive system of the Mien universe and social system started to break down when the French, during their struggle to retain control of Laos (1945–54), and the American CIA, starting in 1958, began heavy recruitment among the mountain tribes in order to counteract the Chinese and Vietnamese communists across the border and the Pathet Lao in Laos. Over 40% of the young men became soldiers. Although they were conscripted, many were willing because they could earn incomparably more money for their families through the military than through farming. However, as young men started actively engaging in military pursuits, making decisions for themselves, learning how the outside world was organized, and taking leadership positions in this new social order, the old system began to seem partially confining and less meaningful than before. At the same time, Lu Mien villages in northern Laos became more and more disrupted, both because it was difficult to maintain cultural continuity with young men spending their time out on raids, rather than learning ceremonies, and because American saturation bombing of hill tribe territory made farming an impossible endeavor. Soon, the American military organized a temporary migration of the Lu Mien so that they could do large-scale
bombing around their villages. Over 70% of the Lu Mien in Laos were forced to leave, abandoning their livelihood and walking two to three months to settle in large camps where they survived on the limited supplies provided by the American army.

When the United States began to withdraw from Laos in 1975 due to the communist victory, the Lu Mien, both because their villages were destroyed and because they were long-term enemies of the Pathet Lao, began to make the dangerous run for the Thai border. Most family groups experienced the anguish of leaving sick relatives behind to die by themselves and watched others be murdered by the Pathet Lao. Most of the harrowing journey was made at night. Once in Thailand, some Lu Mien managed to find relatives, but most ended up in refugee camps. Crowded together as never before, families subsisted mainly on rations doled out by Thai authorities, living for years in a state of uncertainty about their future. At the same time as their loss of autonomy rankled, many families were also disturbed by the implications of the recent dead whose improper funeral rituals ensured their negative intervention in the lives of their families for years to come. Between 1978 and 1981 thousands of Mien started leaving the refugee camps for America. Many Mien, expecting to finally resume their life as farmers carefully packed up seeds and farming implements before they left.

The American military organized a temporary migration of the Lu Mien so that they could do large-scale bombing around their villages. Over 70% of the Lu Mien in Laos were forced to leave, abandoning their livelihood.

---


6. Dr. Michael Strickman, “The Tao among the Yao: Taoism and the Sinification of South China,” given as a communication to the American Oriental Society, Western Branch, Los Angeles, April 2, 1979, as quoted in Lemoine, Yao Ceremonial Paintings, p. 22.

7. Ibid., p. 64.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 63.

14. Kandre, 1971, as quoted in Habarad, Spirit and the Social Order, p. 34.

MacDonald, Transnational Aspects of Lu-Mien Refugee Identity, p. 52.
Ibid., p. 56.
21 MacDonald, Transnational Aspects of Lu-Mien Refugee Identity, p. 52.
22 Ibid., p. 61
23 Ibid., p. 53.
24 Habarad, Spirit and the Social Order, p. 47.
26 Ibid., pp. 48–49.
27 Lemoine, Yao Ceremonial Paintings, p. 33
31 Wildflowers Institute Informal Leaders Focus Group II, 1/22/00.
32 Lewis, Peoples of the Golden Triangle, p. 156.
33 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 46.
38 Lemoine, "Yao Religion and Society," pp. 10, 16.
39 Sarah Hoying Hsia, Lu Mien Southeast Asian Refugees: Choosing Health Practice Options from the East and West, M.S. thesis in Health and Medical Sciences, University of California, Berkeley, 1985, p. 18.
41 Ibid.
42 Wildflowers Institute Informal Leaders Focus Group II, 1/22/00.
43 MacDonald, Transnational Aspects of Lu-Mien Refugee Identity, pp. 48–49.
44 Lewis, Peoples of the Golden Triangle, p. 152.
47 Habarad, Spirit and the Social Order, p. 73.
48 MacDonald, Transnational Aspects of Lu-Mien Refugee Identity, p. 45.
49 Lemoine, "Yao Religion and Society," p. 15.
51 MacDonald, Transnational Aspects of Lu-Mien Refugee Identity, p. 44.
54 Lewis, Peoples of the Golden Triangle, p. 151.
57 Ibid., p. 25.
60 Lewis, Minority Cultures of Laos, p. 344.
61 Wildflowers Institute Informal Leaders Focus Group II, 1/22/00.
65 Lewis, Peoples of the Golden Triangle, p. 151.
66 Wildflowers Institute Informal Leaders Focus Group II, 1/22/00 and MacDonald, Transnational Aspects of Lu-Mien Refugee Identity, p. 58.
67 Ibid., p. 59.

MacDonald, Transnational Aspects of Iu-Mien Refugee Identity, pp. 48–49.


Habarad, Spirit and the Social Order, p. 78.

MacDonald, Transnational Aspects of Iu-Mien Refugee Identity, pp. 48–49.

Lewis, Peoples of the Golden Triangle, p. 150.


Habarad, Spirit and the Social Order, p. 77.


Habarad, Spirit and the Social Order, p. 79.

MacDonald, Transnational Aspects of Iu-Mien Refugee Identity, p. 48.

Habarad, Spirit and the Social Order, p. 83.

Ibid.

Lewis, Minority Cultures of Laos, pp. 362–363.

Habarad, Spirit and the Social Order, p. 91.

Ibid., pp. 92–93.


Lewis, Minority Cultures of Laos, pp. 363–366.

Ibid., pp. 367–368.

Ibid.

MacDonald, Transnational Aspects of Iu-Mien Refugee Identity, p. 183.

Lewis, Minority Cultures of Laos, pp. 375–377.

Ibid., p. 376.
General Asian

History and Society

This Web site has easily accessible handbooks of 100 different countries. Studies are written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists and cover internal politics, religion, society, cultural attitudes, recent history, and relationships with the United States.

General Asian American

Economics

Light compares the Chinese, Japanese, and African American communities’ organization in order to examine and explain their economic development and variable rates of success. The book explores the development of micro-lending and social support systems based on individual perceptions of collective identity and trust.

Education

This is one of the few books that tries to understand the interaction between Asian immigrant children and the American school system. It touches on cultural, social, and social-justice issues. The case studies provided are particularly helpful.

Fiction


Health

This book presents health statistics for California’s Asian American communities.

Sexual abuse of children is addressed in two chapters, one discussing Asian, Pacific Island, and Filipino Americans, and the other specifically examining the Cambodians. Case studies and a cultural and historical context are provided.

**History/Social Justice**


Both books are excellent immigrant, refugee, and social-justice histories of all the different Asian communities. Takaki focuses more on early history and therefore less on the recent immigration of Southeast Asians. However, he has written extensively in this field, and has another book solely focusing on Southeast Asian immigrants, *From Exiles to Immigrants: The Refugees from Southeast Asia*. Chan, who is very concise, tends to include more social and cultural information and is particularly knowledgeable on the history of immigration to California.


This book explores both the development of Asian American identity and the history of Asian Americans’ fight for social justice. Zia describes mainstream American stereotypes and injustices toward Asians and intra-Asian American barriers that have led to disunity and less effective community-wide political action. Zia, a journalist and community activist, interweaves her personal story with some of the defining events in Asian American history, including the killing of Vincent Chin, Filipinos’ fight for better working conditions in the Alaskan salmon canneries, the boycott of Korean grocers in Brooklyn, the Los Angeles riots, and many others.

**Oral History**


This comprehensive set of short interviews is presented both chronologically and thematically. The author particularly tries to understand immigrants’ culturally based attitudes, and their relationship with and perceptions about America and being American.

**Statistics**

ACCIS (API Center for Census Information and Services), *Our Ten Years of Growth: A Demographic Analysis on APIA*, 1992.

This is a quick reference for the location and concentration of Asian and Pacific Island communities across America, by state, county, and city.
General Southeast Asian

Culture in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam

This is an excellent introduction to Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese perceptions about the individual, family, nature, religion, education, knowledge, and values. Note that the Laotian section describes the Lao culture but does not discuss Lao ethnic groups.

Folktales

Tales are written in Chinese, Hmong, Khmer, Laotian, and Vietnamese with English translations. The storytellers give the context in which they learned the tale and how the tale’s cultural values have shaped them. These stories about the storytellers help explain how this traditional form of moral education worked.

Health

This concise guide explains basic cultural attitudes and beliefs about physical and mental health, and about spirituality. In addition, through interviews with indigenous healers, it examines specific traditional spiritual and herbal treatment modalities in the Bay Area.

Cambodia

Culture in Cambodia

Ebihara was one of the only anthropologists to do fieldwork in a traditional Cambodian village prior to the Khmer Rouge. Most knowledge about Cambodian cultural patterns, family relationships, and community organization come from her groundbreaking study.

Health

This article describes the 1989 Cleveland Elementary School killing that left five children dead, four of them members of the Cambodian community in Stockton, California. The help offered by caseworkers and mental health professionals was primarily ineffective at aiding the Cambodian community. The article explores what cultural issues and misunderstandings impeded effective assistance.
**Oral History**

This excellent oral history intermingles interviews with short chapters giving political, historical, social, and cultural background information that highlight and deepen the people’s stories. The author/interviewer examines family relationships and the effects of spirituality and Buddhism on health and mental well-being. She also explores the effects of differing cultural assumptions on successful adjustment into American society.

**China**

**Chinese and American Comparative Culture**

Since 1965 Szalay has been developing an exciting empirical survey sampling technique that effectively examines different cultural perceptions and beliefs. His books range from Central America to the Middle East to Asia. In this book he compares cultural assumptions about the family, education, economics, religion, and national images of the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, and the United States. Each set of statistics has a summary chapter outlining basic trends and points of cultural difference.

**Culture and Identity in America**

This book describes New York City’s Chinatown and the lives of the people who live in it. The author uses extensive interviewing both of Chinatown residents and of educators and social workers to understand the social, economic, familial, and cultural pressures that have molded people’s lives in their present course.

**Fiction**

Jen is a third-generation Chinese American whose books focus mainly on the cultural and identity calculus of being a hyphenated American. This book of short stories examines a broad range of characters whose partial assimilation into the mainstream means they must constantly try to maintain their position and understand themselves while being pressured by a widely divergent set of familial and mainstream expectations.
Folktales
This collection of traditional popular tales in Chinese and English gives good insight into Chinese values, belief systems, and the set of standards for appropriate conduct.

Health
This thesis, found in the U.C. Berkeley Library, gives a very clear explanation of Chinese concepts of physical and mental health care. The author is particularly good at showing how Chinese value and cultural systems influence and support mental health and well-being.

Youth
This self-published memoir/exposé documents the life of a San Francisco Chinatown resident who grew up intimately involved with gangs. The author is very good at placing his life in a rich environmental and familial context and explaining the mindset of a juvenile delinquent.

Japan
Culture and Identity in America
This book provides an excellent description of changing Japanese cultural patterns and perceptions of identity in America. The author compares changing family structures for the traditional, and first, second, and third generations. He also examines how personal values influence both interpersonal relationships and community development.

Laos
Culture and Identity in America
This anthropologist spent years working with, helping, and gaining the trust of the Lao refugee community soon after they had arrived in America. The book is composed of an extensive description of Laotian political history from the 1940s to the 1970s including American involvement in the “secret war” in Laos and the Thai refugee camps; interviews with a comprehensive group of refugees; and a summary of issues and problems faced by Southeast Asian refugees in America.
Lao Hmong

Health

Fadiman explores two vastly different cultural paradigms and how they clash in the arenas of health and child-rearing. This fascinating book is important for medical and mental health professionals because it succeeds in making one reassess automatic assumptions about client motivation and “noncompliant” behavior.

Lao Lu Mien

Culture and Identity in America

This comprehensive book examines Lu Mien ancient and refugee history, spirituality, familial, and social organization and leadership patterns equally well in Laos and in the United States. The author explores how innate cultural patterns have been reestablished and then altered to meet the needs of the new environment.

Culture and Identity in Laos

This is a wide-ranging but succinct book covering some of the larger minority peoples in Laos. The Mien section covers life in Laos, the refugee experience, and life in the United States, particularly in California. It includes an extended oral history of a refugee and is particularly fine at addressing linguistic issues. The Kammu section mainly focuses on livelihood, social organization, and spirituality in Laos. For additional information on the Kammu, see: Damrong Tayanin, *Being Kammu: My Village, My Life*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994.

Philippines

Culture, Identity, and Family in the Philippines

Although somewhat dated, this is an excellent analysis of Filipino society and family. The authors look at family relationships from a psychological perspective, and then examine how kinship networks and cultural values help determine both individual support systems and wider societal organization.
Health
This report explains the traditional Filipino healing system and examines different causative categories of illness and how they should be addressed. It includes a number of case studies based on traditional Filipino healing methodology.

Oral History
This excellent collection starts with a good historical introduction to the Philippines and its American immigrants. The rest of the book is composed of chronologically arranged oral histories that examine issues of changing identity and assimilation.

Vietnam
Culture and Identity in America
Kibria provides a comprehensive book on life in Vietnam and in America. The main thrust of the book is to explore the refugee’s cultural adaptations to the United States particularly regarding economics, the role of women in the family, and intergenerational conflict.

Fiction
This is an exciting compilation of poetry, short stories, autobiography, and art produced by Vietnamese Americans. The book examines their interactions with American society as well as portrays the memories and cultural values they carry within them.
STUDIES 2000 BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Asian American
Health

Economics


Education

Elderly

Ethnic Justice


Fiction


Folktales


Health


History

Oral History

Poetry

Statistics
ACCIS (API Center for Census Information and Services), Our Ten Years of Growth: A Demographic Analysis on APIA. San Francisco, 1992.

General Southeast Asian

Bibliography

Culture in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam
**Folktales**

**Health**

**History**

**Oral History**

**Refugee Experience**

**Statistics**

**Cambodia**

**Culture and Identity in America**
Hopkins, Mary Carol, *Braving a New World: Cambodian Refugees in an American City*. Westport, Conn.: Bergin and Garvey, 1996.


Culture in Cambodia


Health


History
Shawcross, William, The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust, and Modern Conscience.

Oral History
Welaratna, Usha, Beyond the Killing Fields: Voices of Nine Cambodian Survivors in America.

Refugee Experience


China
Biography


Chinese American Youth


**Chinese and American Comparative Culture**

Hsu, Francis L. K., Americans and Chinese: Reflections on Two Cultures and Their People. Garden City, N.Y.: Published for the American Museum of Natural History by Doubleday Natural History Press, 1972.


**Culture and Identity in America**

Chen, Wen-Hui Chung, A Study of Chinese Family Life in Los Angeles as Compared with Traditional Family Life in China, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Southern California, 1940.


**Economics**


**Family and Children in China**


**Fiction**


**Folktales**


**Health**


History


Japan

Culture and Identity in America


**Korea**

**Economics**


**Fiction**


**Statistics**


**Laos**

**Culture and Identity in America**


**Culture in Laos**


Photographs


Politics
Halpern, Joel M., Government, Politics, and Social Structure in Laos, Monograph Series No. 4, Southeast Asia Studies. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1964.

Religion

Lao Hmong

Health

Immigrant Experience

Lao Iu Mien

Culture and Identity in America


**Culture and Identity in Laos**


**Folktales**


**Health**


Religion


Lao and Thai Khmu
Culture and Identity in America

Culture and Identity in Southeast Asia


Folktales


Philippines

Culture and Identity in America

Culture, Identity, and Family in the Philippines


Folktales
Romana-Cruz, Neni Sta., *Why the Pina Has a 100 Eyes and Other Classic Philippine Folk Tales About Fruits*. Manila: Tahanan Books for Young Readers, 1993.
Health
Tan, Michael L., Usug, Kulam, Pasma: Traditional Concepts of Health and Illness in the Philippines,
Traditional Medicine in the Philippines, Research Report No. 3. Quezon City, Philippines: 

History


Jacinto, Jaime Antonio, and Syquia, Luis Malay, Lakbay: Journey of the People of the Philippines.

Takaki, Ronald T., In the Heart of Filipino America: Immigrants from the Pacific Isles, The Asian 

Oral History
Bulosan, Carlos, America Is in the Heart: A Personal History. Seattle: University of Washington 


Poetry
Carbo, Nick, ed., Returning a Borrowed Tongue: Poems by Filipino and Filipino American Writers.

Politics
Arce, Wilfredo Florendo, Leadership in a Muslim-Christian Community in the Philippines,

McCoy, Alfred W., ed., An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines,


Timberman, David G., A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics. Armonk,
Vietnam

**Culture and Identity in America**


**Fiction**


**Folktales**


**Health**


**Oral History**

Daly City (Filipino Community)

Ms. Luisa Antonio  
Executive Director  
San Francisco Veterans Equity Center (VEC)  
1099 Mission Street  
San Francisco, CA 94103  
415.255.2347  
lm_antonio@hotmail.com

Ms. Alice P. Bulos  
President  
California Health Initiatives, Inc.  
2444 Liberty Court  
South San Francisco, CA 94080  
650.872.2301

Mr. MC Canlas  
Executive Director  
Pilipino Bayanihan Resource Center  
2780 Junipero Serra Boulevard  
Daly City, CA 94015  
650.992.9110  
pibrc@aol.com

Ms. Tessie Guillermo  
Executive Director  
Asian and Pacific Islander American Health Forum  
942 Market Street, Suite 200  
San Francisco, CA 94102  
415.954.9955  
tguillermo@apiahf.org

Ms. Bernadette Sy  
Member  
United Pilipino Organizing Network (UPON)  
Executive Director  
Filipino American Development Foundation  
50 San Buenaventura Way  
San Francisco, CA 94127  
415.661.8213  
smpch@worldnet.att.net

Oakland (Southeast Asian Community)

Ms. Kathy Ko  
Consultant  
951 Rose Street  
Oakland, CA 94611  
510.658.1697  
klkconsult@aol.com

Mr. Kouichoy Saechao  
Chairman, Board of Directors  
Lao Lu Mien Cultural Association  
485 - 105th Avenue  
Oakland, CA 94603  
510.635.8356  
ksaechao2@aol.com

Ms. Moung Saetern  
Acting Executive Director  
Lao Lu Mien Cultural Association  
485 - 105th Avenue  
Oakland, CA 94603  
510.635.8356  
moung@ebayc.org

San Francisco (Chinese Community)

Ms. Anni Chung  
Executive Director  
Self-Help for the Elderly  
407 Sansome Street, Suite 300  
San Francisco, CA 94111-3112  
415.982.9171 (work)  
415.823.0331 (cellular)  
anni@pacbell.net

Evelyn Lee, Ed.D.  
President, NICOS Chinese Health Coalition  
Executive Director, RAMS  
3626 Balboa Street  
San Francisco, CA 94121  
415.668.5960 Extension 30  
lee_rams@pacbell.net
Ms. Faye W. Lee
Education Committee Chair
Chinese American Citizens Alliance
1044 Stockton Street
San Francisco, CA 94108
415.661.7352 (home)
fayewoolee@yahoo.com

Rolland C. Lowe, M.D.
Trustee
Council on Foundations
929 Clay Street, #401
San Francisco, CA 94108
415.982.4100
rclowemd@aol.com

Mr. Kent Woo
Executive Director
NICOS Chinese Health Coalition
1490 Mason Street, 3d Floor
San Francisco, CA 94133
415.788.6426 (work)
415.788.0966 (fax)
kentwoo@aol.com

Stockton (Southeast Asian Community)

Mr. Bunna Hang
Board Member
Asian Pacific Self-Development and Residential Association
3820 N. Alvarado Avenue
Suite C
Stockton, CA 95204
209.944.1147
bunna_hang@hotmail.com

Mr. Robert B. Khoonsrivong
Executive Director
Refugee Resource Center
1044 N. El Dorado Street
Stockton, CA 95202-2109
209.547.7801 (work)
209.474.6202 (home)
lkacenter@aol.com

Ms. Sovanna Koeurt
Executive Director
Asian Pacific Self-Development and Residential Association
3830 N. Alvarado Avenue
Suite C
Stockton, CA 95204
209.944.1700
samchith@hotmail.com

Mr. Hak Nheth
President
Asian Pacific Self-Development and Residential Association
3830 N. Alvarado Avenue
Suite C
Stockton, CA 95204
209.944.1700

Affinity Groups and Local Foundations

Ms. Joy Ou
Principal
Group I
354 Pine Street, 7th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94104
415.394.7027
joy@groupi.com

Ms. Moira Shek
Executive Director
Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy
225 Bush Street, Suite 580
San Francisco, CA 94104
415.273.2760
moira@aapip.org

Ms. Carolyn Tower
President
Northern California Grantmakers
116 New Montgomery Street, Suite 742
San Francisco, CA 94105
415.777.5761
ctower@ncg.org
ADVISORY BOARD MEMBERS

Mr. Kao Chiem Chao  
Board of Directors  
Lao Lu Mien Culture Association  
485 - 105th Avenue  
Oakland, CA 94603  
510.635.8356

Mr. Maurice Lim Miller  
Executive Director  
Asian Neighborhood Design  
1182 Market Street, Suite 300  
San Francisco, CA 94102  
415.593.0423  
maulimmill@aol.com

Mr. Nim Ros  
Social Service Coordinator  
Asian Pacific Self-Development and Residential Association  
3830 N. Alvarado Avenue, Suite C  
Stockton, CA 95204  
209.944.1700

Arthur Chen, M.D.  
Health Officer  
Public Health Department  
1000 Broadway, Suite 500  
Oakland, CA 94607  
510.628.7610  
achen@ph.mail.co.alameda.ca.us

Toni Shapiro-Phim, Ph.D.  
Coordinator Center for Southeast Asian Studies  
2223 Fulton Street, Room 617  
Berkeley, CA 94720-2318  
510.642.3609  
cseas@uclink.berkeley.edu

Eric Crystal, Ph.D.  
Coordinator  
Center for Southeast Asian Studies  
U.C. Berkeley  
2223 Fulton Street, Room 617  
Berkeley, CA 94720-2318  
510.643.7062  
crystal@uslink4.berkeley.edu

Steven C. Phillips, Esq.  
Commissioner  
Board of Education  
San Francisco Unified School District  
135 Van Ness, Room 120  
San Francisco, CA 94103  
415.243.3285  
steve@stevephillips.com

Mr. Sophat Sorn  
Social Service Coordinator  
Asian Pacific Self-Development and Residential Association  
3830 N. Alvarado Avenue, Suite C  
Stockton, CA 95204  
209.944.1700  
ssorn82594@aol.com

Mr. Kevin Fong  
Consultant  
321 High School Road, NE, #182  
Bainbridge Island, WA 98110  
206.780.0472  
kevinfong@seanet.com

Frank Proschan, Ph.D.  
Research Associate  
Folklore Institute  
Indiana University  
504 N. Fess Avenue  
Bloomington, IN 47408  
812.855.9073  
proschanc@indiana.edu

Mr. Kamtom Soyvira  
Social Worker  
Lao-Khmou Association  
1044 N. El Dorado Street  
Stockton, CA 95202-2109  
209.547.7801 (work)  
209.463.7148 (fax)  
kamtom@usa.net

Mr. Phillip Khoonsrivong  
President  
Khmu Christian International Mission  
6142 Lorraine Avenue  
Stockton, CA 95210  
209.474.9081

Mr. Lamgveun Rajaphone  
Case Manager  
Refugee Resource Center  
1044 N. El Dorado Street  
Stockton, CA 95202-2109  
209.547.7801  
lkacenter@aol.com

Mr. Fouvang Tang  
Board of Directors  
Lao Lu Mien Culture Association  
485 - 105th Avenue  
Oakland, CA 94603  
510.635.8356
Ms. Kun Tuy
Vista Volunteer
Asian Pacific Self-Development
and Residential Association
3830 N. Alvarado Avenue, Suite C
Stockton, CA 95204
209.944.1147

Khatharya Um, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Ethnic Studies
506 Barrows Hall
U.C. Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720-2570
510.642.2199
umk@uclink4.berkeley.edu
FUNDERS COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Mr. Hugh C. Burroughs  
Director, Special Projects and External Affairs  
The David and Lucile Packard Foundation  
300 Second Street, Suite 200  
Los Altos, CA 94022  
650.948.7658  
h.burroughs@packfound.org

Ms. Ruth Holton  
Senior Program Officer  
The California Wellness Foundation  
One Kearny Street, 9th Floor  
San Francisco, CA 94108  
415.217.3700 Extension 1902  
rholton@cwf.org

Mr. Alan Jenkins  
Program Officer  
Human Rights and International Cooperation Peace and Social Justice Program  
The Ford Foundation  
320 East 43rd Street  
New York, NY 10017  
212.573.5000  
a.jenkins@fordfound.org

Stewart Kwoh, Esq.  
President and CEO  
Asian Pacific American Legal Center  
1145 Wilshire Boulevard, 2d Floor  
Los Angeles, CA 90017  
Trustee, The California Endowment  
213.977.7500 Extension 226

Mr. Thomas C. Layton  
President  
Wallace Alexander Gerbode Foundation  
470 Columbus Avenue, Room 209  
San Francisco, CA 94133  
415.391.0911  
tlayton@gerbode.org

Hanmin Liu, D.D.S., Ph.D.  
President and CEO  
Wildflowers Institute  
354 Pine Street, 7th Floor  
San Francisco, CA 94104  
415.399.1199  
wizard@wildflowers.org

Mr. Craig McGarvey  
Program Director in Civic Culture  
The James Irvine Foundation  
One Market Plaza, Suite 2500  
San Francisco, CA 94105  
415.777.2244  
cmcgarvey@irvine.org

William C. Richardson, Ph.D.  
(Convener)  
President and CEO  
W. K. Kellogg Foundation  
One Michigan Avenue East  
Battle Creek, MI 49017  
616.969.2153  
wcr@wkkf.org

Mr. Miguel A. Satut  
Program Director  
W. K. Kellogg Foundation  
One Michigan Avenue East  
Battle Creek, MI 49017  
616.969.2085  
mas@wkkf.org

Ms. Winnie Chu  
Vice President, Planning and Program  
Community Foundation Silicon Valley  
60 South Market Street  
Suite 1000  
San Jose, CA 95113-2336  
408.278.0270 Extension 2230  
wch@cfsv.org

Sandra R. Hernández, M.D.  
President and CEO  
The San Francisco Foundation  
225 Bush Street, 5th Floor  
San Francisco, CA 94104  
415.733.8500  
srh@sff.org

Ms. Sherry Hirota  
Executive Director  
Asian Health Services  
818 Webster Street  
Oakland, CA 94607-4220  
Trustee, The California Endowment  
510.986.6837  
shirota@aol.com
WILDFLOWERS INSTITUTE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

President
Hanmin Liu, D.D.S., Ph.D.
President and CEO
Wildflowers Institute
354 Pine Street, 7th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94104
415.399.1199
wizard@wildflowers.org

Directors
Gary Arsham, M.D., Ph.D.
Vice President
Arsham Consultants, Inc.
P.O. Box 15608
San Francisco, CA 94115
415.346.4740
garsham@post.harvard.edu

Ms. Charlotte Calhoun
3201 Clay Street
San Francisco, CA 94115-1607
415.921.6781
nainai@pacbell.net

Chair
Ross E. Stromberg, Esq.
Partner
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue
555 West Fifth Street, Suite 4600
Los Angeles, CA 90013-1025
213.243.2463
restromberg@jonesday.com

Mr. Charles S. LaFollette
2620 Larkin Street
San Francisco, CA 94109
415.771.6471

Vice-Chair
Mervyn Silverman, M.D., M.P.H.
119 Frederick Street
San Francisco, CA 94117
415.864.1096
drmerv@aol.com

Mr. John Salbego
Director of Tax Compliance
Johns Hopkins Health Services
5300 Alpha Commons, Suite 332
Baltimore, MD 21124
410.550.7250
jsalbego@gt.com

Secretary and Treasurer
Ms. Joy Ou
Treasurer
354 Pine Street, 7th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94104
415.394.7027
joy@groupi.com

Bruce E. Spivey, M.D.
Spivey International
One Beekman Place
New York, NY 10022
212.326.8804
bruce@spivey.org
Jack Colbert is assistant to Dr. Hanmin Liu. Jack has spent much of his adult life working with the Peace Corps, beginning with volunteer service on the island of Borneo in the 1960s. He has trained Peace Corps volunteers throughout the Asia/Pacific region and, most recently, in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East. In addition to travel, Jack enjoys gardening in his backyard and sailing on San Francisco Bay.

Hanmin Liu is the founder, president, and chief executive officer of Wildflowers Institute and the United States–China Educational Institute. During the course of his work, he has focused a good deal of his attention on uncovering cultural patterns and premises underlying the social formation of communities in the United States and in China. Under his leadership, the institutes have organized study seminars for three Chinese ministers of health and their entourage, and presidents and chief executive officers of major foundations. He is a trustee of the W. K. Kellogg Foundation and the Independent Sector and a board member of the Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy. He was invited recently to be a Wallace Alexander Gerbode Fellow.

He graduated from the University of Pacific in Stockton, California, and then went on to New York University School of Dentistry where he graduated with honors. He completed his internship at the Wadsworth General Hospital, Veterans Administration Hospital in West Los Angeles. Hanmin received his doctorate of philosophy degree from the Union Graduate School in Cincinnati, Ohio.

Weisheng Liu is the technologist at Wildflowers Institute. He is focusing on creating a video documentary series on the cultures of Cambodian, Chinese, Filipino, Laotian, Lao Lu Mien, and Lao Khmu communities. Thirteen years old, he is now in home schooling and attends many outside classes including his recently completed Astronomy 10 course at the University of California at Berkeley. He is currently studying Shakespeare, algebra and geometry, Mandarin, and cross-cultural history. In 1998 Weisheng and his team won first place in the International Competition of the Future Problem Solving program, which was held at the University of Michigan. He was also awarded the Nueva 3 R’s award in 1997/98 for best demonstrating rights, respect, and responsibility. He has traveled to Asia on three occasions and has also traveled to Europe.

Jennifer Mei is an administrator for Wildflowers Institute. She manages national and international projects successfully and is responsible for the finances of the institute. She is particularly interested in organizing activities that enable people to learn about their cultural assumptions as it affects their community and their relationships with one another. Before her work at the institute, she established a community primary health care facility, Min An Health
Center, located on the borders of San Francisco Chinatown. Min An offered both Chinese and Western medicines and served some 4,000 patients for more than ten years. Min An emphasized the importance of learning about prevention of illness, balanced nutrition, and environmental health.

Jennifer graduated from New York University with a bachelor’s degree in fine arts and received a master’s degree in education at San Francisco State University. She worked as counselor in a women’s health center and later in a children’s development center in San Francisco Chinatown.

Michael Reichert is a Senior Fellow and vice president of the Wildflowers Institute. He has served as president of Catholic Community Services of Western Washington and the Catholic Housing Corporation since 1979. Catholic Community Services is the largest private social service, housing, and advocacy agency in the Northwest. Headquartered in Seattle, it serves all of the State of Washington. It has a $60 million annual budget and a staff of more than 3,000 serving nearly 80,000 individuals in twenty-three counties. Michael is a member of the Franks Landing Indian Community and administrator of the Wa He Lut Indian School located at Franks Landing, Nisqually, Washington. He is also special financial adviser to the Puyallup Tribe of Indians in Tacoma, Washington. He served as chief financial officer for the tribe during a period that saw rapid expansion of the tribe’s business and economic development activities, including the construction of a tribally owned and financed class III gaming facility.

Michael studied communications, economics, and Native American studies at the University of Washington and Central Washington State University from which he graduated with honors. Michael is married with five adult children and one grandson.

Francis Wong is a Senior Fellow and has been an award-winning composer and saxophonist for the past twenty years. He is a prolific recording artist (featured on more than thirty titles), a groundbreaking music and web producer, and a pioneer in the forming of perspectives on the nature of Asian American cultural identity. His most recent accomplishments as an artist are winning a prestigious Meet the Composer New Residency grant for three years to work in Oakland Chinatown and participating in the Grammy-nominated compact disc recording by Anthony Brown’s Asian American Orchestra. Phil Elwood of the San Francisco Examiner has proclaimed Mr. Wong among the great saxophonists of his generation.

Francis is the executive director of the nonprofit social justice organization Justice Matters Institute and the producer/editor for asianimprov.com, a Web site covering trends and achievements of Asian Americans in Music. Since 1996, he has been a part-time lecturer in American studies at the University of California at Santa Cruz.
Pamela Burdman is an independent journalist based in San Francisco. She was a staff writer at the San Francisco Chronicle for seven years, covering immigration, education, racial issues, and Asian affairs. Her articles have also appeared in the Far Eastern Economic Review, Lingua Franca, Crosstalk, and the Oakland Tribune. Her translation of Peng Xiaolian’s Random Thoughts was selected Best Screenplay at the Locarno Film Festival. A native of Youngstown, Ohio, Pamela earned her bachelor’s degree in philosophy and East Asian studies at Princeton University and master’s degrees in business administration and in Asian studies at the University of California at Berkeley, where she taught second-year Mandarin Chinese. She also attended universities in Taipei and Shanghai.

MC Canlas is a service provider in two large Filipino communities in the Bay Area as the executive director of the Pilipino Bayanihan Resource Center in Daly City and the Healthy Start Collaborative coordinator in South of Market in San Francisco. Before he moved to the United States, he taught history and social science at the University of the Philippines, did socioeconomics research and education with the IBON Foundation, Institute for Popular Democracy, and took part in grassroots leadership formation with the Philippine-Danish Folk School. He worked as a community organizer for Filipinos in Daly City and cofounded the service agency—Pilipino Bayanihan Resource Center. He currently writes a column for a Filipino weekly newspaper, Manila Bulletin-USA, and for a Filipino entertainment guide, Pinoy Pa rin Kami. He is very much involved in developing community and cultural centers in South of Market and Daly City. In 1999, he was one of the recipients of the Civic Unity Award of Koshland Foundation of the San Francisco Foundation. MC’s family maintains two homes—one in South of Market and the other in Bulacan in the Philippines. He has dedicated his life to pursuing social transformation for the betterment of his family, his people, and their community.

Kevin Fong is a consultant for Wildflowers Institute and other organizations, and a facilitator and trainer specializing in organizational systems, design, and philosophy. Through his combined experience as a corporate buyer, a health care administrator, a writer, and an organizational consultant, Kevin has created Working in the Hyphen™, a training series that utilizes Eastern traditions and philosophies, along with conventional organizational and leadership theories to design functional and harmonious organizational systems. He is also a practitioner and teacher of Feng Shui, the Chinese art and tradition of placement. A Kellogg Fellow and graduate of the University of California at Berkeley, Kevin lives in San Francisco and Bainbridge Island, Washington.

Miriam Gross is a cultural researcher for Wildflowers Institute. She graduated from Reed College in 1991 with a degree in history. She worked at the federally funded HIV Education and Research Center at the State University of New York at Brooklyn from 1991 to 1998,
starting as a research assistant, then advancing first to a grant administrator and finally to a grant project manager. As project manager she developed a training plan for fifty sites and organized over 120 education programs that trained more than 5,500 health professionals a year. At the same time she took evening classes in international relations and Chinese. In 1998 she took third-year Chinese in Beijing through Columbia University. In July 1999 she joined Wildflowers as a consultant and deferred graduate school for one year to continue working as a researcher for the institute. She will start a master’s in international relations at Columbia University in September 2000. Her focus is on conflict resolution with China.

**Bill Ong Hing** is on the law faculty at the University of California at Davis and a member of the Board of Directors of Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy. His books include *Making and Remaking Asian Pacific America Through Immigration Policy; To Be an American—Cultural Pluralism and the Rhetoric of Assimilation; Immigration and the Law—A Dictionary;* and *Handling Immigration Cases.* Professor Hing is a trustee of the Rosenberg Foundation.

**Alex Laurant** is a graphic designer, illustrator, and film art director, currently working both independently and for George Lucas’s Industrial Light and Magic (ILM). Before and after graduating from California College of Arts and Crafts in 1986, Alex spent eight years producing illustration and graphic design for a wide variety of clients, both in-house and as a freelancer, with a focus on editorial illustration. In 1989 and 1990 he worked as a theatrical storyboard artist and conceptual designer at George Coates Performance Works in San Francisco. That multimedia stage experience then led him to the computer and six years in the interactive/multimedia arena designing and supervising a wide range of two-dimensional and three-dimensional digital graphics and animation for many educational and edutainment products. Alex was art director for Albathion Software in Sausalito, whose clients included Broderbund Software, Apple Computer, Mattel Media, Johnson & Johnson, and The Exploratorium. Just before joining ILM, Alex was an art director at Rocket Science Games in San Francisco, working on the graphic adventure *OBSIDIAN.* As a visual effects art director at ILM, he has worked on a variety of features and commercials including the *Star Wars Special Editions, Saving Private Ryan, The Mummy,* and *Mission to Mars.*

**Linda S. Lloyd** is the vice president of programs for the Alliance Healthcare Foundation in San Diego, where she manages all aspects of the foundation’s grant-making process. Linda consults for a variety of agencies on public health programs in less developed countries. Her clients have included the Pan American Health Organization, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ministry of Health in Mexico, the Environmental Health Project, and Wildflowers Institute.

Linda’s expertise includes the design and evaluation of community-based health programs. She has ten years’ experience integrating medical anthropology and epidemiology in the design of community-based vector control programs. She also has considerable experience in message development, behavioral trials, and the training of local staff in applied research and evaluation techniques.
She earned her master’s degree and doctorate of public health at Johns Hopkins University, School of Hygiene and Public Health.

**Naomi Lucks** is a writer and editor whose work includes virtually every aspect of traditional publishing and Web publishing, from magazines, books, and advertising to Internet articles and online learning. She is a freelance development editor and book doctor, co-founder of YouCanWrite.com, a Web site for aspiring nonfiction authors, and co-author of *A Woman’s Midlife Companion: The Essential Resource for Every Woman’s Journey* (Prima, 1997).

**Ying Ying Meng** has published articles on health care quality and outcome in many academic journals. She was previously the director of programs at the Association of Asian Pacific Community Health Organizations and the principal investigator for projects assessing utilization patterns for primary care and sociocultural barriers to health care of Asians and Pacific Islanders. She was born in China and was involved in international health while she was in China. She was a Kellogg Foundation International fellow and World Health Organization fellow in primary health. She earned her doctor’s degree from the School of Public Health, University of California at Berkeley. Ying Ying was former vice president of Wildflowers Institute and program director of Studies 2000. Before she joined Wildflowers Institute, she was a senior health service researcher at the Quality Initiatives Division of Foundation Health Systems.

**Alyce Bezman Tarcher**’s life has been devoted to medicine. After her graduation from the University of Nebraska College of Medicine, she trained in the specialty of internal medicine at Cincinnati General Hospital, Boston City Hospital, and the University of California in San Francisco (UCSF). She became a Research Fellow in the Cardiovascular Research Institute at UCSF. After completing her fellowship, she went to Oxford University as a visiting research scientist in the Department of Biochemistry.

Alyce then returned to UCSF to head her own laboratory and carry on her research. She also had teaching responsibilities and began her private practice of internal medicine. Clinical practice and teaching became her focus of attention. After becoming concerned about the health effects of human exposure to toxic agents in the environment, she developed a course on the subject at UCSF Medical Center. She designed, edited, and wrote a large part of a book entitled *Principles and Practice of Environmental Medicine*, the first comprehensive text in the field.

Alyce continues to practice internal medicine, teach medical students, and focus on the healing qualities found in alternative and complimentary medicine. Alyce has been a volunteer physician in Trujillo, Peru, for Project Hope, and was awarded the Career Development Award from the National Institutes of Health.
Paul Tsang is a designer and is currently operating a multidisciplinary studio in San Francisco. Paul graduated from the Academy of Art College, San Francisco.

David Sweet has been a freelance copyeditor and proofreader since 1983. He has been working with Wildflowers Institute for several years.

James Tyler is a photographer who creates Bright Moments in his work. He has documented relationships using photographic methods for more than thirty years. His most recent works are published by the Center for Ecoliteracy and feature photographic essays. Publications include Getting Started: Creating Gardens as Outdoor Classrooms; Ecoliteracy: Mapping the Terrain, which documents the restoration of a watershed by students their teachers and families; Edible Schoolyard, a case study of the model school program founded by chef and visionary Alice Waters; and a grants report. Tyler provides videography, photography, and logistical services to Wildflowers, capturing visually the relationships that are at the essence of cultural patterns.

Richard Woo is the executive director of The Russell Family Foundation (TRFF). The foundation is committed to values-based education, sustainable environment, and community development. TRFF is based in Tacoma, Washington, with offices in Seattle. Before joining TRFF, Richard consulted with corporations and foundations on issues of social responsibility, strategic philanthropy, and public affairs. Earlier in his career, Richard spent eleven years managing public affairs programs at Levi Strauss & Co., including serving as executive director of the Levi Strauss Foundation. He has extensive international experience, having directed Levi Strauss Foundation grantmaking in twelve Pacific Rim countries. He has served on nonprofit boards for Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy, Northern California Grantmakers, and the Red Tab Foundation. The first fourteen years of Richard’s work life were dedicated to the public and nonprofit sectors.

Richard has a strong commitment to leadership development. He has traveled extensively in China with the U.S.-China Educational Institute (USCEI), both as a 1998 USCEI Fellow and a 1999 cultural mentor to a delegation of Kellogg National Leadership Fellows.

Dianne Yamashiro-Omi has served as the executive director for numerous nonprofits in the Asian community, including Asian Manpower Services and Asian Foundation for Community Development. She has acted as co-director of Asian Health Services and as administrative assistant for Kimochi. She has served as a board member for the Asian Law Caucus, East Bay Asian Local Development Corporation, United Japanese Community Services, and Association of Children’s Services. She has served on the boards of the California Childcare Resource and Referral Network and Youth Alive. She has actively fundraised for the Asian Women’s Shelter and Asian Immigrant Women Advocates.
Dianne is a recipient of the Pacific Asian American Women Bay Area Coalition, Women Warrior Award, and the Japanese Community Youth Council (JCYC) Leadership Award and was selected as an Outstanding Young Woman of America in 1982. She is a graduate of the University of California at Berkeley and has completed a teacher’s credential program at the University of San Francisco. Dianne has also completed the Coro Foundation Public Affairs Leadership Development Program.

Her tenure in the field of philanthropy began as an intern at the San Francisco Foundation in 1985. In 1986 she worked for the Koret Foundation in San Francisco as a program officer for youth and education. In 1993 she served as a consultant to the Levi Strauss Foundation. From 1994 to 1997, Dianne worked as the program officer for children, youth, and families for the Gap Foundation. She served as a consultant with the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund and the Asian Pacific Fund. Currently, Dianne is a consultant to the Evelyn and Walter Haas Jr. Fund and Levi Strauss Foundation. She has served on the board of directors for the Northern California Grantmakers and Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy (AAPIP).